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Martin Lenk, Virtue, Liberty, and Justice: 'Original principles' in 
Algernon Sidney's political thought. Exploration of context and 
intellectual foundations of the Discourses Concerning Government 
This thesis explores significant aspects of Algernon Sidney's political 
thought that have hitherto been neglected. By closely analysing Sidney's 
contribution to seventeenth-century discourse this study reveals new sources 
inherent in his thought, and thus offers the basis for a much wider appreciation 
and understanding of Sidney's political heritage. 
An emphasis is put on Sidney's Discourses, written between 1681-1683. 
Although originally conceived as a polemic against Sir Robert Filmer the 
Discourses contain a political theory that can be considered independently 
from the immediate intention of the work. As becomes clear in his earlier 
writings, particularly the Court Maxims, Sidney developed a set of political 
ideas long before the Filmer controversy. 
His ideas, however, can be grasped fully only i f seen in the context of 
Ancient Greek philosophy, as this dissertation argues. Sidney's thought is 
built on three key concepts: virtue, liberty and justice. In his Discourses 
Sidney's manifold references to these concepts convey to the reader that these 
concepts ought to constitute the foundation of political order. While there are 
several recognised conscious concepts, i.e. direct references to Ancient Greek 
philosophy, the numerous implicit concepts in Sidney's text have remained 
undiscovered. By revealing these indirect, somewhat hidden references to 
Ancient Greek philosophy this study demonstrates its significant impact on 
Sidney's thought. It becomes clear that Aristotle, especially as seen in 
Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, as well as Plato constitutes a main source of 
influence on Sidney. 
While taking into account other analyses of Sidney's work this 
hermeneutical approach towards Discourses and its ancient philosophical 
sources offers the framework for a much wider understanding of Sidney's 
thought than has hitherto been suggested. It points beyond the limitations of 
Roman Republican ideas that have so far been regarded as guidelines for the 
study of his work. 
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Foreword 
"Ungrateful country, if thou e'er forget 
The sons who for thy civil rights have bled! 
How, like a Roman, Sidney bowed his head, 
And Russel's milder blood the scaffold wet; 
But these had fallen for profitless regret." 
William Wordsworth1 
These verses were written by William Wordsworth (1770-1850) about a 
hundred years after the death of Algernon Sidney (1622-1683): he has fallen 
and is no more. Nevertheless a great deal is conveyed about the way in which 
Sidney actually was remembered during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Up until the late eighteenth century, when he was still well known, 
he was mainly seen as a martyr for the civil rights of England and America. 
Yet, before dying as a 'martyr', he had led a public life, in which he served as 
officer, politician, and ambassador, as well as being a contemplative at his 
family home, Penshurst Place, and during the Restoration, as an exile, to 
several places on the Continent. There, he devoted himself to reading the great 
texts of Classical and Early Modern philosophy and, throughout his life, he 
managed to "employ some time of leisure"2 in composing political literature: 
1 'Obligations of civil to religious Liberty', Ecclastical Sonnets X. In Series, 1821-22. Part 
III; in: William Wordsworth, The Complete Poetical Works of William Wordsworth; with 
an Introduction by John Morley, ed. John Morley (London: Macmillan, 1888). 
2 Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government, ed. John Toland (London: Printed 
and are to be sold by the booksellers of London and Westminster, 1698). For the sake of 
easy accessibility, all my references are from the latest edition: Algernon Sidney, 
Discourses Concerning Government, ed. Thomas G. West, Rev. ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1996), quoted as Discourses; 1.1, 5. (The format for all quotations is: chapter, 
section, page). 
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the Court Maxims*, the Just and modest vindication of the proceedings of the 
two last parliaments*, and the once famous Discourses Concerning 
Government, which has stirred up some minds in all times, and cost him his 
head on the scaffold on 7 t h December 1683, sixty years after his birth. Unlike 
today, his writings were well known in the eighteenth century. For some time, 
he was even better known than John Locke.5 There were two main reasons for 
the great interest in his writings. First, Sidney's name was much glorified by 
Parliamentarians as well as by favourers of America's Independence, and so 
Sidney became something of a celebrity, and was hailed as a hero of liberty 
and justified resistance. Secondly, Sidney's main work is more than just 
philosophical discussion. It moves between pure polemics and the discussion 
of the problems of European absolutism, and between philosophical and 
theological deliberations. Pamphleteers loved to quote the Discourses to 
justify revolutionary activity, while more learned politicians appreciated 
Sidney's ability to bridge the gulf between polemics and the political 
discussion against absolutism. They also appreciated his references to the 
great philosophical authors, from classical antiquity to the seventeenth 
century. 
Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu (1685-1755), Jean Jaques 
Rousseau (1712-1778) and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) are some of the 
names that came under Sidney's far reaching intellectual influence.6 
3 Algernon Sidney, Court Maxims, ed. H. W. Blom, E. O. G. Haitsma Mulier, and Ronald 
Janse, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). Only recently, a copy of this work, a dialogue in platonic style, 
was discovered by Blair Worden in Warwick Castle. 
4 William Jones et al., A Just and Modest Vindication of the Proceedings of the Two Last 
Parliaments: (London: s.n., 1681). 
5 Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, Cambridge 
Studies in Early Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
210. 
6 About Sidney's influence cf. Paulette Carrive, La Pensee Politique D' Algernon Sidney, 
1622-1683: La Querelle De L'absolutisme, Collection "Philosophic" (Paris: Meridiens 
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Reference made to Sidney in early American constitutional debates illustrates 
his influence,7 while references to him during the French Revolution indicate 
his role as a revolutionary hero. Of course, this popularity produced legends 
and anecdotes, which have hidden much of the true character of this 
seventeenth-century hero and his work. Like so many great figures, Sidney 
finally lost his country's admiration. Since then a long silence has fallen over 
the life and work of Algernon Sidney. However, two hundred years after his 
death, Blair Worden, Paulette Carrive, Jonathan Scott and John Carswell have 
cut through the mist which has surrounded Sidney's life, work, and deeds.8 
Sidney's intellectual context is considered to be early modern 
republicanism, a subject that since the 1970s has met with renewed curiosity 
on the part of historians and political philosophers, pivotally through John 
Pocock's Machiavellian Moment,9 which stimulated research on 
republicanism's humanist and particularly Machiavellian sources. 
Machiavelli's influence is also discernible in Sidney's main work, the 
Discourses Concerning Government, although it is not the main intellectual 
influence on this. Frequent citations from Aristotle in the Discourses give 
evidence of the pre-eminent role ancient Greek philosophy played in the work. 
Aristotle, it is generally believed, stands for the vita antiqua, or the traditional 
Klincksieck, 1989), 220-2. Alan Craig Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican 
Heritage in England and America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 231-
68. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 13-21. Pocock remarks 
that a history of Sidney's influence is still wanting J. G. A. Pocock, "England's Cato: The 
Virtues and Fortunes of Algernon Sidney," The Historical Journal 37, no. 4 (1994): 933-5. 
7 Carrive, La Pensee Politique D' Algernon Sidney, 1622-1683: La Querelle De 
L 'absolutisme. For a good account of eighteenth-century interest in Sidney see also: Blair 
Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," Journal of British Studies, 
no. 24(1985). 
8 See introduction, 4: "Discourse on the Discourses". 
9 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition, Limited Paperback Editions. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1975). 
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philosophy of the time, yet in Sidney's thought his political and moral thought 
appears in conjunction with such ideas as the social contract and a justification 
of rebellion. 
As we shall see in the main part of the thesis, Sidney's political theory 
developed in a unique way. I hold that it is built on the foundation of original 
principles - the concepts of liberty, virtue and justice are in the foreground -
and that, among other influences, the impact of ancient Greek virtue ethics is 
pre-eminent. This intellectual inheritance has hitherto received limited 
attention, but plays a key role for understanding the nature of Sidney's 
political thought, in particular as the concepts of justice and goodness derived 
from Aristotelian Platonic thought have, as I shall discuss, significance for 
Sidney's ideas concerning human nature and its relationship to the state. 
Beside this intellectual tradition, other influences that have already received 
some scholarly attention imprinted themselves on Sidney's political thought. 
Among them are Roman republican and Machiavellian ideas on liberty; neo-
stoic ideas on stability and virtue; and the Early Modern idea of the social 
contract. Stimulated through this variety of intellectual sources, Sidney 
responded to the demands of the political climate though an attack on the 
posthumously published absolutist treatise Patriarcha, by Sir Robert Filmer 
(1588-1653). This work served as a catalyst for Sidney to put his own political 
thought on paper as part of his polemics against Filmer's absolutism, and 
stimulated him to discuss a number of issues that were at stake in late 
seventeenth-century political debate. The centrepiece of Sidney's political 
thought, however, is an idealistic appeal to virtue as an opposition to the 
conservative appeal to a divine right of kings. This approach distinguishes him 
from other contemporary authors such as James Tyrrell and John Locke, who 
wrote with the same polemical intention. 
As can be seen, it is not only Sidney's active life that deserves attention, but 
his unique political theory that has hitherto received little attention as such. 
The research on Sidney to date focuses to a large extent on his life. John 
Pocock hints that it does so too much: 
10 
"Without the Discourses it is unlikely that we should be giving more 
attention to Sidney - extraordinary man though he was - than to John 
Wildman, or Richard Rumbold; without the Discourses, to which Jeffrey 
affixed the new-coined maxim scribere est agere, it might have been harder 
for the court to find him guilty of treason."10 
The discussion wil l now turn to the allegedly treasonous text and the 
political philosophy it expresses, through a consideration of the biographical, 
intellectual, and historical context; and to the backbone of his theory, which I 
consider as the virtue-centred discussion of what to Sidney are the related 
concepts of liberty and justice. This wil l be followed by an exploration of the 
ancient Greek sources to establish the thesis of the fundamental value of this 
impact on the basic concepts of Sidney's political thought and their 
relationship to his teleological idea of human nature as a foundation of his 
political ideas. 
Pocock, "England's Cato: The Virtues and Fortunes of Algernon Sidney," 927. 
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Introduction 
1. General relevance of the topic 
An understanding of Algernon Sidney's political thought, and the context in 
which his ideas were developed, is crucial to understanding the political and 
moral ideas that shape a great deal of everyday life in the contemporary 
western world. To understand these, we need to familiarise ourselves with 
their origin and the circumstances in which they emerged. Constitutional 
ideas, in particular in regard to their emphasis on justice and liberty, are 
considered to owe a great deal to John Locke. The origin and the 
circumstances in which Locke's ideas emerged are also considered, though 
undeservedly, to be similar to those of Sidney's ideas. 
Nowadays, Sidney's thought is highly underrated as it has been 
overshadowed by his contemporary John Locke; this was different throughout 
the eighteenth century. Regarded as a founding father of constitutional ideas 
and moral principles, Locke's Two Treatises of Government has made it to 
most reading lists for political theory. His political thought is generally used 
as a source of modern parliamentarian ideas in classroom discussion. Yet 
Jonathan Scott's research suggests that Sidney's political thought must have 
been of an equal, i f not greater importance for the eighteenth century, which is 
the period in which the constitutional reality of our time emerged. Several 
examples underline the far-reaching influence: First, the work was published 
in thirteen editions, "in three languages (English, French and German) and in 
six countries (England, Scotland, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
America)"1 1. Secondly, it became a political classic in eighteenth-century 
America; the Discourses developed to a key text on Harvard College and 
1 1 Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, Cambridge Studies 
in Early Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 6. 
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University of Virginia reading lists. Thirdly, the influence of the Discourses 
is reflected in their impact on such later political classics as the writings of 
Montesquieu, Rousseau, Condorcet and Jefferson. These points indicate that 
Sidney has shaped more of current constitutional and moral ideas than he is 
credited with, even i f he finally disappeared from the bookshelves during the 
late eighteenth century. His contemporary John Locke rose to become a 
political classic and remained so up until our time, while Sidney lost his due 
recognition. 
The text of the Discourses that has been transmitted to posterity is a nearly 
complete draft. The first edition was published by John Toland in 1698, which 
Blair Worden considered a fairly adequate copy. The manuscript reproduced 
in this edition must have been composed between 1681 and 1683.14 Toland's 
edition has often been used as the standard reference to Sidney as well as an 
edition of the Discourses and other writings that has been published by Joseph 
Robertson. The most recent edition of the Discourses is by Thomas G. West. 
It is based on Toland's edition. West modernized capitalisation in the body of 
the text, retained italics except for proper names, changed the spelling i f the 
original version seemed inconsistent and corrected typographical errors.15 
During my research I used all three versions, but decided to quote from the 
latest edition owing to its better accessibility. 
When inquiring into the philosophical context of Sidney's political thought, 
it springs to mind that the seventeenth century, often identified as the 
important link between the philosophy of the vita antiqua and the vita 
moderna, ushered in a shift in political philosophy: from scholastic 
Aristotelianism to rationalism and empirical natural law theory. Hobbes' 
1 2 Caroline Robbins, "Algernon Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government: Textbook of 
Revolution," William and Mary Quarterly 4, no. 3 (1947): 268-9. 
1 3 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 5. Scott, Algernon Sidney 
and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 143,210-11. 
1 4 Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 39. 
1 5 Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government. 
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thought echoed this shift and Rousseau and Kant later developed it further in 
the contractual tradition. These apparently diverging traditions, however, 
coexisted for a much longer time than is often assumed.16 Sidney's Discourses 
provide an example of this coexistence as they combine Classical Greek and 
Roman ideas, such as political Aristotelianism and Platonic metaphysics, with 
modern modes of thought, like contractualism and empirical approaches to 
political argument. It is interesting to see how Sidney combined traditional 
ideas with the 'new' thoughts of his time, i.e. Virtue Ethics with contractual 
ideas. Despite being a traditional concept of moral philosophy, in Sidney's 
political thought virtue ethics advances to an innovative status through its 
combination with such contemporary ideas as the social contract. In addition 
to the political and philosophical implications indicated above, the historical 
aspects are central to the current project. To understand the answers Sidney 
provides to the questions of his time the broader context out of which these 
questions were grown deserves attention. 
An exploration of Sidney's key political concepts and their relation to their 
context leads to four main questions. First, what kind of background had 
Sidney, and whether it prepared him for a virtue centred political thought. 
Secondly, what the intellectual climate was, in which Sidney's political ideas 
developed. Thirdly, what impact Filmer's absolutism in particular had on the 
formation of Sidney's Discourses, Fourthly, what relation Sidney's 
fundamental concepts have as part of an independent theory and why virtue 
has such a pre-eminent position in his thought, and finally, whether the 
ancient Greek influence may contribute to an understanding of the core of 
Sidney's political theory. 
In the course of the exploration of these questions I hope to contribute to 
the ongoing discussion of the nature of seventeenth-century constitutional and 
1 6 Cf. Charles B. Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, Mcgill-
Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas; 5 (Kingston [Ont.]: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1983). Schmitt gives a good example for the perpetual influence of Aritistotelianism 
in the Seventeenth Century. 
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particularly republican thought. This wil l be achieved by looking in depth at 
classical Greek political concepts, an aspect of Sidney's political writings that 
has been named as fundamental alongside many other influences, but never 
been explored in depth. With this approach I am taking up the suggestions that 
the classical Greek ideas had an influence, and substantiate this influence in 
regard to the virtue centred aspects of Sidney's political thought. 
The focus of this exploration will be on the Discourses concerning 
government, which Sidney wrote between 1681-1683. This was about the 
same time in which Locke composed the Second Treatise of Government, and 
in which Whigs turned to become radical. This development found expression 
in the well-known pamphlet, A Just and Modest Vindication}1 
As Jonathan Scott's research has shown, there are many crucial links 
between Sidney's life and his political thought. This is also the case in terms 
of Sidney's concepts, and I shall therefore begin the presentation of the 
context of Sidney's political thought with a biographical introduction (1.1). 
Particular attention wil l be devoted to the relation between Sidney's emphasis 
on virtue, his family background and his personality. Furthermore I shall 
introduce his political activities, which emphasise that Sidney's Discourses 
are not only theoretical deliberations, but also the expression of reasoning on 
politics that had developed on the foundation of personal experience. The 
following section (1.2) wil l consider the biography of Sir Robert Filmer, 
Sidney's intellectual adversary. In the course of this section, I aim to 
familiarise the reader with Filmer's political writings as a starting point for the 
exploration of the intellectual climate in which Sidney developed his own 
political ideas (1.3). After introducing the reactions to political instability, I 
shall refer to the role of Catholicism as well as to further issues that influenced 
contemporary political thought. In section 1.3 I hope to communicate the 
1 7 Jones et al., A Just and Modest Vindication of the Proceedings of the Two Last 
Parliaments. The Historian Burnet had stated that Sidney had a hand in it. Blair Worden 
doubts this, but points out, that one passage of it appears in the Discourses. Worden, "The 
Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 15. 
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diversity of the intellectual landscape of the time, as there is a temptation to 
consider that English political thought of the seventeenth century could simply 
be categorised in terms of monarchist and parliamentarian beliefs. By 
indicating the diversity of the period's political positions, I aim to show that it 
is necessary to take a close look at a political text, like the Discourses, before 
making any statements about its ideological position within seventeenth 
century political thought. This wi l l be followed by an introduction into the 
immediate context into the time of the Discourses' genesis, the 'Exclusion 
Crisis'. Chapter 1.3.1 wil l start with an exploration of Patriarcha, the work 
that imprinted its shape on the Discourses and stimulated Sidney, as well as 
James Tyrrell and John Locke, to put their political ideas on paper. Patriarcha 
will be treated rather extensively as this work is crucial for an understanding 
of the climate in which the Discourses developed. Even i f my main line of 
inquiry concerns the essence of the political theory of the work rather than its 
polemical intention against Filmer, I still take it as important to introduce into 
this nowadays hardly known work to communicate to the reader an idea of the 
theory against which Sidney's thought stood as an alternative. 
The responses to Patriarcha, James Tyrrell's Patriarcha non monarcha and 
John Locke's Two Treaties on government wi l l be explored in the consecutive 
section 1.3.2. Through this introduction into the arguments of the other anti-
Filmer authors, I shall allow the reader to get a better understanding of the 
intellectual climate directly linked to the Filmer controversy. This wil l prepare 
the ground for the exploration of Sidney's political ideas. Though Sidney's 
polemics against Filmer are not the principal object of my thesis, but the 
essence of his thought, I still take it as important to raise awareness of the 
political thought that Sidney aims to destroy through polemics. 
In Chapter I I the political ideas of the Discourses are in the foreground, and 
as such, this chapter is clearly the core of my thesis. I shall inquire into the 
nature of Sidney's most frequently used concepts of virtue, liberty and justice. 
This wi l l allow an understanding the foundational principles that determine 
the role of the state. Here, I shall firstly inquire into the meaning of the 
concept of virtue and its relation to Sidney's concept of human nature and its 
16 
significance in political order. This will be followed by Sidney's account of 
liberty and justice to build up a framework for discussing some details of 
"Sidney's Commonwealth" (II.4). Through this exploration, I hope to develop 
an understanding of Sidney's thought from his work itself. 
This exploration wil l serve as the foundation for discussing the Greek, and 
primarily Aristotelian, influences on Sidney. (I l l ) Through comparing and 
interpreting Sidney's account of the Greek authors, I shall aim to answer the 
question of why virtue and the Greek idea of human nature were so important 
to Sidney and what meaning the other two concepts had. This wil l finally 
establish the thesis of virtue as the primary factor that decides on the value of 
political order and serves as a guide, in conjunction with the concepts of 
liberty and justice, for developing or re-establishing a political institution. 
2. Method 
The term concept seems rather vague and needs further clarification. Two 
types of concepts may be distinguished here: firstly conscious concepts, and 
secondly, implicit concepts. By the term conscious concepts, I mean ideas 
which were obvious to contemporaries and could either be accepted or 
rejected. In Sidney's case, they are the fundamental principles of virtue, 
liberty and justice. Sidney uses these terms to stand for an idea that has a 
number of implications that can be derived through an exploration of the text. 
In regard to Sidney's sources, a conscious concept is most obviously where 
Sidney reveals the sources of an idea he promotes. Thus in II.3 he states 
"Plato and Aristotle find no more certain way of distinguishing between a 
lawful king and a tyrant, than that the first seeks to procure the common good, 
and the other his own pleasure or profit". 1 8 The reference to Plato and 
Aristotle reveals to the reader that Sidney is conscious of the impact that the 
18 Discourses II.3, 91. 
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ancient Greek concepts of Kingship and Tyranny have on his own thought, 
hence it may be called a conscious concept. This concept is explicit, as Sidney 
reveals Plato directly as his source. Implicit concepts, on the other hand, wil l 
be defined as ideas or streams of thought standing in the background owing to 
education or interaction in a certain society. For example, Bacon was rejecting 
Aristotelian ideas but was still building on a framework of Aristotelian 
argumentation and physics.19 This means that even i f there is no explicit use 
of a concept taken from, let us say, a philosophical authority, certain concepts 
or clusters of ideas are so deeply ingrained into the mind of an author, that 
they occur in such a consistent way that that their presence may be inferred 
from the text. For example, we see that the implicit concept of Roman liberty 
is present, i f we realise that authors like Algernon Sidney or John Milton 
would never have been tempted to use the term liberty exclusively in the sense 
of negative liberty as it may be found in twenty-first-century libertarian usage 
of this concept. Although justifiable doubt might be raised in regard of the 
accuracy of any statement on implicit concepts, it is to be borne in mind that 
neglecting them altogether would prevent one from encountering the 
intellectual context in which a past author was writing. Revealing implicit 
concepts in form of highlighting inferred references to other authors alongside 
explicit concepts - discernible in direct references e.g. quotations from ancient 
texts - brings us closer to understanding the intellectual climate in which 
Sidney wrote and helps to grasp the unique character of Sidney's own view on 
politics as it leads us to some of the premises of his own thinking. 
The main task for this paper is to concentrate on the concepts governing 
Sidney's political thought, to understand it and to contrast it to explore it in 
the light of Aristotelian political philosophy. One of the striking issues to be 
addressed in considering this methodological deliberation is the question 
concerning how the importance of certain ideas can be determined. A decisive 
1 9 Cf. Charles B. Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance, Martin Classical Lectures; V. 27 
(Cambridge, Mass: Published for Oberlin College by Harvard University Press, 1983). 
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step on the way to an answer is to free ourselves from concepts of our own 
language. Quentin Skinner gave a particularly revealing example of this 
approach in regard to the term Liberty. Liberty before liberalism20 
demonstrates particularly well how important it is to untangle the problems 
arising from the shifts of meaning in the word 'liberty' through time. I shall 
attempt, following Skinner's example, to look at certain clusters of ideas that 
occur in conjunction with the terms of liberty, virtue, and justice, to approach 
Sidney's understanding of them. They are the concepts that can be identified 
as the basis of Sidney's political writings. In the course of exploring their 
implication within Sidney's text, I shall aim to show their fundamental 
meaning as well as their all-pervasive character they have in Sidney's political 
thought. In the course of exploring them, such further issues wil l be covered 
as the individual and the state, the right form of government, and revolution 
and rebellion. These issues, and their importance, wi l l be discussed with 
regard to Sidney's learning and in consideration of his tendency to recall the 
great political writers of the past. Particular emphasis wi l l be placed on the 
Aristotelian and Platonic influence occurring as implicit as well as explicit 
concepts that are directly derived from these authors may be inferred. This 
wi l l help to understand Sidney's account of human nature and the Greek 
influence, which has hitherto received limited attention, wi l l be a central 
aspect of the current paper. 
As regards the Greek influence, I shall concentrate on the implicit concepts 
that help to understand what relation Sidney sees between politics and 
morality. In particular, the idea of human nature wil l be in the centre of 
attention. Through the conscious concepts of Aristotelian and platonic thought 
in the Discourses, there is enough evidence that Sidney embraced particularly 
Aristotelian ideas. The aim of Chapter I I I wil l be to show the extent to which 
implicit Aristotelian concepts may also be detected in Sidney's political 
2 0 Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, 2. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
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thought. Regardless whether they were transmitted from Aristotle directly or 
through other sources, they wil l lead to a better understanding of the 
foundations of Sidney's political thought, particularly because Aristotle's 
teleological idea of human nature helps to understand Sidney's fundamental 
principles of government that are prior to any just political order. 
3. Sidney's Republicanism 
Although a project on Sidney's Discourses might seem to focus on a very 
limited aspect of political thought, an exploration of the context requires the 
consideration of the early modern intellectual landscape in general, and the 
role of republicanism in particular. By looking at the various streams of 
thought and conflicting opinions of the time, which influenced Sidney's work, 
an overview wi l l be attempted of the those ideas that education and learning 
imprinted on the seventeenth-century mind. Authors such as Pocock, Skinner 
and Tuck have offered detailed studies of the prevailing intellectual climate in 
that period on a rather general scale. They give accounts of political thinking 
in the tradition of Machiavelli's republicanism,21 the intellectual formation of 
Early Modern state building, as well as the rise of Tacitisim and the new 
science of natural-right thinking that overshadowed the old Aristotelian and 
humanist approaches to political philosophy.23 
2 1 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition. 
2 2 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
2 3 Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651, Ideas in Context (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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The most important current of thought to be mentioned - in conjunction 
with Sidney - is republicanism.24 While the recognition of such works as 
Harrington's Oceaana25 as Classical Republican is well established,26 the 
exact location of Sidney's Discourses within the Classical Republican 
tradition is still a matter of contention. We owe to Jonathan Scott the most 
comprehensive attempt to place Sidney within Classical Republicanism. John 
Pocock, however, recently expressed his doubts about Sidney's identity as a 
republican. We know, particularly from John Carswell, that Sidney's 
background as an aristocrat shaped him personally: he was an aristocrat not 
only by blood and title, but also in thought and deed. The Percy, Neville and 
Dudley families are among his ancestors. This background stimulates John 
Pocock to the following question: "What manner of republican might such a 
man be, and in what kind of republic might he imagine, or be imagined, 
living?" 2 7 Furthermore, he states, "more than anything else [Sidney's 
thinking] is aristocratic...".28 John Pocock is pointing in the right direction 
with this suggestion - made in reference to Sidney's religion - especially, as 
the above statement is complemented with a characterisation of Sidney's 
temper as 'philosophical'. This is confirmed by Jonathan Scott's observations 
- from which I shall benefit in my own exploration of the Discourses -
2 4 Most recently Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner published a new collection of 
essays on European republicanism. Owing to its late publication, it was net possible to 
appreciate it as a further source for an interpretation of Sidney's republicanism. Martin van 
Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, eds., Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
2 5 James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana (London: Printed for D. Pakeman, 
1656). 
2 6 Cf. Arihiro Fukuda, Sovereignty and the Sword: Harrington, Hobbes, and Mixed 
Government in the English Civil Wars, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition. 
2 7 Pocock, "England's Cato: The Virtues and Fortunes of Algernon Sidney," 916. 
2 8 Ibid. 917. 
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although I shall move in a different direction. I shall concentrate on pre-
eminent intellectual concepts to be found in the work of Sidney and explore 
the Ancient Greek influences on them. This intellectual tradition is essential to 
Sidney's work, and until now, it has been a much undervalued aspect of 
Sidney's thought and hardly been explored with the enthusiasm that it 
warrants. However, before the text turns to Sidney, his context and his work, it 
is worth exploring the key texts of secondary literature that are of pre-eminent 
value for the current project. 
4. Discourse on the Discourses 
Considering the works of scholarship published so far, we have to ask what 
they have achieved and what we can expect from further work on Sidney. We 
can broadly distinguish three types of publications: Firstly, we have 
intellectual biographies such as that of Scott, Carswell and Worden's 
publications.29 Secondly, there are publications centering around the 
Discourses, such as work by Carrive, Houston, and Nelson.30 Finally, there is 
a series of articles covering aspects of Sidney's work and its context, for 
example Blair Worden's writings on Republicanism.31 
2 9 John Carswell, The Porcupine: The Life of Algernon Sidney (London: J. Murray, 1989), 
Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, Scott, Algernon Sidney and 
the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon 
Sidney." 
3 0 Carrive, La Pensee Politique D' Algernon Sidney, 1622-1683: La Querelle De 
L'absolutisme, Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and 
America, Scott A. Nelson, The Discourses of Algernon Sidney (Rutherford, London: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; Associated University Presses, 1993). 
3 1 David Wootton, Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, Making of 
Modern Freedom (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994), Blair Worden, 
"English Republicanism," in Cambridge History of Political Thought, ed. J.H. Burns and 
Mark Goldie (Cambridge: 1991), Blair Worden, "Politics and Policy of the Rump 
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The book by John Carswell is an entertaining biographical work and 
provides easy to read information about Sidney's life, his personality and his 
character. It is a sound introduction to Sidney, particularly because it is less 
scholarly in its approach than the other writings. It extensively unfolds 
Sidney's family background and leaves no doubt about the aristocratic and 
learned flavour of his environment. 
Paulette Carrive's work, La pensee politique d'Algernon Sidney is hardly 
recognised in the English speaking world. After introducing the life, the 
historical context of the Exclusion Crisis and the Filmer Controversy, Carrive 
gives a systematic account of Algernon Sidney's political thought to conclude 
with an overview of Sidney's impact in France, England and America. She 
takes up the natural law approach contained in Sidney's idea of initial liberty 
through distinguishing clearly between a state of nature and man in society. 
Her focus is on the political order promoted by Sidney. 
The two most recent American works are by Alain C. Houston and Scott 
Nelson. Both of them place emphasis on the role of liberty. After a 
biographical introduction and a discussion of English royalism, Houston gives 
a detailed account of such dichotomous terms as "virtue and corruption", 
"freedom and slavery" as an approach to Sidney's political thought. The last 
part of the book is devoted to Sidney's impact on the American Revolution. 
Considering the title of the book, Algernon Sidney and the republican heritage 
in England and America, the account of the Sidney heritage seem rather scant. 
At least in reference to the English reception of Sidney, Blair Worden's article 
(see below) throws more light on the mysterious periods of Sidney admiration, 
adoration and condemnation. 
Nelson's work as a whole centres round the idea of the social contract. In 
my own approach I shall refer to the contract, but maintain that the contract 
Parliament, 1648-1653" (D.Phil, Oxford University, 1971), Blair Worden, "Republicanism 
and the Restoration, 1660-1683," in Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 
1649-1776, ed. David Wootton, The Making of Modern Freedom (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994). 
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justifies Sidney's concern for a just political order developed in freedom to 
maintain and further the development of justice among the citizens. While I 
explain this approach by introducing into the significance of the Greeks for 
Sidney's ideas, Scott Nelson claims that the contract is defended by the use of 
Greek sources. 
It is these most recent publications on Sidney that were commonly referred 
to, until Blair Worden decided to bring to light the life work and legacy of 
Algernon Sidney at the third centenary commemoration - at which Sidney was 
to be much less commemorated than in the centuries before. The key text for 
reference on Sidney and his republicanism was Caroline Robbins' "Algernon 
Sidney's Discourses concerning government. A textbook of revolution.32 It 
deserves a few comments: 
After an introduction on the readership and the impact of Sidney, she 
devotes her attention to the content of the Discourses. She emphasises the 
people's control over the holder of political power, and refers to Sidney's 
account of the Greek idea that the most worthy should rule, as well as the 
Roman idea that the most vigorous should be in political power.33 With these 
references, she points to important influences on Sidney's concept of virtue, 
yet she does not give an account of the more holistic flavour that may be 
detected in Sidney's concept of virtue, i f observed carefully. Her reference to 
the contract as an agreement to maintain just rule is over-simplified. It fails to 
allow an insight into Sidney's approach of combining a virtue-based political 
order with the contract for the sake of its maintenance. Hence it is not 
surprising that she concludes, "...there is nothing very original about this 
theory except the repeated denial that a people can ever permanently give 
away its liberty, or even a part of i t . " 3 4 Through exploring the key concepts of 
the Discourses in Chapter I I below, "The shape of Sidney's Theory", I shall 
3 2 Robbins, "Algernon Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government: Textbook of 
Revolution." 
3 3 Ibid.: 283. 
3 4 Ibid.: 238. 
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go beyond Robbins' judgement and show to what extent Sidney does indeed 
provide an original approach to political philosophy. 
More useful for the current paper were the publications by Blair Worden, 
particularly "The Comonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney". Blair Worden 
did a lot to place Sidney in the context of seventeenth-century 
35 
republicanism. "The commonwealth Kidney" was the first comprehensive 
account of Algernon Sidney's life, his political thought and the legacy from 
his death up until the late nineteenth century. Being the first publication 
among a number of recent publications that rediscover Sidney as a worthwhile 
topic of scholarly scrutiny, it demolishes a number of myths that have been 
created about him. Looking back on eighteenth-, and nineteenth- century-
publications, Worden's approach looks like the beginning of a discovery of 
the real Sidney, particularly, as his research has brought to light a number of 
useful sources on Sidney, among them the hitherto unknown manuscript of the 
Court Maxims. Hence, his intention to compose a myth" based more closely 
on Sidney's writings and on the materials for his l i f e " 3 6 seems to be an aim not 
too difficult for him to achieve. 
Blair Worden's position on Sidney may broadly be divided into issues 
concerning Sidney's legacy, his background and his political thought, as well 
as his place in the context of classical republicanism. This latter point is dealt 
with in a number of his articles. Above all, Blair Worden has done a lot of 
detailed research on the relations between Sidney's political writings and 
those of other anti-absolutist, classical republican and Whig authors. As this 
topic is well explored by him, I shall confine my own approach to a focus on 
the Discourses itself as well as on sources that have hitherto not been 
subjected to close study. 
3 5 Wootton, Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, Worden, "English 
Republicanism", Worden, "Politics and Policy of the Rump Parliament, 1648-1653", 
Worden, "Republicanism and the Restoration, 1660-1683". 
3 6 Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 3. 
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Covering a great deal of his Sidney article, Blair Worden's account of 
Sidney's legacy is rather comprehensive compared to the literature published 
so far on this issue.37 In regard to the Sidney legacy, the most interesting 
point for the current paper is the following: he states that in 1688 the "abstract 
principles" of the Discourses were too philosophical for Whig pragmatism.38 
It wi l l be suggested here that the opposite case is true as the pragmatic and 
polemical intention are not the focus, but instead these very abstract principles 
which I identify as the fundamental principles of the Discourses. 
About Sidney's background, Worden makes a few central claims. Firstly, 
England's absolutism should be overcome through rebellion.39 This claim is in 
accordance with the general interpretation of Sidney's statements on just war, 
rebellion and the contract, as later explored by Jonathan Scott.40 The way for 
improving the English situation, the "cure of England's ills", which are 
identified as absolutism and popery, is the parliament.41 With this statement, 
Worden indicates the direction of his answer to the question of what 
institutional shape Sidney was promoting. We can learn from this, that Sidney 
considered parliament the principal holder of political sovereignty. 
The key points of Worden's assessment of Sidney are concerned with the 
branch of seventeenth-century scholarship for which Worden is renowned. His 
argument for Sidney's republicanism is founded on the observation that he 
had an extensive knowledge of Roman history which he deployed in the 
Discourses.42 While this aspect concerns Sidney's background rather than the 
immediate context of the Discourses, Worden states about Sidney's account of 
3 7 Ibid.: 27-37. 
3 8 Ibid.: 36. 
3 9 Ibid.: 15. 
4 0 Cf. Jonathan Scott, "The Law of War, Grotius, Sidney, Locke and the Political-Theory of 
Rebellion," History of Political Thought 13, no. 4 (1992). 
4 1 Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 16. 
4 2 Ibid. 
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corruption, that Machiavelli mainly imprinted himself on Sidney. 
The above points give information on Worden's account of Sidney, but the 
following are in direct relation to this paper. One aspect is Sidney's family 
background. I shall take up Worden's idea to consider the influences of Sir 
Philip Sidney as well as the ancient noble background of Sidney as crucial 
aspects of his personality that allow some conclusions for the understanding of 
his political thought.44 While I am more interested in the effect Sidney's 
background had on his idealisation of virtue, Worden also refers to the 
aristocratic background to highlight the fact that Sidney was distinguished 
from Whigs to such an extent that it even brought about hostility. While this 
hostility may be derived from Sidney untypical connections,45 another aspect 
of Sidney is more closely related to his personality. This is the evidence for 
Sidney's self image as the only candidate able for personal rule. Sir William 
Temple claimed this about Sidney and some passages of the Discourses seem 
to confirm this view. 4 6 
There are a few issues concerning the nature of Sidney's political thought 
that are of significance for the current project. The key here is Worden's 
account of the concept of virtue. Although he is not giving a detailed 
exposition of his observations on the Discourse, he gave a few statements. 
Similar to my interpretation of Sidney's thought, Worden states that Sidney 
considered a constitution as healthy i f it secures the rule of the virtuous under 
the prerogative of law. This aristocratic idea does of course not give an 
inherited nobility preference over others, but it stands for a nobility that has to 
justify ability by superior wisdom and virtue in order to prove their capacity of 
leading the "community towards moral and political fulfilment". In this 
account of the state, Worden makes clear that morality and politics are 
4 j Ibid.: 18. 
4 4 Ibid.: 4. 
4 5 Ibid.: 6. 
4 6 Ibid.: 23-24. 
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inseparable, but he does not explain further the deeper reasons for this 
understanding of politics. I shall take up Worden's idea and enhance it by 
exploring the original concepts which wil l allow us to understand the reasons 
for Sidney's understanding of politics as a branch of knowledge. While 
Worden concentrates on the Platonic influences explaining this aspect of 
Sidney's thought, I shall rather inquire into the Aristotelian foundation for 
Sidney's understanding of morality and politics. They lead to a constitution 
that Worden identifies as mixed, as he claims that the subtle difference 
between, for example mixed government and a government regulated by law 
do not really matter to Sidney owing to his attitude of contrasting whatever 
form of government he is talking about against absolutism.49 
Unlike Worden I wi l l not devote further attention to this issue, as my 
primary interest is on the philosophical foundation that leads to this attitude 
towards constitutional reality. By the same token, I leave aside the question of 
what practical implications Sidney's political thought has for the day-to-day 
running of politics as well as their intellectual origins. While Worden makes 
inroads in this direction when he extracts from Sidney's political writings, 
among other things, the conclusion that Sidney favoured annually elected 
magistrates "and appears to regard the Roman consuls - who were agreed to 
have constituted the monarchical element in Rome's republican constitution -
as a particularly apt model for modern imitation. 5 0 Conversely, I do share 
Worden's conviction that "Sidney is less interested in constitutional 
arrangements than in the principles on which they are built. Yet while Worden 
simply states, they are the "...classical principles of mixed government..."51.1 
try to extract fundamental concepts by exploring the Discourses. This 
approach wil l lead me to exploring the Platonic and Aristotelian impact on 
4 7 Ibid.: 24. 
4 8 Ibid.: 25. 
4 9 Worden, "Republicanism and the Restoration, 1660-1683," 163. 
5 0 Ibid., 164. 
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Sidney's fundamental concepts in regard to the moral implications of Sidney's 
thought, and lead to an understanding of why Worden names Sidney and 
Milton advocates of "aristocracies of virtue". 5 2 
Among the biographical writings on Sidney, Jonathan Scott presented the 
most extensive account of Sidney's life and time. His research provided a lot 
of background information for the current paper. Like Worden, Jonathan Scott 
aims to find the reality behind the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Whig 
myth of Sidney.53 However, it is not only the starting-point that is the same, as 
Scott also covers similar ground for example in regard to Sidney's biography, 
to which I refer in 1.1. One of the great merits of Scott's research is his study 
on the relationship between Sidney's personal and family background and the 
intellectual influences that found their way into his political thought. While 
biographical research provides a background for the current paper, it is not the 
focus of its main part. I shall rely mainly on Scott's research in my own 
biographical chapter, even i f I interpret some of the facts he has brought to 
light from a different angle. 
As far as the intellectual background of Sidney's thought is concerned Scott 
claims that it is republican. He asserts that Sidney deploys classic models of 
republics for statements on politics. In this classical manner, he characterised 
Israel as a divinely sanctioned institution, Sparta as the model standing for 
discipline and longevity, Rome, as model of vigour and conquest and Venice 
as model of stability and longevity. Though Scott claims that Sidney provides 
the "clearest association of classical republican theory with English republican 
practice that we have on record,54 he still states that "Classical republicanism 
is, however, neither a sufficient nor a very precise category for describing 
Sidney's thought as a whole." This is an adequate statement on the nature of 
Sidney's thought considering its variety in terms of sources and political 
5 2 Ibid., 165. 
5 3 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, xiv. 
5 4 Ibid., 15. He quotes from Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, Fr. MS 23254 'Lantiniana', fols. 
99-101. 
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languages, as well as its uniqueness. Jonathan Scott names six important 
sources for Sidney's political thought: Plato, Aristotle, Livy, Tacitus, 
Machiavelli and Grotius. In so doing, Scott aims to show the framework that 
unites all these writers as a whole,5 5 while I shall concentrate on the Greek 
influence, particularly in reference to the concepts of virtue and justice. Scott 
refers to the importance Plato and Aristotle hold for these ideas, yet he does 
not give a very detailed account of the texts themselves owing to his different 
emphasis. I shall not deny the influence of the others, yet for the argument of 
this paper, I consider it more important to explore the Greek sources further 
and to rely in all other respects on the research done so far. 
Jonathan Scott emphasises that Sidney considers law as equivalent to 
reason and that the order of a just state comes closest to the rule of God i f it is 
based on law, as opposed to the rule of passion which is evident in the rule of 
a single man in absolute monarchy.56 I follow Jonathan Scott in this account, 
yet I hold that there is a case to be made for enhancing the understanding of 
the closeness that a law-based state may have to God. In Chapter I I shall show 
that law has not merely the function of preventing undue acts of passion, but 
also a thoroughly civilising effect on character. As a means of fostering virtue, 
I shall claim that law fulfils the function of stimulating man to virtuous 
actions. In this respect, the effect of law is not only negative in terms of 
restriction, but also positive, in terms of stimulating good and just action that, 
after it becomes a habit, may be pursued out of free wil l . My attempt at 
enhancing Scott's statement that the Aristotelian understanding of virtue 
stands in the background wil l be discussed in Chapter I I I . 
The Platonic influence on Sidney is a further decisive point in Jonathan 
Scott's account of the Greeks.57 He places emphasis on the role of Platonism 
as well as on the impact of the Sidney family teacher Henry Hammond, whose 
background was Greek and theology. Scott ascribes the Platonism of the 
5 5 Ibid, 17. 
5 6 Ibid, 37. 
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Court Maxims to Hammond. Like the Discourses, the Court Maxims were 
also influenced by Plato and Aristotle. Scott claims, that Sidney, like Milton, 
referred to Aristotle's political categories of the one, the few and the many, 
thus monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, which are opposed to their 
corrupted counterparts of tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy. Like Milton in his 
Tenure of Kings and Parliaments59, as Scott claims, Sidney also refers to the 
Aristotelian categories owing to their suitability to the English situation.60 
This interpretation of Scott seems entirely relevant. I shall accept it but 
enhance it further as there is no contention about the Aristotelian influence on 
republican authors in regard to the political categories. Instead, I shall look at 
the philosophical foundations that bring Aristotle and Sidney to the conclusion 
that these forms of government are appropriate for the well being of a people. 
I shall do this again in regard to the principles of virtue, liberty and justice. In 
my approach, I accept Jonathan Scott's claim that Sidney, like Milton, read 
Aristotle directly and not through the writings of schoolmen.61 Further 
evidence, explored in Chapter I I I , wi l l confirm that there is indeed a case to be 
made for Aristole's direct influence on Sidney's idea that a true, virtuous, 
nobility ought to guide the community towards the completion of their 
nature.62 
While Scott confined the first book of his work on Sidney to biographical 
issues and the wider intellectual context, the second book, Sidney and the 
Restoration Crisis, has not only the intention of exploring Sidney's life after 
his continental exile, but also it aims to re-assess the Exclusion Crisis to 
introduce into the historical context by means of approaching a 
contemporary's point of view. His assessment of the Crisis is subject of 1.3. 
5 7 Ibid., 22-28. 
5 8 Ibid., 27-8. 
5 9 John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (London: 1649). 
6 0 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 26-30. 
6 1 Ibid, 25. 
6 2 Cf. Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 24. 
31 
Beyond the above points on Sidney's political thought, Scott makes some 
pertinent remarks on the relation between Sidney and Filmer, whose thought 
he considers as polemics against anti-absolutists. As a result he sees the reason 
for the shape of Sidney's argument in the fact that Sidney took up most anti-
absolutist arguments as well as the classical republican stance from the period 
of 1640-66 to refute Filmer. Therefore, Scott draws the conclusion that "the 
Discourses may be described as a work of anti-absolutist and republican 
theory." In this context, he emphasises the function of the text as a foundation 
for popular sedition. This is indeed true, but may sound as i f it is revoking 
the interpretation of Sidney by putting forward in the Discourses his own and 
independent theory. As Scott explained in "The Law of War", 6 4 it was indeed 
Sidney's intention to justify rebellion, yet this rebellion is a means to recover 
an ideal institutional arrangement or to re-establish it. The foundation of it wil l 
be explored in the main part of the paper, but for now we shall turn to 
Sidney's life and time. 
Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, J677-1683, 209. 
Scott, "The Law of War, Grotius, Sidney, Locke and the Political-Theory of Rebellion." 
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I Algernon Sidney: his life and time 
I . l The sound of virtue and true nobility: aspects of Sidney's life 
The account of Sidney's life outlined in this chapter does not set out to 
repeat the extensive research that has already been carried out on the 
relationship between Sidney's life and political thought.65 In contrast it aims 
to highlight particular aspects of Sidney's life. It is intended that this wi l l 
produce a greater understanding of the biographical implications, and the 
importance of Sidney's emphasis on virtue in the Discourses concerning 
government. Three aspects are used as guidelines for this biographical 
exploration. First, the aristocratic background, secondly, the intellectual 
background, which, it could be suggested, informed Sidney's idealism and 
shaped his own understanding of idealised aristocratic principles, and thirdly, 
the historical background. 
Algernon Sidney was born on either 14 th or 15 th January of 1683 as the 
third child and second son of Robert Sidney, the second Earl of Leicester, and 
Dorothy Percy, daughter of the ninth Earl of Northumberland. Through this 
union of two well-established aristocratic families he was by blood a Neville 
and a Dudley.6 6 Such a family background may be surprising to those who 
recognise Algernon Sidney as a hero of liberty and rebellion. Yet Sidney's 
family background shaped his character and beliefs in much the same way as 
it did that of his great-uncle, Sir Philip Sidney,67 who is remembered as a 
renaissance man of learning and a committed protestant. At the same time, his 
6 5 See above all: Carswell, The Porcupine: The Life of Algernon Sidney, Scott, Algernon 
Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration 
Crisis, 1677-1683, Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney." However, 
the core of this chapter is based on Jonathan Scott's research. 
6 6 Pocock, "England's Cato: The Virtues and Fortunes of Algernon Sidney," 916. 
6 7 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 53. 9-50 
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position at the English court and his death on the battlefield give testimony of 
his ability to combine successfully the vita activa and vita contemplativa. 
Through his own life, Sir Philip Sidney demonstrates a means for overcoming 
the gulf between these two dichotomous topoi of the ethical and political 
debate in Renaissance Humanism, although his Old Arcadia seeks the ideal 
solution from the vita activa. Algernon was to follow his great uncle's 
example. Both aspects of Sidney's family background, awareness of ancient 
and noble ancestors and the home environment, found their way into Sidney's 
political thought; they are particularly well reflected in his idealisation of the 
virtuous nobility. 
Sidney grew up at Penshurst Place. Here, he acquired most of the 
knowledge he later displayed in the Discourses. Penshurst stands for the 
setting in which Sir Philip Sidney most likely composed Arcadia and his 
renaissance poetry. The library at Penshurst expressed not only his great-uncle 
Sir Philip's interest in learning, but also that of Sidney's father. Penshurst 
Place was also the starting point for Sidney's classical and philosophical 
education that shaped his understanding of politics. This wi l l be encountered 
later in Chapter I I I . The intellectual climate of the family provides the 
background for Sidney's learning. The commonplace books of Algernon's 
father and grandfather had already dealt with problems of government and 
Aristotelian principles.69 Sidney's great-uncle, Sir Philip's, life and work, 
illustrate further the role Aristotle played in the family. 7 0 It would be 
6 8 Markku Peltonen, Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 
1570-1640, Ideas in Context; 36 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 22. 
Further exploration of Sir Philip's idea on virtue may be found in: Blair Worden, The 
Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney's Arcadia and Elizabethan Politics (New Haven; London: 
Yale University Press, 1996). 
6 9 Jonathan Scott refers briefly to the family library as well as to the content of the Common 
Place books. (Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 55.). A further 
consultation of the sources would be revealing for a more detailed account of the genesis 
of Sidney's political thought and its relation to the intellectual family tradition. 
7 0 Cf. Carswell, The Porcupine: The Life of Algernon Sidney, 3-5. 
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surprising i f the great ancestor's preference for Aristotelian thought, as 
• 71 
expressed in his Arcadia, did not stimulate Algernon's interest in Aristotle. 
Beyond these foundations for intellectual development, Algernon had a 
chance to expand his horizons through travelling. Of significance was a six-
year stay in France where, in the 1630s, his father, the second Earl of 
Leicester, had been appointed as ambassador to the English court. Here, 
Algernon's learning was furthered through education, most likely at the 
Huguenot Academy in Saumur.72 His father's appointment as ambassador was 
in line with the family tradition of public service both abroad and at home. Sir 
Philip had lost his life on a military mission in the Netherlands and other 
family members had held positions of responsibility in the diplomatic service. 
Algernon was to follow in this tradition. 
On the continent, Algernon is likely to have been introduced to a variety of 
important political figures. Jonathan Scott's research reveals that the six years 
in France were an intellectually stimulating period for Sidney. He was in 
contact with such anti-absolutist French writers as Morny, Hotman and Beza 
whose ideas appear to have stimulated Sidney's arguments against personal 
monarchy. In addition, Algernon met high ranking Huegenots, for example 
the Due du Rohan, who had led a Huegenot rebellion at La Rochelle.74 
However, the family relationship to Hugo Grotius was more significant for 
Sidney's thought, particular in regard to the issue of rebellion. This legal 
thinker was at the time ambassador for Sweden in Paris and was well known 
to Sidney's father, whose "surviving notes are full of Grotius's social chatter 
and reflection upon his political ideas".75 Regardless whether Algernon met 
him in person, Grotius was to have a definitive impact on Sidney's ideas on 
7 1 Cf. Worden, The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney's Arcadia and Elizabethan Politics, 23, 
210-2, 301-2, 20-1,25,39. 
7 2 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 53. 
7 3 Cf. Ibid., 17. 
7 4 Ibid., 53. 
7 5 Ibid., 51-58. 
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the contract and his theory on rebellion. It could be said that the idea of 
rebellion has already been dealt with effectively by Jonathan Scott and that it 
is therefore of minor interest to the current thesis.76 
The ideas on contract and liberty are of greater significance in the following 
part, since I shall claim that one of the innovative aspects of Sidney's thought 
finds its expression in reconciling a contractual understanding of the state with 
Aristotelian ethics. Unlike other political authors who were also influenced by 
such contractual thinkers as Grotius, Sidney did not refer to the contract to 
justify political order as such, but to justify a value-laden order grounded 
particularly in Sidney's classical learning. This wi l l be analysed further in 
Chapter I I I , "The Classical Inheritance". 
Sidney idealised ancient nobility in his writings and his life was influenced 
by his family's close connections to ancient houses, most notably the Percys, 
who were, in the seventeenth century, considered to be one of the oldest and 
best-known noble families. Sidney states that in the past the English nation 
"had a great, strong, virtuous and powerful nobility to lead them".7 7 In his 
understanding nobility, greatness, strength, combined with leadership, were 
closely linked to the principle of virtue. For Sidney, greatness and successful 
leadership were the result of virtue. Nobility for him was not a privilege but a 
vocation. Having noble ancestry gave Sidney the incentive to uphold the 
standards that had been laid down by ancestors. By this attitude he 
endeavoured to set a moral example to those in positions of military and 
political responsibility. While the former required him to develop and act in 
accordance with such virtues as valour and courage, the latter required him to 
strive to be an example to others through good and just actions. This meant 
that he had to put aside personal interest - which lies at the heart of the 
contractual ideas of some other contemporary political authors, notably 
7 6 This paper is not going to expand on this topic owing to its emphasis on the key concepts. 
It is topic in the following article: Scott, "The Law of War, Grotius, Sidney, Locke and the 
Political-Theory of Rebellion." 
77 Discourses 111.37, 527. 
36 
Hobbes and Locke. He achieved this through just, wise and good actions 
which placed emphasis on the welfare of others. 
Being influenced by such an aristocratic idealism, Sidney had reason to be 
proud of his own ancestors. In accordance with the idea of mixed monarchy, 
they had advanced the interests of the English nation in the face of attempts by 
kings to increase their power to the disadvantage of people and nobility. 
Algernon Sidney's uncle, Algernon Percy, duke of Northumberland, was a 
close friend of Algernon's father, and Algernon himself developed a close 
friendship with him. Northumberland supported Algernon in his political 
career.78 He held his nephew's merit and virtue in high esteem and 
characterised him as "a person that understands very well how to value such 
as are de[s]erving". As this example indicates, virtue was not only an 
intellectual concept, but also a principle which played a role in his actual life. 
Sidney admired ancient nobility for being involved in politics. He 
considered them the element of 'mixed monarchy' that defended the interest 
and the well being of the people and prevented kings from arbitrary rule. 
The fact that Sidney himself was from ancient lineage is reflected in the way 
he was perceived. Jonathan Scott states that Algernon's personality "was 
crucially characterised by [...] Percy-style imperiousness and pride". To give 
an impression of the way Sidney might have appeared, Jonathan Scott refers 
to Sidney's uncle, the Duke of Northumberland. He has been considered a 
rebel of a family that had a tradition of bringing up some of the most freedom-
conscious individuals who constantly posed a challenge to any absolutist 
measures.81 In regard of personal style, Northumberland may have been an 
example to Sidney. Clarendon characterised him as the "proudest man alive" 
and stated, " i f he had thought the King as much above him as he thought 
7 8 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677,43-4. 
7 9 North MSS Alnwick Letters and Papers vol. 16 1641-56 23/5 B.M. reel 286 fol. 59, quoted 
after ibid., 44. 
80 Discourses III. 37, 525-7. 
8 1 Cf. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 145-8. 
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himself above other[s], he would have been a good subject". Yet he was not, 
and so he stood against the king during the Civil War and fought, presumably 
as an example to Algernon, on the parliamentary side against the absolutist 
interests of Charles I . 
The Civil War provided Sidney with the chance of proving military virtue. 
After his father had been appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland, Sidney and his 
brother fought in the Irish Revolt near Rosse on 28 March 1643. On this 
occasion, Sidney failed to prove his virtue. He and his brother were reported 
to have retreated in disorder while the infantry was left on their own. 8 4 
Although this occasion suggests that Sidney failed to live up to his ideals on 
virtue, he made up for this failure during the Civil War that soon followed: 
Like Algernon Percy, he sided with the parliamentary party. At the battle of 
Marston Moor, in 1644, Algernon Sidney proved his bravery.85 It is evidenced 
in a report that states "Colonel Sydney, son to the Earl of Leicester, charged 
with much gallantry at the head of [...a] regiment on horse, and came of f with 
much honour, though with many wounds".86 
This juxtaposition of two events in which Sidney first failed and then lived 
up to his idealistic moral standards shows that he was well aware of the gap 
between upholding moral ideas and having the courage to implement them. It 
could be said that Sidney experienced difficulties in living up to his standards 
of virtue and controlling his own temper. Believing that true liberty entails 
self-government and the control of reason over passion (cf. Chapter II). 
Sidney found it a real challenge to control his own passions. In relationships 
with other people, he was considered quarrelsome.87 Temperance was 
Quoted after ibid., 45. 
Ibid., 43. 
Ibid., 83. 
It was reported in five different parliamentary journals. Ibid., 85. 
Ash's Intelligence from the Armies in the North no. 6; Meadley, Memoirs p. 18, quoted 
after ibid. 
Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 5. 
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definitely not one of the virtues he proved in everyday life. He experienced 
most strongly how passion may make "itself master of all the faculties of [the] 
mind." 8 8 This he wrote in the earliest surviving longer essay, Of Love. This 
reflection on these worries allows the conclusion that his political writings are 
not only shaped by intellectual ideas and political experience, but that his 
ideas on human nature bear the marks of his personal struggle to live up to his 
moral ideals. 
Sidney took the responsibility of representing his people by representing 
them from 1646 onwards in the Long Parliament. In 1649 Charles I . was 
executed, the monarchy and the House of Lords were abolished. Sidney stated 
"the King could be tried by no court"; and perhaps more importantly as an 
indication for Sidney's attitude towards Cromwell's position, that "no man 
could be tried by that court."8 9 The above quotation suggests that this 
development did not find outright approval from Sidney. In this time, "[f j rom 
1649-52,[...] he was a rare bird in Parliament."90 It is not entirely clear what 
Sidney's intention was when he opposed Cromwell's politics and the 
legitimacy of his court that became responsible for Charles I execution. But 
this event exemplifies that Sidney was not a follower of Cromwell in all 
respects. 
There is a further point that gains significance through this biographical 
detail in that it raises the question as to whether Sidney's thought is republican 
and anti-monarchist in its intention. One possible answer is that of Blair 
Worden, who pointed out that this event happened long before Sidney wrote 
his Discourses,91 On this line of thought, the occasion only reveals that there 
was a development of Sidney's thought from pro-monarchical to republican. 
8 8 Algernon Sidney, "Of Love", in A Collection of scarce and valuable Tracts ...of the Late 
Lord Somers, ed. Sir Walter Scott, 13 vols. (London, 1809-15), 8:616, quoted after ibid. 
8 9 Ewald, 1:324; cf. also David Underdown, Pride's Purge, (Oxford 1971), pp. 166n, 188. 
Quoted after ibid.: 6. 
9 0 Ibid.: 7. 
9 1 Ibid.: 6. 
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On the other hand, it also raises the question as to whether the abolition of 
monarchy might have been of lesser urgency to him than eighteenth-century 
historiography and classical republican interpretation of his political ideas 
suggest. He might have found monarchy less objectionable than the 
unchecked rule to which such political leaders as Cromwell aspired. 
Yet this did not prevent him from taking on more responsibility in politics. 
In 1652 Sidney occupied a leading position in Parliament. He favoured the 
war against the United Provinces and worked out proposals for a regulation of 
the situation in Ireland. In line with both family tradition and his conviction 
that nobility defends its country abroad, he took on responsibility for the 
foreign affairs of his country. This office put him in charge of sustaining the 
external liberty of his country; to protect its freedom against foreign attempts 
at subjection, which - ironically - he was to favour at a later stage of personal 
and political development. This vita activa came to an end in 1653 when 
Cromwell's army broke up the Rump Parliament. After Algernon Sidney was 
forced to leave parliament, he retired for the next six years from politics to 
enter again only after Oliver Cromwell had died in 1658. 
Having resumed his seat in the re-established Rump parliament, Sidney 
took on responsibility as a senior member of the Council of State. He was 
immediately placed in charge of mediating peace between Sweden and 
Denmark through a diplomatic expedition which he headed as its senior 
member. This expedition "gave Sidney [...] not only some real power and 
autonomy, a combination of which he was inordinately fond, but the 
opportunity to perform upon the great stage of Europe, and among foreign 
heads of state. It was an opportunity for which he had been prepared by family 
and political background".92 He took full advantage of his position in shaping 
the expedition to his own taste, which was not at all a diplomatic one. In co-
operation with the Dutch, former enemies but now England's fellow 
republican North-European power, Sidney pursued a course of action that 
9 2 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 127. 
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attracted attention when he managed to neglect all rules of etiquette through a 
policy which Jonathan Scott has labelled "Gunboat Diplomacy".9 3 Both the 
rigorous deployment of naval force to bring about quick agreements and his 
disregard of etiquette while negotiating with Charles X, King of Sweden, were 
unusual in the diplomatic environment of the time. 9 4 While the use of force 
reflects Algernon Sidney's conviction in the righteousness of his actions 
committed for the sake of his country as well as his impatience, his conceited 
style in dealing with Charles X shows his conviction of the English 
Commonwealth's pre-eminent position as well as his noble background. Both 
points disposed him to treat the Swedish king as an equal. Sidney finally 
completed this mission in 1660, immediately after the Restoration, with a 
treaty that secured - in his view - English naval interests, but in Charles II's 
view favoured the Swedish interests to an excessive extent. This was Sidney's 
last great office and ended with the Restoration. 
Though surprising to everyone who considers Sidney a true adversary of 
monarchy, he was far from explicitly disapproving of the new political 
developments. He stated: 
"Since the Parliament hath acknowledged a king, I knowe, and 
acknowledge, I owe him duty and the service that belongs unto a subject, 
and wil l pay i t . " 9 5 
He was ready to continue in office under the restored monarchy. This gives 
further evidence for an attitude that was not necessarily anti-monarchist.96 He 
was clearly willing to submit to the rule of law - an aspect of Sidney's 
understanding of justice - which, in this case, required the acknowledgement 
9 3 Cf. ibid., 128-42. 
9 4 Ibid., 132. 
9 5 Blencowe, R. (ed.) Diary of the Times of Charles II (1843) Sydney Papers (1823), quoted 
after ibid., 143. 
9 6 Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 8-9. 
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of the newly established king, Charles I I . Yet, as the quotation above 
indicates, he considered this not as a personal monarchy, but as a government 
founded on parliamentary acknowledgement. This perception hints already at 
his later expressed philosophy of limited government, which provides the 
context for an understanding of the words that he owed 'duty and the service 
that belongs unto a subject'. It reveals Sidney's understanding of allegiance. 
Sidney considered himself as being obliged to the authority of the 
government. The reference to parliament indicates that he accepted the 
obligation to be bound to a parliamentary sanctioned authority of the king. 
This rather mild attitude to the new government vanished after he had been 
accused of having favoured the Swedish too strongly, of declaring himself a 
defender of the Commonwealth and of accusing the King-in-Exile of being a 
bandit. Instead of recanting and asking for pardon from the King, Algernon 
Sidney chose exile.9 7 Surprisingly though, a short time later, he declared that 
he had justified the regicide out of allegiance to the government on whose 
behalf he was negotiating in Denmark.98 These opposing statements obscure 
Sidney's attitude towards monarchy, but do also indicate that allegiance to 
government had significance in his deliberations. Furthermore these 
statements indicate that Sidney's anti-monarchical attitude is not as clear cut 
as eighteenth-century and liberal admirers have liked to present him. The issue 
of allegiance, that clearly played a role in both his submission under the 
principles of the Rump as well as in his willingness to serve under the restored 
monarchy indicates that he was ready to submit himself to the rule of law. 
Hence it shows that he accepted the principle of justice that obliged him to be 
in line with the intentions of the government by which he was employed to 
serve the well being of his country. Though these occasions allow inference of 
Sidney's personal understanding of allegiance, they also indicate that his 
understanding of allegiance did not go so far that it prepared him to submit to 
9 7 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 143-7. 
9 8 Ibid., 148. 
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Charles I I through renouncing earlier anti-monarchist statements. 
Sidney's exile was a time of travel, political activity and contemplative 
retreat. Against the advice of his father, who wished his son back in England, 
he went from Denmark via Germany and Switzerland to Italy. Throughout his 
exile, he met a number of prominent contemporaries. In Hamburg, right at the 
beginning of this not quite voluntary "Grand Tour", he met Christina, Ex-
Queen of Sweden. Just converted to Catholicism, she had been to Rome and 
evidently she opened for him the doors to the highest clerical circles in Rome, 
where Sidney was soon to travel. These contacts give an idea that Sidney's 
social network was not quite a Whig one. About their conversation it is known 
that she assured Sidney that she had no aspiration to move into politics." By 
contrast Sidney's inclination to play an active role in politics did not fade 
away during his time on the continent. He was subject to a certain fluctuation 
between the eagerness and intensity in which he pursued his political aims and 
contemplative retreat to which he devoted himself in several periods during 
his Continental exile. 
The first such period was in Rome. Although far from being Catholic, 
Sidney still appreciated the intellectual culture of the Roman Clergy. 1 0 0 This 
reveals a new side of Sidney's intellectual curiosity that does not quite fit into 
the picture of a Protestant martyr. However, it does give an impression of his 
distance from ideological or, in this case, religious dogmatism. During his stay 
in Rome, Sidney maintained productive relations with Cardinals such as 
Mazarin, Palavicini, Azzolini, and Zacchetti. These were prominent members 
of the Vatican elite. Mazarin was a nephew of the Pope; Palavicini a papal 
biographer.101 Although opposed to 'Popery and Arbitrary Government' in 
domestic politics, Algernon Sidney was by no means blind to the idea that 
there might be something positive to be derived from the intellectual heritage 
of the Catholic Church. 
9 9 Ibid., 146-8. 
1 0 0 Ibid., 151. 
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Soon after this rather contemplative period Sidney found himself involved 
in political activism. In 1665, Sidney moved to Holland and wrote the Court 
Maxims, discussed and refelled. This marks a period of growing discontent 
with the English government in terms of both intellectual expression and 
concrete action. This hostility might have had its origin in an encounter with 
royalist assassins in Augsburg who tried to ki l l him in 1665.102 Regardless of 
where it came from, by the year 1666 Sidney had become a leader among the 
English exiles in Holland. After unsuccessful attempts to convince the Dutch 
government to invade England with the support of English exiles, Sidney 
moved to France to continue his endeavour of finding allies for an attack 
against the corrupted English government. This even included a meeting with 
Louis XIV that later did a lot to discredit the sincerity of Sidney's 
republicanism among eighteenth-century admirers.103 
Sidney's plans of initiating an invasion by English common-wealth men 
supported by foreign troops ended with him being finally isolated from other 
English exiles and in disagreement with Ludlow, their recognised leader. 1 0 4 
These developments demonstrate that Sidney's allegiance to the actual 
English government had by now faded away. His understanding of justice 
showed flexibility. Apparently he found himself no longer required to be 
obedient, but rather the opposite. This change appears as an interesting 
dichotomy in his attitude towards political matters. The fact that Sidney was 
finally isolated from other exiles suggests that he was neither in line with a 
common ideology in terms of his actions nor, most likely, in terms of his 
political thinking. 
The course of his political thinking is expressed in the Court Maxims. It is a 
polemic dialogue between a courtier, Philalethes and a common-wealth man, 
Eunonomius. The work has only recently been published for the first time. In 
1 0 1 Ibid., 152-63. 
1 0 2 Ibid., 172. 
1 0 3 Ibid., 4-5, 181-5. 
1 0 4 Ibid., 181-5. 
44 
Blair Worden's account, it is presented as a work of propaganda to stir up 
revolution and to overthrow Charles I I . 1 0 5 
Having lost his role as a leading republican activist among the English 
exiles, Sidney went into his final retirement in France which lasted from 1666 
to 1677.1 0 6 A notable feature of this period is that he was known to the French 
as le Comte de Sidney. He was "occupying a place of title within the French 
aristocracy which he could never [...] have occupied at home." The different 
attitude of the French towards the inheritance of titles allowed him to present 
himself in greater accordance with his self image, which in this period was 
significantly shaped by his awareness of the Percy heritage. This was 
particularly the case because of his close contact with a circle of South 
Western French Aristocrats, de Bouillon, Turenne, and de la Rochefoucauld, 
all of whom had participated in the last great French noble rebellion and to 
whom Sidney felt close affinity owing to his own family, educational and 
political background.107 
Sidney made two attempts to come back to England and in 1667 finally 
succeeded in obtaining a royal pass for his return. In his letters he expressed 
his intention to stay out of politics, his gratitude and the wish for subjection to 
the king. In his conversation with his Parisian friend Latin however, he 
expressed his inclination to influence English politics again.1 0 8 This is 
intriguing and allows for two explanations. First, he might simply have 
deceived those who were able to grant him a safe journey to England, 
secondly he may have been willing to accept the king's power as a result of 
his obligation to allegiance and have merely intended to influence politics 
from an official position. A letter of recommendation from Louis XIV to the 
1 0 5 Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 10-11. 
1 0 6 Sidney spent this time in the Languedoc, Guyenne/Bordeaux and Paris. A detailed account 
of this time is to be found in Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 
222-49. 
1 0 7 Ibid., 224-9. 
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English king, which explained Sidney's readiness to serve the king, expressed 
Sidney's identification with the parliamentary as opposed to the Cromwellian 
party. Also earlier, as we have seen, Sidney had referred to the role of 
parliament as the basis for monarchy when he had expressed his willingness to 
continue his diplomatic service under Charles I I . Such statements may be 
considered as hints to his doubts about the righteousness of the king's actions. 
Perhaps they were meant to be the back door through which he was ready to 
escape into opposition in case he found hard evidence against the legitimacy 
of the king's actions. By expressing his inclination to serve the king always in 
conjunction with reference to parliament, he unveils his conformity with 
monarchy, but underlines that he only acknowledges it as a limited monarchy. 
The idea of limited monarchy, however, was not at all in line with the view of 
a great number of Restoration politicians and Anglican clergymen. They 
sharpened their positions during the time prior to Sidney's return to England. 
Rising discontent with parliamentarian and anti-monarchist views found 
expression in both political events and intellectual dispute. Against his initial 
promise, Sidney himself had tried to regain a position of political 
responsibility, but failed. In Amersham, on 29 t h January 1679, he made his last 
attempt to get elected.109 
Three years after Sidney's return to England Charles I I dissolved 
Parliament. Sidney became involved in the intellectual expression of the 
climate of this time. Together with William Jones he wrote A just and modest 
vindication of the proceedings of the two last parliaments110. Favourers of 
personal monarchy reacted to parliamentary writings and furthered the 
publication of absolutist writings. Retrospectively, the most prominent among 
them was Sir Robert Firmer's Patriarcha, published in 1680. Interestingly, the 
author of this book, who had come from the same region as Algernon Sidney, 
was long dead when it was published. This underlines, that there must have 
1 0 9 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 183. 
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been a desire to bring absolutist literature onto the bookshelves. 
Patriarcha was considered the essence of Filmer's absolutist ideas that had 
already been published in other works. 1 1 1 The publication of the work 
stimulated Algernon Sidney, after his return to England, to put his own 
political ideas on paper. They amounted to the Discourses concerning 
government. The climate of their production, and the catalyst for Sidney's 
expression of his political thought, was Filmer and his Patriarcha. The 
Discourses, Sidney's literary reaction to absolutism, signifies the end of 
Sidney's life as parts of its unpublished draft served as evidence in his trial for 
treason, as a substitute for the second witness against him, who was required 
by law but whom Judge Jeffreys could not find. 1 1 2 
Algernon Sidney's concern for virtue and his eagerness to live up to his 
own standards is in line with both his ideals on ancient nobility and his 
intellectual background. His activism can be seen as an expression of his 
strivings for liberty and justice, although justification of the means he 
intended to deploy may remain a matter of contention. Surveying his life in 
consideration to his political thought suggests that he aimed to care for the 
well being of his people as a politician and was eager to prove that he was 
prepared to support it with drastic actions that more than once put him at risk 
of losing his head. While his participation on the parliamentary side of the 
Civil War underlines his conviction that the people's interests are to be upheld 
by the parliament, his several political offices display that he was willing to 
take up political responsibility in everyday life rather than just ruminating 
about it. The last words prior to his execution confirm this attitude and throw 
further light on the motives underlying his vita activa when he stated that he 
had prosecuted "the common rights of mankind, the laws of the land, and the 
1 1 0 Jones et al., A Just and Modest Vindication of the Proceedings of the Two Last 
Parliaments. 
1 1 1 James Tyrrell in the "Introduction" to his Patriarcha non Monarcha expressed the view 
that Patriarcha contained the essence of Filmer's other works. 
1 1 2 Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 13. 
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true protestant religion, against corrupt principles, arbitrary power, and 
popery".1 1 3 
He had to fall for his convictions. But after his execution, his political 
thought and his fame were to rise. The Discourses had been the evidence for 
his trial, his Apology, the essence of his self-defence was quickly published 
and became well known. It prepared the ground for the first publication of the 
Discourses in 1698 that was followed, as was stated in the "Introduction", by 
thirteen further editions in the century to come, initiating the period in which 
the author became a much admired martyr for the fight against absolutism. 
Sidney's life gives evidence for his idealism, and the manner of his death, 
in particular, produced admiration for him. The eighteenth-century literature 
about him reflects this. Yet it was specifically the idea of negative liberty that 
was admired and identified as the cause of his actions. Through the research 
of the past ten years, it has already been revealed that admiration for this has 
distorted the real image of Sidney, and as this paper wi l l show, particularly the 
significance of the other key concepts that characterise Sidney's thought. I f 
eighteenth-century admirers of Sidney liked to see Sidney as a hero of liberty 
and a revolutionary, then this thesis wi l l suggest on the basis of Sidney's own 
statements in the Discourses that his political thought should be considered in 
a new light and in a more holistic manner. 
As a result of the break with the eighteenth-century interpretation of his 
death as martyrdom for liberty, the question arises as to whether Sidney 
himself, informed by ancient Greek philosophy, might have seen his death as 
a situation similar to that of Socrates as described in the Phaido. Instead of a 
hero for liberty and revolution, he could thus be seen as an example for virtue 
and justice, who, informed by Christian belief, was ready to die for the well-
being of his people like the "good shepherd [...who] "lays down his life for his 
sheep."114 
1 1 3 Sidney's „Apolopgy", 3, quoted after ibid.: 4. 
114 Discourses 11.24, 224. 
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1.2 Sir Robert Filmer 
Sir Robert Filmer inspired Sidney to write down his political thought in the 
form of the Discourses. Yet upon Sidney's return to England Sir Robert 
Filmer had long been dead. It was Patriarcha, one of several absolutist 
treatises, that stirred up the anti-absolutist debate in the late seventeenth 
century and suddenly revived Filmer's spirit in a new light altogether distinct 
from the political context in which he had been working. In what follows I 
shall introduce Sir Robert Filmer and his work as it provided the starting point 
for Sidney's writing of the Discourses.115 
Born in 1588, the oldest son of eighteen children of a prosperous Kentish 
gentry family, Filmer was perhaps not the least likely proponent for a theory 
of patriarchalism.116 In terms of education, Filmer followed the usual 
educational path of a man of his standing. Having entered Trinity College, 
Cambridge in 1604, he gained admission to Lincoln's Inn the following year. 
Even i f it is not certain whether he ever went into legal practice, his works 
give us evidence that he had some knowledge of legal history albeit "much of 
his material was cribbed from a few recent authors."117 His marriage to Anne 
Heton (1618), the daughter of the Bishop of Ely, might tell something about 
the sources of his concern about religious issues, while the residence of the 
young couple, the porter's lodge of Westminster Abbey, invites speculation 
1 1 5 This chapter is based on Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed. J. P. 
Sommerville, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge [England]; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991 (1999)), Jean-Pierre Schobinger and 
Friedrich Ueberweg, Die Philosophic des 17. Jahrhunderts, Bd. 3. England, Vollig 
neubearbarbeitete Ausgabe ed., vol. 1, Grundriss Der Geschichte der Philosophie / 
Begriindet von Friedrich Ueberweg (Basel: Schwabe, 1988). 
1 1 6 Cf. PnM p. 21. Tyrell states that treatises about Patriarchalism are written by people who 
are fathers themselves, he has in mind that the author himself is profiting from the theory 
he is putting forward. 
1 1 7 Concerning Filmer's biographical details I rely on Sommerville's introduction in: Filmer, 
Patriarcha and Other Writings. 
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about Filmer's political connections. Even i f there is limited knowledge about 
this, it is at least most likely that he met and befriended Peter Heylin, who was 
at that time living at Westminster. Filmer's success on the political stage was 
rewarded with a knighthood in 1619. In 1629 he inherited his family estates in 
East Sutton and devoted himself to managing his property. 
After writing a theological and a legal treatise, Filmer developed an interest 
in writing on political matters, in particular political works promoting the 
absolute power of the king. The first work he wrote, but the last to be 
published, was Patriarcha. It only entered public discourse in 1680, long after 
Filmer's death. Only then did it catch Sidney's attention and lead him to write 
the Discourses. When Patriarcha was written Sidney was unlikely to react to 
it, having not even completed the first decade of his life. Although the exact 
date of Patriarcha's composition is still a matter of contention, it seems as i f 
the work was even written before 1631. After that time, it is likely that it 
circulated in manuscript. But even without having published Patriarcha, 
Filmer was already known as a convinced royalist, which turned him into a 
prisoner of conscience when he was arrested by parliamentarians in Leeds 
Castle for some time between 1643 and 1647. 
The absolutist argument of Patriarcha was founded on the assumption that 
Adam's patriarchal power be considered as monarchical power being granted 
dominion over the world. In Filmer's account, all Kings are to be considered 
direct heirs of Adam's initial power. This assumption builds the foundation of 
Filmer's absolutist ideas and wil l be explored further in the following chapters 
as it provided the starting point for Sidney's exposition of his political 
thought. Filmer's growing interest in publishing monarchist treaties was 
stimulated by the increasing popularity of political literature that favoured the 
idea of the mixed constitution. The intellectual climate had supported these 
developments. The fact that these ideas were to a certain extent also favoured 
1 1 8 Richard Tuck, "A New Date for Filmer's 'Patriarcha'," Historical Journal 29, no. 1 
(1986). 
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on the part of the king finds expression in His Majesties answer to the XIX 
propositions of both Houses of Parliament, (London 1642), which created 
uneasiness among such convinced favourers of divine right monarchy as 
Filmer. 
In 1648, one year before King Charles was executed, Filmer published his 
first absolutist treatise, The Freeholder's Grand Inquest, The Anarchy of a 
Limited or Mixed Monarchy followed in the same year.1 1 9 Also in 1648, 
Filmer published the Necessity of The Absolute Power of All Kings: And in 
particular of the King of England. By John Bodin, A protestant according to 
the Church of Geneva. This latter work is a collection of excerpts from 
Bodin's work. The title indicates the essence of Sidney's writings; a plea for 
acknowledging an absolute right of the English King embedded in religious 
deliberations. 
These works were a reaction to the political developments of the time in 
which ideas of the mixed constitution became increasingly popular as a topic 
of political debate, that wi l l be a topic in the next chapter. In the Freeholder's 
Grand Inquest, Filmer analyses a number of royal statutes to prove that the 
Commons had never been part of the Common Council and that there are no 
early cases affirming any royal orders of the election of popular 
representatives. The book itself was an answer to William Prynne's The 
sovereign power of kingdoms and parliaments. 
The Anarchy attacks the principle of the mixed constitution, which, in 
Filmer's view, Philip Hunton's Treatise of monarchy (London 1643) had 
1 1 9 Robert Filmer, The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy. Or, a Succinct Examination 
of the Fundamentals of Monarchy, Both in This and Other Kingdoms, as Well About the 
Right of Power in Kings, as of the Originall or Naturall Liberty of the People. A Question 
Never yet Disputed, Though Most Necessary in These Times (London: [s.n.], 1648), Robert 
Filmer, The Free-Holders Grand Inquest, Touching Our Sovereign Lord the King and His 
Parliament: To Which Are Added Observations Upon Forms of Government. Together 
with Directions for Obedience to Governours in Dangerous and Doubtful Times (London: 
1648). 
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made of of the English Constitution. With this attack, Filmer reacted to the 
contemporary tendency of interpreting the English constitution as a mixed 
form of government in which the king, the Lords and the Commons are 
considered share holders of political power. This idea had most notably 
entered political discourse through His majesties anwers. In contrast to these 
contemporary ideas, Filmer always considered monarchy as absolute as he had 
already expressed in Patriarcha. He formulates his understanding of 
monarchy as a form of government that can only function i f political power is 
limited to one person. Hence, he rejects the idea of a mixed or limited 
monarchy particularly through claiming that neither Scripture nor Aristotle's 
writings would support such a theory. With this line of argumentation, Filmer, 
again, takes up issues he already developed in Patriarcha and which also re-
occured in his Observations concerning the Originall of Government™, 
published in 1652. In this work, Filmer attacked one of the key premises of 
contractual thought that was to appear in Sidney's thought as well; he attacked 
the idea of a state of nature. While acknowledging Hobbes' absolutism, he 
attacks his usage of state of nature theory. The matter of contention over 
Hobbes' theory is the fact that his state of nature theory allows no space for an 
initial patriarchal right of Adam. Like other contemporaries, Filmer fails to 
acknowledge the hypothetical character of Hobbes' state of nature theorem.121 
The last work published during Filmer's lifetime is the Observations on 
122 
Arisotle's Politique's. It is a further example of Filmer's elaboration on 
topics that were already developed in Patriarcha. The principle target is of 
Robert Filmer, Observations Concerning the Originall of Government, Upon Mr. Hobs 
Leviathan. Mr. Milton against Salmasius. H. Grotius De Jure Belli (London: printed for R. 
Royston at the Angel in Ivie-Lane, 1652). 
1 Peter Schroder, Naturrecht Und Absolutistisches Staatsrecht: Eine Vergleichende Studie 
Zu Thomas Hobbes Und Christian Thomasius (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2001), 48-9. 
2 Robert Filmer, Observations Upon Aristotles Politiques, Touching Forms of Government: 
Together with Directions for Obedience to Governours in Dangerous and Doubtfull Times 
(London: Printed for R. Royston at the Angel in Ivie-Lane, 1652). 
52 
course Aristotle's politics. Already in the preface, Filmer expresses his 
suspicion about heathen authors and discourages his readership from turning 
to the writings of such ancient philosophers, as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero or 
Polybios. He discredits them as being unable to give advice on the "grounds 
of dominion and property which are the main principles of government and 
justice" 1 2 3 The direction of Filmer's polemics is indicated in this statement. 
Cicero and Polybios in particular were the principal sources of humanist and 
classical republicanism, Aristotle was still considered an authority on political 
matters, to whom the above authors referred. Republican ideas in political 
thinking and other ideologies promoting limited monarchy or the mixed forms 
of government appear as the key target of Filmer's critique which he combats 
for the sake of advancing his own version of the divine right theory. 
The reader well versed in the above named authors, for example Algernon 
Sidney, is bound to find counter-arguments against Filmer's theory. Filmer 
endeavours to prevent criticism of his absolutism through degrading the 
credibility of Aristotle. His main strategy in the Observations is to highlight 
contradiction in Aristotle's political ideas. On the basis of several passages 
which Filmer considers contradictory, he conveys to the reader that Aristotle 
is ignorant of principal political ideas. Scripture is the principal source he 
holds against Aristotle in such statements as: "We cannot much blame 
Aristotle for the incertainty contrariety in him about the sorts of government i f 
we consider him as a heathen. For it is not possible for the wit of a man to 
search out the first grounds or principles of government [...] except he know 
that at the creation one man alone was made, to whom the dominion of all 
things was given and from whom all men derive their title. This point can be 
learnt only from Scriptures."9 This strategy differs from the one which Sidney 
encounters in Patriarcha. In his earlier work, Filmer had primarily distorted 
Aristotle's account of politics and used it for his own purposes. He also 
indicated that he considered Aristotle's knowledge limited, but he still 
123 Observations Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, 236. 
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acknowledged him as an authority. 
The Observations are followed by a text called Directions for obedience to 
governours in dangerous and doubtfull times. In this work, Filmer 
concentrates on the issue of allegiance. His key argument consists in the plea 
that even a government of unjust origin has the end of protecting their citizens 
and therefore requires the obedience of its subjects. The argument of the 
Directions gives an impression of the main problem that motivated Filmer to 
his political authorship. It reveals Filmer as a person who aims to overcome 
his time's political instability and disposition to civil war through influencing 
in his readership in a pro-monarchist fashion. The usage of Scripture may on 
the one hand be derived from his personal idea, and on the other hand, from its 
value as a rhetorical means to convince a readership that generally agreed on 
the authority of Scripture. 
In 1653, Filmer died. The real success of his political writings however, 
was only brought about through the political developments of the late 
seventeenth century. Only about a generation after his death did he become 
well known as a political author. During the period that Jonathan Scott refers 
to as the 'Restoration Crisis', a collected edition of Filmer's works, excluding 
the Necessity and Patriarcha, was published in 1679. Only in 1680 was 
Patriarcha published the first time and the Necessity was published under the 
new title: The power of Kings. 
A more thorough interpretation of Filmer's political thought will follow in 
the exploration of his best known text, Patriarcha, the starting point for both 
Sidney's anti-absolutist polemics and for the exposition of his own political 
principles. But before, I shall shed light on a few aspects of the political and 
intellectual situation in which the political works of such royalist authors as 
Filmer were stimulated. 
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1.3 Intellectual Climate 
The political instability of the mid-seventeenth century found its climax in 
the Civil War, but even i f this struggle was between just two parties - the 
parliamentarians and the royalists - the political literature that reflects the 
general concern for political stability is characterised by a number of very 
different political positions. This variety differs from the clear cut picture of 
the superficial observer of the Civil War who succumbs to dividing the 
intellectual landscape exclusively into parliamentarians and royalists assuming 
that the royalist side equates with absolutism, and the parliamentarian with 
ideas of popular sovereignty. As John Sommerville has argued, "the English 
in fact shared [not] a single political outlook", but "several radically different 
outlooks".1 2 4 
A book, written by Dudley Digges, The unlawfulnesse of subjects taking up 
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armes against their soveraigne, in what case soever stands for the royalist 
side. Like Filmer's Directions for obedience, it promotes the general 
obligation of the subjects to obedience. Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan was 
written for a similar purpose and it seems, i f just these works are considered, 
that there is a tendency to promote absolute submission under the king as a 
means to maintain political stability. Like Filmer, many authors considered 
the idea of limited monarchy or mixed constitution as a threat to political 
stability. As we have seen in the survey of Filmer's writings, he endeavoured 
to discredit particularly the philosophers who supported the idea of the mixed 
constitution. Filmer and other royalist authors attacked for example Milton's 
Tenure of Kings and Magistrates}26 This seems to be an example that the idea 
of the mixed constitution may be identified with the parliamentary side. 
1 2 4 J. P. Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640 (London; New York: 
Longman, (1986) 1992), 3. 
1 2 5 Dudley Digges, The Unlawfulnesse of Subjects Taking up Armes against Their Soveraigne, 
in What Case Soever (London: 1644). 
1 2 6 Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates. 
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Nevertheless, a consideration of a wider range of literature reveals that the 
picture is not as clear cut as it seems. Not only parliamentarians deployed the 
argument of popular representation for the sake of maintaining stability, but 
also on the royalist side we find such tendencies. Surprisingly, the idea of the 
Mixed Constitution also found its way into political discourse from the 
royalist side. A renowned example is His Majesties answer to the XIX 
propositions of both Houses of Parliament, (London 1642).1 2 7 This work has 
already been encountered in Chapter III.2 as a target of Filmer's thought. It 
exemplifies that even among the royalist side of the political spectrum there 
was much contention over the right way for maintaining political stability and 
the power of the king. 
As His Majesties answer had a great impact on stimulating debate on the 
nature of the English government, it deserves a few comments: The text was 
written in the name of the king by Lucius Cary (Viscount Falkland, 1610?-
1643) and Sir John Colepepper. It interprets the English constitution as the 
combination of the virtues of monarchy (Unity and strength) with those of 
Aristocracy (Virtue or ability of advisers and magistrates), with those of 
democracy (Liberty, diligence, courage, which grow under liberty). 1 2 8 
Especially the element of democracy stands for the introduction of the 
argument of popular sovereignty into royalist rhetoric. Despite the concession 
that the King did not want to become "Doge of Venice", or transform the 
Kingdom into a republic, the language of the document still revived the ideal 
of the Roman Republic.1 2 9 
This work provoked discontent among authors like Filmer as well as 
provoking further developments in this direction. For example Henry Parker's 
(1604-1652) thought may stand for the support of popular sovereignty. Parker 
His Majesties answer to the XIX propositions of both Houses of Parliament, (London 
1642), quoted after Schobinger, ibid. 
Ibid. 
Schobinger and Ueberweg, Die Philosophic Des 17. Jahrhunderts, Bd. 3. England, p. 549. 
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was, to a certain extent, influenced by the Aristotelian tradition. 1 3 0 An 
important aspect of his ideas was that he combined the idea of England as a 
mixed constitution with common law thinking. 
These moderate views on the royalist side were the principal target of 
Filmer's publications. In particular the Anarchy stands for a strong attack on 
the ideas represented by the above writers. 1 3 1 Building his arguments on 
Scriptural premises and on patriarchical ideas, Filmer was a strong voice for 
absolutism. Both premises matched contemporary common sense. Owing to 
the importance religion still had in everyday life of the time, an objection to 
his thesis without a convincing argumentation had to appear as a pagan and 
therefore invalid move. Filmer's works did not provoke direct attacks during 
the author's lifetime; they did so even more when the work was posthumously 
re-published. The only explanation for this is that Filmer's Patriarcha must 
have appeared more dangerous in the context of the "Restoration Crisis", than 
the other works appeared to anti-royalists during and immediately after the 
Civil War. 
To sum up, the divers approaches that may be found among the royalist 
authors of the mid-seventeenth century show that there was no distinct royalist 
position. The royalist support for the idea of the mixed constitution shows that 
it is difficult to judge on the nature of the literature of this time by simply 
considering what institutional shape of politics they are promoting. 
Considering the supposedly opposite site of political debate, it seems too 
simplistic to judge an author like Sidney as parliamentarian, anti-monarchist, 
1 3 1 Filmer, The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy. Or, a Succinct Examination of the 
Fundamentals of Monarchy, Both in This and Other Kingdoms, as Well About the Right of 
Power in Kings, as of the Originall or Naturall Liberty of the People. A Question Never yet 
Disputed, Though Most Necessary in These Times, Robert Filmer, The Free-Holders 
Grand Inquest Touching Our Soveraigne Lord the King and His Parliament (London: 
[s.n.], 1648), Filmer, Observations Concerning the Originall of Government, Upon Mr. 
Hobs Leviathan. Mr. Milton against Salmasius. H. Grotius De Jure Belli. 
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or republican just on the basis of his promotion of the mixed form of 
government. An approach to the nature of the political thought of another can 
only be successful i f more fundamental issues are explored than just the form 
of government. Therefore, Chapter I I wil l turn to fundamental concepts of 
Algernon Sidney's thought rather than just discussing what forms of 
government he promoted. 
A further point that influenced political debate, and particularly the concern 
for stability, was tension between Catholicism and Protestantism. While the 
continent experienced the Thirty Years' War as a struggle between catholic 
and protestant political powers, England was generally protestant but still 
perceived Catholicism as a threat. This threat was perceived in different 
forms; i.e. as the threat of Catholic invasion through France or another 
Catholic power or as a fear of conspiracy. In regard to political discourse, 
ideas of popular sovereignty were sometimes identified with Catholicism. 
This was particularly so, as early forms of contractual thought and state of 
nature theory had been promoted by such Jesuit natural law thinkers as Suarez 
and Molina. Although these ideas were further developed by protestants, i.e. 
Hugo Grotius, authors like Filmer perceived them as a Catholic threat 
particularly because they undermined divine right theories. Stimulated through 
Filmer's attacks on Jesuit natural law theory, Algernon Sidney devotes some 
attention to these ideas. Although Sidney's ideas on the initial liberty of a 
people are not solely derived from Jesuit natural law thinking, their ideas are 
still an important background for the understanding of Sidney's thought. 
Filmer's attack on them stimulated Sidney's consideration of the contract as a 
means to justify popular control over the quality of the state which wil l be 
discussed in Chapter I I . In the English perspective the Jesuits were primarily 
considered a catholic means to advance the ultimate power of the Roman 
Church. Acting as a tool of counter-reformation, they had advanced a theory 
of justified rebellion and popular consent on political power. The event most 
closely associated with this perception of Catholicism is the gunpowder plot. 
Although the Catholic Church is generally associated with a rigid 
hierarchical structure, it is not surprising that ideas that amounted to a plea for 
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popular representation had their origin in Catholicism. A closer look reveals 
that even within the Catholic Church, alternatives to absolute rule had been an 
issue long before the Jesuits introduced ideas on popular sovereignty in 
consideration of secular order. Conciliarism of the fourteenth century and the 
contention among such authors as Marsilius of Padua, Dante and Ockham are 
only a few examples of this tendency. Yet the explanation for the Jesuits 
interest in natural law has its main source in their scholarly approach to legal 
thought as advanced at Salamanca by such authors as Bellarmine and Suarez 
who were to be attacked much later by Sir Robert Filmer. These authors 
deployed natural law theory to advance the absolute power of the church over 
secular order. Their justification of rebellion derived from this approach and 
was a strategy of counter reformation. Advancing the supremacy of faith over 
secular political arrangements, the Jesuits did finally aim to advance the 
power of the church - in more than just ecclesiastical matters - over protestant 
government. It was a counter attack on the doctrine of obedience, which, 
among others, Martin Luther advanced in Augustinian manner in reference to 
the secular and the divine kingdom. 1 3 2 
Looking at the post civil-war order of the state, the role of religion on 
another level becomes evident. The High Church appears as an important 
means of propaganda supporting the absolutist structure of the sovereign 
power, sometimes even more than the Crown itself. 1 3 3 Supporters of popular 
sovereignty, however, were, as in the first half of the century, repeatedly 
associated with the threat of Catholicism even i f they understood themselves 
as opponents not only of arbitrary government but also of popery. The Rye-
House plot, for example, an event Sidney has always been associated with, 
was presented as a new popish plot. As a result, the usage of theories that had 
been promoted by Jesuits were a certain danger. As a result Sidney and other 
1 3 2 Cf. Martin Luther, Von Welltlicher Vberkeytt Wie Weytt Man Yhr Gehorsam Schuldig Sey 
(Uuittemberg: Nickel Schyrlentz, 1523). 
1 3 3 This view has been emphasised in the following article: M. Goldie, "Locke,John and 
Anglican Royalism," Political Studies 31, no. 1 (1983). 
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authors who promoted ideas of natural law and initial liberty had to be careful 
in their usage of sources to avoid the accusation of favouring Catholic 
arguments. 
Jesuit natural law theory had envisaged the aim to free citizens from their 
belief that they had a God-given duty to obey their rulers. Their deployment of 
natural law theory was an implicit appeal to rely on reason. When it advanced 
further in the course of the history of political thought, it amounted to the 
ideas of the social contract. Hence there is a case to be made for considering 
Jesuit natural law theory as a source for the modern purely rational 
justification of the state. This perspective suggests that Jesuit ideas on politics 
can be seen as a first sign of the paradigm shift that took place in philosophy 
throughout the seventeenth century. 
The shift of paradigm in political philosophy is a further aspect that stands 
in the background of the political thought of Algernon Sidney and the 
intellectual climate in which he wrote. Most notable in this respect is the 
advance of modern science that placed emphasis on empirical observation in 
science as well as in political philosophy. Authoritative texts, such as the 
writings of Plato, Aristotle, and the Church Fathers, as well as the Scriptures, 
ceased to be the only recognised sources for knowledge although they still 
played a recognisable role. Firmer fought against this theory. As already 
discussed in reference to his Observations on Aristotle, he declares human 
reason inferior to the knowledge that Scripture provided about the first 
principles of politics. Filmer however, is not representative for the trend of his 
time's philosophy. As in scholastic discourse, it was still assumed that true 
knowledge could only be in accordance with Scripture. Observation was seen 
as a complementary means for disclosing Divine Will . The discovery of 
natural laws behind the phenomena was considered an aid for the right 
exegesis of Scripture, not as a contradiction. 
In political discourse the move to rationalism is explicit in the great 
emphasis placed on the importance of natural law theory. In its most extreme 
form, natural law theory intertwined with empirical observation is discernible 
in Thomas Hobbes's writings. He is a particularly good example, as he, like 
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Sidney, built his idea of a social contract on state of nature theory. Yet, as 
already mentioned in the discussion of Filmer's work, most of Hobbes's 
contemporaries were unable to recognise the innovative moment in his 
thought. It consisted in a state of nature that was a purely hypothetical 
construction whose only purpose was to reveal human nature as found in 
society. Sidney took up some of these ideas, although, as wil l be explored 
later, he tended to present the state of nature as a historical one and not as a 
hypothetical theorem. Opposing scholasticism openly, Hobbes pursued the 
aim of developing a political theory purely based on natural law. Hence, it is 
neither surprising that the principal ideas of his thought form a coherent 
system even i f one cut out all references to Scripture, nor that his writings 
were attacked as being atheist and failed to find official support from the 
English Court. 
Hobbes, like Filmer had written against popular sedition. This was in the 
climate of the civil war. The key issue in this respect was the duty to 
submission. Quentin Skinner has claimed that Hobbes's argument for 
submission under government was in not original, but just the most 
convincing example of this type of literature. Skinner deals extensively with 
the issue of allegiance,134 which also stands in the background of Sidney's 
thought. The importance of this background wi l l be considered in Chapter I I . 
The fear of a new civil war stood in the background during the time in which 
Sidney was writing the Discourses. The situation was in some respects similar 
to the mid seventeenth-century fear of popular sedition. This is where the 
debate between Filmer and his opponents has its place. Jonathan Scott referred 
to it as "a resurrection of the absolutist/anti-absolutist positions of the reign of 
Quentin Skinner, "Conquest and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the Engagement 
Controversy," in The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement, 1646-60, ed. G. E . Aylmer 
(London: Macmillan, 1972). 
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Charles I . " 1 3 5 The memory of the Interregnum gave rise to the assumption that 
an English Republic as an alternative to absolutism was indeed possible, 
which caused both fear and hope. While fear of dissolution is evident in the 
publication of royalist treatises, such as the posthumous publication of 
Filmer's whole work; hope for a move away from absolutist structures found 
expression in Sidney's writings. 
Yet, the intellectual landscape of this period was again as diversified as 
around the middle of the century. Absolutist works were not the only ones 
aiming to prevent the repetition of the dissolution of political order. There was 
a great number of anti-absolutist writers, who would not perceive themselves 
as republicans or commonwealth-men, but as Royalist, who did still found 
their political theories on the premise of popular consent as Sidney did. For 
example James Tyrrell, who wi l l be considered later, states in the Introduction 
to Patriarcha non Monarcha that he is not a "Commonwealths-man" himself. 
He "reverence[s] Monarchy above all other forms of Government and should 
be as willing to have it unmixed." Besides Tyrrell there were a number of non-
republican authors who furthered the idea of a limited monarchy. A number of 
political writers and politicians whom David Smith labelled constitutional 
royalists pursued a distinct form of monarchy and already had a considerable 
impact on English political debate during the Civil War. Their ideas still 
played a role during the Restoration Crisis period. 1 3 6 
As in the middle of the century, the variety of positions adopted between 
the extreme ideas makes it difficult to categorise the different thinkers in 
terms of royalists, parliamentarians, or republicans. A l l terms neither say 
anything substantial about the character of the different writers nor do they 
1 3 5 Jonathan Scott, "England's Troubles: Exhuming the Popish Plot," in The Politics of 
Religion in Restoration England, ed. Tim Harris, Paul Seaward, and Mark Goldie (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1990), 210. 
1 3 6 David L . Smith, Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, C. 1640-1649, 
Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). 
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describe a distinct group. Hence, the usage of such terms may fail to be of any 
help for understanding the particularities of an author's political thought. This 
is significantly so in the case of Algernon Sidney's political thought; it cannot 
simply be classified as republican. Despite all the republican elements, a close 
reading of the text reveals a form of aristocratic elitism at the core of Sidney's 
thinking. Thus, a fruitful assessment of this time's moving intellectual forces 
can only centre around significant questions within the intellectual dialogue, 
rather than exclusive ideologies like royalism, parliamentarianism, or 
republicanism. Only i f one goes beyond such categories as royalism or 
patriotism may the real issues of the time be laid open. I aim to achieve this by 
concentrating on distinct concepts. Looking at such intellectual concepts as 
virtue, liberty and justice, I hope to move away from an over-simplistic view 
that tries to pigeonhole an author into a particular ideology or stream of 
thought. 
The Exclusion Crisis is the period in which Filmer's Patriarcha was 
published and in which Sidney started writing the Discourses. In that time, an 
opposition to King Charles I I was being established. It had the aim of 
excluding the king's brother, James, Duke of York from the succession. 
Although this period is generally referred to as the Exclusion Crisis, the 
accuracy of this term has recently been challenged by Jonathan Scott. His 
argument deserves some attention in this discussion because his doubts about 
the traditional interpretation of the crisis have emerged from research on 
Algernon Sidney. In the core of Scott's argument stands the thesis, as the title 
of his book, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis 1677-83, already 
suggests, that it would be appropriate to name the crisis of 1677-83 a 
Restoration rather than an Exclusion Crisis. He bases his argument on the 
claim that seventeenth-century England can only be understood i f one widens 
the scope to developments on the continent and their relation to the English 
perception of religious tensions. Placing great emphasis on the extent to which 
English politics are embedded in the European context, he suggests that the 
problem of exclusion is only the tip of the iceberg of the more important issue 
of religious tensions between Catholicism and Protestantism. Thereby, he 
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links the immediate fear of popery and absolutism with the wider intellectual 
context of the century, which had been shaped by religious tensions as well as 
claims to absolutism on different levels. 
A further strand of Scott's argument is based on the evidence that exists 
regarding contemporary perception of the crisis. Taking the contemporary 
experience of the past into account to a greater extent than has hitherto been 
done, he attacks interpretations of the crisis of 1678-83 that link it with the 
future rather than the past historical events. In this, he is pointing out the 
historian's temptation to be blinkered by the crisis of 1689. He assesses this 
temptation as being the main reason for losing sight of sources revealing the 
immediate impression of contemporaries. Referring to a survey on the 
pamphlet literature of the time, Scott points out the evidence for the 
contemporary perception of the similarities to the crisis of Charles I , which he 
calls "the first crisis of popery and arbitrary government".137 Challenging 
Jones' thesis of the importance of party structures for the understanding of the 
Crisis, Scott tries to establish his own account which is refined in England's 
Troubles. His main argument against Jones is based on the thesis of 
contemporary unawareness of party structures during the crisis of 1678-83.139 
Scott holds against the argument for the importance of the issue of 
exclusion in 1678 that contemporary sources do not provide sufficient 
references to it. Opposed to this finding is the title of Andrew Marvell's The 
Growth of Popery and arbitrary Government,140 which in itself already 
1 3 7 Betty Behrens, "The Whig Theory of the Constitution in the Reign of Charles Ii," 
Cambridge Historical Journal 7, no. 1 (1941): 44. Quoted after: Scott, Algernon Sidney 
and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 9. 
1 3 8 J. R. Jones, The First Whigs: The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678-1683, Durham 
University Publications. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). Cf. above all: Scott, 
Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 12-17. 
1 3 9 Behrens, "The Whig Theory of the Constitution in the Reign of Charles Ii," 44. Quoted 
after: Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 9. 
1 4 0 Andrew Marvell, An Account of the Growth of Popery, and Arbitrary Government in 
England, More Particularly, from Nov. 1675 Till 16th. July 1677 (Amsterdam: 1677). 
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appears as an explicit hint to the problems Scott sees in the heart of the crisis. 
Scott's thesis finds confirmation in consideration of the anti-Filmer authors. 
Sidney's Discourses, Tyrrell's Patriarcha non Monarcha and Locke's Two 
Treatises do not leave the reader with the impression that exclusion was one 
of the key issues of these works. Anticipations of exclusion are both too 
scarce and too vague to justify the assumption that exclusion was the main 
issue governing the thoughts of these authors while composing their works. 
Having no evidence for a deliberate omission of direct references to exclusion, 
the literature suggests that exclusion might have lurked in the background, but 
did not attract particular attention. 
With his statement that Whig and Tory denoted different beliefs not 
different parties,141 Scott points us in the direction of the religious struggles as 
the key factor for any explanation of intellectual landscape of the time when 
he states, "The Restoration Crisis crystallised political belief. This 
crystallisation took place through the lens of the past, the lens of history. It 
gave rise to a debate about politics, and religion, which produced some of the 
most influential political writings in English history." 1 4 2 
1.3.1 The Target: Patriarcha 
It may be said that the experience of the success of the parliamentary side 
in the Civil War created both a confirmation of the necessity of parliamentary 
power and a sharp attack on such views. During the interregnum, absolutist 
positions were sharpened and they built an ideological cornerstone for the re-
established royal sovereignty. The restoration, on the other hand, revived the 
ideas of the mixed constitution, which finally prepared the ground for their re-
emergence during the troubles of the 1680s and nourished the discontent with 
absolutist writings. 
141 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 14. 
1 4 2 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Most important for placing Sidney's Discourses in the right context is the 
information that Filmer's Patriarcha was published in 1680. Apparently only 
in the Crisis of 1678-1683 were Filmer's ideas perceived as a serious threat to 
the English political situation. Otherwise, it would be surprising why 
Patriarcha stimulated people like Sidney, Tyrrell and Locke to respond to it. 
The role and the content of Patriarcha wil l be the object of this chapter. 
Patriarcha owes its significance to both its originality and to its modes of 
argumentation. After Peter Laslett established the thesis that Patriarcha and 
not Hobbes's Leviathan was the main target for Locke's political ideas, Filmer 
has been seen on the one hand as a representative of contemporary Divine 
Right theory and on the other hand as a far more individualistic writer than 
most royalist authors.143 The point of greatest interest for this paper, however, 
is not so much Filmer's relation to other absolutist writers, but his work itself 
and its reception by the anti-absolutist opponents forming the intellectual 
context of Sidney's Discourses. 
With Filmer's Patriarcha we come to the heart of the historical context of 
the political writings of the Restoration Crisis. Being only published in 1680 
and perceived as an attack on critics of the Restoration Government, 
Patriarcha became the starting point for discussions on the nature of kingship, 
sovereignty, liberty and popular representation, and served thereby as the 
initiator for a whole range of literature on the original principles of 
government in general.144 Filmer's patriarchalism proved on the one hand to 
be a strong supporter of English absolutism and on the other hand a view too 
Cf. James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought (Toronto; London: 
University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. xii. 
I shall refer to the significance of this role of Patriarcha later on as it requires some further 
comments. I take this observation as the starting point for the discussion of the true origin 
and the true purpose of the constitutional and moral ideas we take for granted in our 
society. 
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extreme to be supported fully. This proves the reception of Filmer, who was 
read and referred to by absolutist writers to a lesser extent than for example 
Thomas Hobbes. One explanation for the success of Patriarcha is its capacity 
to address a great number of issues that prevailed in contemporary discourse. 
Owing to the similarity of the problems occurring in the 1680s and the 1740s, 
Filmer's text could gain such a great importance long after the author himself 
was dead. 
In the centre stands his principle of absolute monarchy, an argument taken 
up most gratefully by the supporters of the government which was already 
under attack. As in the 1640s, the principle of popular sovereignty had gained 
new importance and repeatedly found its expression in the attempts to 
strengthen the role of parliament as the people's representative body. Beside 
classical ideas of mixed forms of government, natural right theories received 
increasing attention. Hugo Grotius, John Selden and Pufendorff especially 
were widely read and became a source of natural law thinking, far less 
associated with Catholic theories of resistance than the Jesuit natural law 
thinkers attacked by Filmer. 
Filmer is motivated by the argument for popular sovereignty. Like Hobbes, 
his main concern is, as stated earlier, the issue of obedience. However, he 
differs from his contemporary insofar as he has not the ambition to elaborate 
on an entirely new system of political thought. Relying to a great extent on 
both Bodin's absolutism and his philosophical style, he excels in deploying 
Scripture as a strong premise for his ideas. 
The principal object of his polemics is the premise that man was born free 
and therefore has a right to choose his own government. His intellectual 
enemies writing in support of this premise are in particular (1) scholastics, (2) 
1 4 5 Laslett claimed, "there was something faintly ridiculous about Filmer even by the year 
1679", but does not hesitate to refer to Locke and Shaftsbury's concern about him to show 
how seriously he was still taken. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter 
Laslett, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, (1988) 1997. 
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papists and (3) the Reformed churches. Thus he targets the major sources of 
early modern natural law thinking commonly associated with the modern 
concept of popular representation. The particular problem motivating Filmer 
is the emergence of this theory in the reformed churches. Being anxious about 
the political development in his native land - a country of reformed belief - he 
sees the danger that this inheritance of the Reformation could 'poison' the 
English state. In particular the popularity of such "favourers of the Geneva 
discipline" as Buchanan (De iure regni apud Scotus) raised Filmer's concern. 
Buchanan's discontent with the kingly prerogative over law as well as his 
argumentation for the people's right to choose their government made him in 
Filmer's eyes a threat to kingly power. 1 4 6 
According to Filmer's own perception, the people were fooled in the "faith, 
that a man may become a martyr for his country by being a traitor." 
Accordingly, he states, "the new coined distinction of subjects into royalists 
and patriots is most unnatural, since the relation between king and people is so 
great that their well-being is reciprocal." 1 4 7 With this (Bodinian) statement we 
get to the heart of Filmer's account of the contemporary situation. It is 
revealing for the author's historical context and the place of his ideas in the 
history of political thought. For Filmer, there is no doubt that the king is the 
true embodiment of the state. The separation of the office of the king from the 
person seems impossible. The king is as much the holder of sovereignty as he 
is the symbol of it. Thus it must seem absurd, from Filmer's perspective, to 
attack a king for any failures or even to accuse him of being a lawbreaker. 
With this statement he gives a good example of contemporary perception, as 
we find it to a certain extent even Sidney's views when he expressed his 
disapproval of the trial of Charles I with the words, "the king may be tried by 
148 
no court." Although Sidney's attitude towards the issue changed throughout 
his life, we may still take his words as an example of the general perception of 
146 Patriarcha, (2) 2. 
147 Patriarcha 1,1, p. 5 
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the time. 
Looking at the statement in a wider context, we encounter the move from 
the medieval idea of the commonwealth to the modern concept of the state. 
According to the above quotation, Filmer shared an ontology that was not yet 
prepared to accommodate the idea of the state as an entity separated from the 
holder of political office. The transformation of politics into a mere functional 
system, as stimulated, for instance, by Hobbes, had not yet taken place. The 
political system was still perceived as an organic unit in which everyone had 
his due place. This is a thought that appears also in Sidney, but with entirely 
different resonances (see Chapter II). This perception provided as fruitful a 
ground for Bodinian absolutism as for classical republicanism. It was the 
former which flourished in Filmer's ideas. In conjunction with Scripture, 
Bodin's ideas form the foundation of Filmer's absolutism.149 
Having written against the success of the theory of popular sovereignty, 
Filmer could not know that he would deliver the most extreme arguments in 
favour of both the absolute power of the weakened government in the 
Restoration Crisis and, a short time later, the issue of Exclusion: his concern 
was the failure of earlier defenders of the crown to attack the theory of 
popular sovereignty. When in the 1680s Filmer's entire work had finally been 
published, the situation had some similarities. Theories of popular 
sovereignty, in particular of mixed forms of government, infringed the 
absolute power of the King. Filmer's ideas were to be revived in this situation 
to deliver arguments that could establish the superiority of the King and 
minimize the sovereignty of Parliaments. Excluding both the right of the 
people to have any say in the issue of succession and to infringe the King's 
decision at all, Filmer's thought strengthened the royalist side. Finally, and 
this has to be emphasised, Filmer's theory was an attack on such modern ways 
1 4 8 Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 6. 
1 4 9 Cf. Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought, p. 23. Daly acknowledges that 
Filmer was not a Bodinian thinker, but still points out that the Bible and Bodin were his 
main sources. 
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of reasoning as empiricism and Rationalism, which were seen by many as a 
danger for true religion. Unlike Hobbes's, Filmer's way of arguing avoided 
the accusation of atheism, but offered an alternative. 
Despite the forceful argumentation in Patriarcha, it seems as i f the Royalist 
side did make a far less exhaustive use than one would imagine of the theory 
provided by Filmer. According to James Daly, Filmer's "name and influence 
were usually conspicuous by their absence" in royalist writings of the 
1680s.150 Conversely it stirred up heated reaction on the anti-absolutist side, as 
proved by the writings considered in the following chapters. The force of his 
argument stimulated opponents to react and thereby they dragged Filmer's 
absolutism into the political discourse of the time. 
While the title-page of Patriarcha already indicates what nature of 
argumentation the reader may expect, the chapter headings summarise 
Filmer's main arguments. These are the following: (1) The first kings were 
fathers of families. (2) It is unnatural for the people to govern or choose 
governors. (3) Positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of 
kings. Considering the principal lines of argumentation, the following is to be 
said: The first chapter stands for the elaboration of his original argument for 
the divine right of kings. Being dominated by exegetic argumentation, Filmer 
presents a theory which deviates from the thought of his contemporaries in so 
far as he derives divine right solely from his own interpretation of Adam's 
paternal power. It aims to provide a strong basis for the recognition of de facto 
kingship, without legitimising other forms of government. The second chapter 
refutes natural law assumptions about sovereignty and argues for the 
superiority of absolute monarchy on the basis of divine wi l l , historical 
evidence (based on various sources including Scripture), and references to 
authoritative philosophers. The treatise concludes with a chapter in which 
jurisprudential and historical strands of argumentation dominate to support the 
idea of absolute sovereignty. Here, the theory addresses most directly the 
1 5 0 Ibid., p. xii. 
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English situation. The historical context for the theory is evident in the 
references to king and parliament. Anxiously Filmer shows what thorough 
foundation the kingly prerogative has. 
These points are backed, according to Filmer's own words, with the 
following modes of argumentation: (a) theological, (b) rational, (c) historical 
and (d) legal. Theological and historical argumentation often rely on Scripture 
owing to its authoritative status as well as its value as a primary source. A 
look at the text confirms that Filmer carried out the above modes of 
argumentation. They support the main argument, and as Locke polemically 
remarked, Filmer's only argument; the thesis for the divine right of kings 
derived from the fatherly power of Adam. This argument recurs throughout 
the treatise; it is at the core of Filmer's political writings. It rests on the thesis 
that fatherly and political powers are identical and aims to present the 
argument as a theologically sound interpretation of the origin of political 
power. The different modes of argumentation aim to provide a defence against 
the possible objections to Filmer's thesis, although the theological side 
appears as both the most original and the most persuasive argument in 
contemporary discourse. 
Filmer introduces his argument right at the opening of his text. Here Adam 
is presented as the first holder of absolute power. Arguing mainly on the basis 
of (a) the theological perspective and (c) the historical perspective, he builds 
the foundation for his political conception by applying political terms to 
fatherly power. Filmer's account of the theory of popular sovereignty, its 
context and origin, leads him to the discussion of natural law issues, which 
can be said to represent (b) the rational side of his argumentation. For Filmer, 
the source of political authority is the sovereign power God granted to Adam 
as the first patriarch and sovereign. He supports this argumentation by 
referring to Adam's absolute paternal power over his wife, his children and his 
servants. Furthermore, he refers to Genesis to claim that Adam was ordained 
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to be absolute sovereign over creation.151 The natural law argumentation of 
such contemporaries as Grotius did not fit into this framework, consequently it 
proved to be a challenge for Filmer's points, and provided a starting point for 
the refutation of Filmer's thesis. 
Considering the political practise, one of the most evident problems with 
Filmer's thesis was the question of succession. Being aware of it, Filmer held 
that the succession of absolute sovereign power went via the sons of Noah to 
the Kings of the Old Testament and finally to all later kings. He states that 
there has always and in every country been a legitimate heir, even when his 
identity was not known. To solve the problems evolving from such a 
statement, Filmer claims that the de facto sovereign had to be accepted as the 
152 
right heir. As a result Filmer's theory shows a certain proximity to 
pamphlets of the engagement controversy,1 5 3 although he differs substantially 
from a great number of writers as he insists that political power has its source 
always in royal sovereignty. 
Filmer's main attack, directed against the natural law thinkers, tries to 
prove the flaws in a theory of popular sovereignty. Arguing on a theological 
basis, Filmer claims that Scripture does not prescribe that political power has 
to be consent based. In the manner of Early Modern absolutists, he claims 
monarchies were in accordance with the creation of the Universe and supports 
this statement with the observation that republican times only led to chaos and 
civil war. Looking at the sources for the idea of popular sovereignty, it is 
1 5 1 This is a point Locke criticises already in the beginning of his First Treatise and it is most 
likely that his theory of acquisition (2nd Treatises) developed from this critique. 
1 5 2 Here it is to ask whether there was a de facto theory of political obedience which 
influenced Filmer similarly to Hobbes, or how Filmer comes to the claim of this principle. 
It is also likely, that he is just influenced by the current problems of the engagement 
controversy when he puts forward this statement. A closer analysis of this idea in 
consideration of problem of succession might also help to understand how Filmer's work 
entered the political debate in the 1670s and 1680s. 
1 5 3 The best discussion of this literature is Skinner, "Conquest and Consent: Thomas Hobbes 
and the Engagement Controversy". 
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surprising that Filmer takes most examples from the Jesuits Suarez and 
Bellarmine. He does not refer much to more recent natural law thinkers. 
Grotius is quoted a few times, but older sources prevail. In terms of sources 
backing Filmer's argumentation, Aristotle is most conspicuous. Filmer's use 
of him is noteworthy as a number of natural law thinkers do also refer to 
Aristotle but support an opposite case. In particular Hobbes's disapproval of 
Aristotelian philosophy had grown from his judgement that Aristotelian moral 
philosophy had paved the ground for sedition. Just for now, it is worth 
recalling that there is an absolutist Aristotelian tradition, which was strong on 
the continent and explicitly expressed in Bodin - the chief influence on 
Filmer's ideas - as well as the republican tradition, which we find being taken 
up by seventeenth-century anti-absolutists or monarachomachs among which 
we can also locate Sidney. 
Filmer himself plays a key role as the initiator of natural law discourse 
among anti-absolutist writers. He introduces the notion of a state of nature in 
the discussion by quoting: " I f the positive law be taken away, there is left no 
reason why amongst a multitude (who are equal) one rather than another 
should bear rule over the rest."154 This argument, which serves as a basis for 
his attack on the initial liberty of man, inevitably stimulated the minds of 
Sidney and likeminded thinkers and forced them to deal extensively with the 
natural law principles underlying just constitutional arrangements. Thereby, as 
I shall show later in this chapter, he played a major role in shaping the way in 
which Sidney, Locke and Tyrrell developed their own political systems. Most 
evident becomes Filmer's impact through a comparison of Sidney's Court 
Maxims and the Discourses. While many concepts, such as the principle of 
virtue as a justification for political leadership, are developed in the former 
work and just re-appear in the Discourses, the discussion of the concept of 
initial liberty and a state of nature does only occur in the Discourses. Hence 
this addition to the already existing political ideas may be accredited to the 
154 Patriarcha 1.2, 5. 
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contention with Filmer. 
The lack of convincing premises for his argument is at the centre of 
Locke's critiques on Filmer's absolutism. Yet Filmer's arguments were still 
thorough enough to provoke his opponents to the writing of several hundred 
pages. Apparently, Filmer's arguments were - in the late seventeenth century 
- considered strong enough to justify such a reaction. To understand the heart 
of the crises we have to turn to Filmer's principal statements. They are: (1) 
that even Bellarmine states monarchy was in accordance with creation. (2) 
Scripture does not give evidence for an assembly of the people. (3) History 
proves, in particular in the case of Rome, that power is mainly kingly. (4) In 
Roman history, republics always had a short life only; all improvements of 
republican times were quantitative. (5) The example of David shows that God 
ordered Kingly rule. 1 5 5 
These arguments derive their great strength only in conjunction with 
Filmer's perpetual reference to Scripture. Unlike the unpopular Hobbes, he 
avoided getting into the danger of being suspected of being an atheist. Unlike 
Hobbes', Filmer's argument did not gain its significance from its 
philosophical sharpness, but from the intertwining of philosophical modes of 
argumentation with theological premises. Beside Scripture, history played an 
important role in Filmer's argumentation. Sharing this mode of discourse with 
republicans, he was en vogue, and may be even more accurate about the 
Roman period than his opponents. Relying mainly on Livy's interpretation of 
Roman republicanism, classical republicans distorted the historical facts of the 
Republican period as it served their purposes. The reading of Machiavelli, of 
course influenced their picture of Rome tremendously. Filmer's interpretation, 
on the other hand, even i f he does not give an accurate account of his sources, 
is far closer to what twentieth-century classicists have brought to light about 
the Roman past. 
155 Patriarcha 96. 
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A first decisive difficulty in Filmer's text occurs when he analysis 
Bellarmine's thesis of the divine origin of the immediate political power in the 
people. Filmer's way of dealing with this statement is not convincing. He 
questions the value of this statement by interpreting it as the hypothesis that 
God was the author of democracy.156 In this, he neglects the fact that 
Bellarmine is speaking about a situation characterised by the absence of 
government rather than about a specific form of it. Hence, Filmer wrongly 
equates Belllarmine's assumption of political power in the people with an 
ordinance for democracy. This is an over-simplistic interpretation in regard of 
the state of nature, which we have already encountered, especially because 
Bellarmine states that the multitude directs the power and is not seen as the 
corporation that executes the power itself, as Filmer would understand it. 
Twisting the facts in Bellarmine's statement, Filmer prepares the ground for 
his thesis that God must have given an ordinance about the holder of political 
power and arrives at his familiar conclusion that this form of government has 
to be tied to a single person.1 5 7 
With this thesis, which is restated in various forms, Filmer has got to 
address the question of succession. Although he clearly argues for an 
exclusive succession of political power, he still does not give a sufficient 
explanation for the coexistence of several holders of political office in 
different places and that, in situations of conflict, the right ruler would have to 
be determined. In this respect, he appears in the end as a de facto theorist and 
deviates from his initial claim that political office is inherited directly from 
Adam's fatherly sovereignty. 
Patriarcha 1.2, 5-6. 
Patriarcha 1.2, p. 6-7. 
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1.3.2 Aspects of the anti-Filmer controversy 
Sidney's Discourses are first of all an attack on Sir Robert Filmer's 
absolutism, but the work also contains a political theory. As an attack on 
absolutism the Discourses belong into the context of those writings that had 
the same polemical intention. Yet, despite being polemics against absolutism, 
the Discourses also fulfilled the purpose of broadcasting the author's political 
ideas to the reader. In this sense Filmer's Patriarcha served as a catalyst for 
Sidney to bring his political ideas to light. Although Sidney's political ideas 
conveyed through the Discourses are central to this essay, the dispute against 
Filmer still deserves attention as it dictated the form in which Sidney 
presented his political ideas. After all, Filmer's Patriarcha stimulated Sidney 
to recollect his political ideas. In case of an intended publication or informal 
circulation, it would also have fulfilled a rhetorical purpose: as Patriarcha 
obviously provoked rebuttal, a readership disapproving of Filmer's thought 
and absolutist theory would devote greater attention to Sidney's theory i f 
presented as an attack on Patriarcha, instead of a mere presentation of a 
political theory. 
Regardless of whether this speculative meditation on the form of Sidney's 
thought gives an exact account of Sidney's deliberations on potential 
readership, it still remains a fact that Sidney's theory of the Discourses is 
presented as an attack on Filmer. As a result, an attempt to understand the 
political ideas of Sidney in their significance for their time should include an 
exploration of the immediate literary context which is constituted by the 
argument of Filmer's Patriarcha, as the starting point for Sidney's 
presentation of his ideas as well as the writings of further anti-Filmer authors. 
The most prominent among them, we encounter in this exploration are Locke 
and Tyrrell. Even i f their works attracted public attention later than Sidney's -
unlike him, these authors had not the chance to promote their books through a 
spectacular trial followed by an execution - they still deserve to be considered 
in conjunction with the Discourses owing to their similar purpose. But first, 
the text wi l l recall who these fellow anti-Filmer authors actually were and 
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proceed with an attempt to throw light on a few issues that were of mutual 
concern for Sidney, Locke and Tyrrell. 
Exploring the ideas of Locke in this context is particularly interesting as he 
is the political theorist who is considered a classic example of the sources of 
western constitutional thought. Sidney was for a long time read alongside 
Locke whenever, for example, American authors inquired into the nature of 
constitutional ideas. Exploring the ideas of Tyrrell, on the other hand, opens a 
further opportunity to get an impression of contemporary anti-absolutist 
argument. Even i f he has not advanced to our time's classical texts of political 
theory, he still had certain significance for the modern development of the 
idea of property as it seems that his ideas on property had a direct impact on 
John Locke. 
In the current exploration of the relationship between Patriarcha, and the 
anti-absolutist writings, Sidney's text serves as a frame of reference. I shall 
ground this exploration on Jonathan Scott's analysis of Sidney's text and add 
information about the relationship to the other anti-Filmer authors. The actual 
content of Sidney's theory, or the essence of it, wi l l be subject of the next 
chapter. In this account the context in regard of similarities and dissimilarities 
to Tyrrell's and Locke's ideas - is of greatest importance as well as the form 
of the argument, which is dictated by the context of Patriarcha'% impact. 
Jonathan Scott's account of Sidney's Discourses wi l l serve as a guideline. 
"For Sidney, as for Locke [and Tyrrell], people are naturally equal - not 
actually, but morally, in their relationship to God. They are also naturally 
free - in their relationship to one another, not in their relationship to 
God." 1 5 8 
Jonathan Scott hits the nail on the head with this characterisation of the 
premises for the attack on Filmer. On Tyrrell, even i f not considered by 
1 5 8 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 215. 
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Jonathan Scott, this statement fits as well. Filmer himself was the originator of 
this emphasis on liberty and equality. As mentioned in the chapter on 
Patriarcha, the principal object of Filmer's polemics was the premise that 
man was born free and therefore has a right to choose his own government. 
Refuting this premise with his emphasis on the patriarchical right of kings 
derived from Scripture, Filmer had the effect that the limitation of liberty 
implicit in his theory was disproved on the basis of both theological and 
natural law argumentation. This was indeed the starting point for the writings 
of all three authors who declared liberty an original principle of government. 
Through this the relationship between Filmer, Locke and Tyrrell Filmer 
became, unintentionally and indirectly, one of the key originators of the 
modern emphasis on liberty as a principle of government. 
Liberty and equality are so fundamental in the anti-Filmer writings owing 
to their reference to a state of nature. In this account the ideas of Bellarmine 
are taken up and developed further. The prevailing thought is that this liberty 
and equality of a state of nature is the foundation for considering government 
as a contractual arrangement. This concept is diametrically opposed to 
Filmer's interpretation of government as a divinely sanctioned order that 
regulates the life of man. While Filmer's system is rigid in its exclusive appeal 
to recognition of absolutist monarchical government, the contract allows a 
variety of possible institutional arrangements. This variety is reflected in the 
writings of Sidney, Locke and Tyrrell. There is a mutual consensus on liberty 
as an original principle of government, but apart from mutual consent that an 
absolute government is not an acceptable one, all authors provide a different 
answer to the question what the right form of government is. While Sidney 
promotes a form of government that furthers virtue among citizens and 
magistrates, but is not specific in terms of a particular constitutional 
arrangement, Locke promotes a government that is sanctioned by parliament, 
while Tyrrell is specific in his statement that he "references monarchy above 
all other[s]" forms of government. It is not a rejection of monarchy itself that 
78 
is the target of his argument, but a rejection of absolute monarchy on the basis 
of the laws of nature. 1 5 9 
Locke's Two Treatises introduce and reject Filmer's argument. First, 
Locke, like Sidney, refutes the argument that man was not born free. He starts 
with the accusation of Filmer's theory as degrading all men to a state of 
slavery through the thesis that no man is born free. 1 6 0 In chapter I I , he already 
turns to discussing the difference between paternal and regal power, to 
continue with the rejections to Adam's title of sovereignty in chapter I I I - V I , 
to complete this argumentation with the discussion of Adam's right of 
dominion in consideration of his right of property in chapter V I I I . Locke 
finishes the first book by scrutinising such further issues as inheritance in 
chapter IX-XI . Book two, the better known part of Locke's theory, sets out a 
counter definition of political power, as "a Right of making Laws" and 
punishment.161 Locke continues with definitions of right and punishment. 
During the discussion of the state of nature he introduces life, liberty and 
property as fundamental values that are to be protected by natural law. In the 
course of the further exploration these values form the foundation for 
discussing the constitutional shape of politics. To sum up, the favoured 
institutional shape expressed in his work is built around the idea of protecting 
citizens, rather than influencing them in their moral development, as is the 
case in Sidney's approach. The contract serves as justification for the 
maintenance of the political principles established. 
James Tyrrell is far less well known even than Sidney. He also stands in the 
shadow of John Locke. While mentioned frequently in conjunction with John 
Locke and the circle around Shaftesbury, Tyrrell hardly got any exlusive 
PNM, "Introduction". 
1st Treatise, 1.1-3, 141-2. 
2nd Treatise 1.3, 268. 
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attention, nor does his Patriarcha non Monarchal2 There is only one article 
by J.W. Gough that is completely devoted to Tyrrell and provides further 
information on this author's background.163 
Tyrrell sets out, that interpretation of Scripture ought to be in accordance 
with reason. He primarily concentrates on the practical implications of 
Filmer's theory. Through discussing the legal implications of domestic 
relationships between parents, children and slaves and the nature of marital 
relationships,164 Tyrrell prepares the ground for discussing political matters in 
showing that domestic and political power are not equivalent.165 Tyrrell 
continues with inquiring into the origin of sovereignty and of society, which is 
the key for the rejection of Filmer's absolutism.166 In the following sections, 
Tyrrell deploys the relationship between children and parents as a metaphor 
for government subject relationships. Speaking about children suffering under 
i l l behaviour of their parents, Tyrrell introduces the natural law of self-
preservation as a justification of disobedience. In consideration of 
government, Tyrrell underlines, that the power of a king is the result of a 
contract and not a God given right. 
In the annexed account of Filmer's Observations concerning the original of 
government, and of the Observations on Aristotle's Politick's, Tyrrell presents 
James Tyrrell, Patriarcha Non Monarcha: The Patriarch Unmonarch'd: Being 
Observations on a Late Treatise and Divers Other Miscellanies, Published under the 
Name of Sir Robert Filmer (London: Printed for Richard Janeway, 1681). 
J. W. Gough, "James Tyrrell, Whig Historian and Friend of John Locke," The Historical 
Journal 19, no. 3 (1976). Owing to Tyrrell's Brief disquisition of the law of nature 
according to the principles and method laid down in the Reverend Dr Cumberland's Latin 
treatises on that subject, (London 1692), he found further attention in Jon Parkin, Science, 
Religion and Politics in Restoration England : Richard Cumberland's De Legibus 
Naturae, Studies in History (London: Royal Historical Society, 1999), 215-21. 
PnM 15-22; 102-113. 
PnM 44-109. 
PnM 104-123 (there is a pagination mistake in the book). 
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his theory of the development of property. As later re-stated by Locke, 1 6 7 the 
earth is considered common property and may be acquired through work in 
accordance with the respective needs of a person. Here again Tyrrell brings in 
the natural law principle of self-preservation. With this - in contemporary 
perspective- innovative approach, Tyrrell attacks Filmer's principle of 
dominion, which was the major issue in his and Locke's battle against Filmer, 
but which was also the issue that distinguished them from Sidney's approach. 
Tyrrell's and Locke's major difference from Sidney is the issue of property 
rights, that play a minor role in the Discourses. 
For the current exploration, the meaning of natural law arguments deserves 
attention in relation to the refutation of the original right to dominion, or 
political power and property. In the course of assessing Filmer's polemics 
against Bellarmine, Sidney asks, "Whether in his opinion, the empire of the 
whole world doth, by the laws of God and nature, belong to one man[...]?"1 6 8 
He gives the answer himself in referring to the principle of liberty and equality 
in relation to the pre-social scenario of the state of nature. Rather than 
belonging to one man, here political power belongs to every man. According 
to their own judgement individuals join together and "set up one, or a few men 
to govern them, or to retain the power in themselves".169 As a result, the 
source of sovereignty and dominion is in the people, but political power is 
executed by those chosen to take on responsibility for all. In this account of 
the nature of political power, Sidney pursues a genetic approach; he focuses 
on the historical development of political power. In this approach, the 
development from pre-social condition to society is presented as alternative to 
the Filmer approach, which uses Scripture as a source to claim its foundation 
to be historical truth. 
Locke attacks the backbone of Filmer's theory, Adam's exclusive right of 
dominion, by accusing him of Scriptural error. Locke's argument rests on the 
1 6 7 Schobinger and Ueberweg, Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, Bd. 3. England, 747-8. 
168 Discourses 1.5; 97. 
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premises that the earth was not exclusively given to Adam, but also to Eve and 
their descendents. He concludes "God gave (I . Gen. 28) [.. .] a Private 
Dominion [...] to Adam in particular [...] but a Dominion in common with the 
rest of Mankind", thus he establishes his view that the Earth is common 
property.1 7 0 A point that becomes very clear through comparing these authors 
to Sidney is the absence of an emphasis on the idea of virtue. The concept of 
virtue, which was to a great extent of Aristotelian origin, discloses itself 
through the contrast as a particularity of Sidney. The use of the concept of 
initial liberty and of the contract, on the other hand, unites these authors and 
may stand as an example for the extent of Filmer's influence on the 
development of the political philosophy of all three authors. This influence is 
also at stake i f we take into account that all the considered anti-Filmer authors 
share the claim of contending with their adversary on the basis of discussing 
the "true and original principles of Government", which is a hint to natural 
law as well as to an understanding of politics as a process that evolves around 
fundamental concepts. Hence, their emphasis on original principle may be 
understood in a twofold manner, firstly as an emphasis on principles that had 
already importance before political order was set up. Thus, the term "original" 
is understood in the sense of initial. This interpretation looks at the genesis of 
political order and considers these principles as a kind of source. Secondly, 
the emphasis on original principles may be understood in the sense of an 
appreciation for the value of fundamental and permanent principles. This 
interpretation refers to principles that can be identified as the essence of 
politics. Thus, it refers to "original principles" as timeless maxims underlying 
the institutional shape of politics as well as political decision making 
processes. In Sidney's case we may encounter this approach in his emphasis 
on the value of the concepts of virtue, liberty and justice in the Discourses. 
169 Discourses 1.5, 99. 
170 Two Treatises I; 29, 32,40. 
82 
II The shape of Sidney's theory 
II.1 Introduction: approach and introduction to Sidney's argument 
While the Discourses was a polemical work, it also has a core of political 
ideas that can be abstracted from it. This core of political ideas is what I am 
focussing on in this part of the thesis to establish an understanding of the 
nature of Sidney's political thought. In a short summary of the Discourses, I 
shall introduce the way it is argued. Most literature so far has dealt extensively 
with the polemical aspects of the Discourses so that there is not much to add 
beyond the introduction of the intellectual climate presented in the last 
chapter. For a more extensive account of these issues, the secondary literature 
offers substantial information that allows enlargement of the picture beyond 
the scope of the thesis.171 The main body of this text will focus on the question 
of what the essence of Sidney's political work really is beyond the polemics 
against Filmer, which are covered scantily to avoid losing sight of them 
completely. 
In the course of this approach to exploring Sidney's political ideas, the text 
will focus on key concepts, as introduced in the methodological Introduction, 
section 2. Hence, instead of presenting an attempt at classifying or de-
classifying it as republicanism or any other sort of political language in 
Sidney's writings, the thesis aims to re-approach Sidney's writings by 
1 7 1 Literature on the political intention of the Discourses : Carrive takes great care of the links 
between Sidney's and Filmer's arguments in her account of the Discourses. Carrive, La 
Pensee Politique d' Algernon Sidney, 1622-1683: La querelle de I'absolutisme, 79-167, 
Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 203-64. For a study of the 
direct influence of Filmer on Sidney's arguments, it is particularly useful to refer to West's 
edition of the Discourses. The editor references Sidney's attacks on Filmer throughout the 
text, so that it is easy to read both texts side by side. Sidney, Discourses Concerning 
Government. 
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presenting above all the concept of virtue in the variety of its implications as 
well as the concepts of liberty and justice in their implications for Sidney's 
political philosophy. As the discussion of virtue wil l be intertwined with an 
account of Sidney's idea on human nature, this chapter wi l l also allow some 
conclusions to be drawn on the question of why virtue has such a pre-eminent 
position in Sidney's thought, what meaning the other concepts have in relation 
to this position and on Sidney's account of the relationship between the 
individual and the state. This last point wi l l be considered in regard of the 
question, of what purpose Sidney ascribes to political power. 
The purpose of political power is of greater significance for the thesis than 
the question of how to classify Sidney. As set out in the Introduction, section 
4, there are justified doubts as to whether Sidney is a classical republican 
author. Owing to the variety of influences that found their way into the 
Discourses, it is hard to give a sound classification of the nature of Sidney's 
thought. The focus on concepts, however, wi l l make a start in building up an 
understanding of Sidney's main ideas by dealing with ideas extracted from the 
text itself. In our case, the concepts of liberty virtue and justice. The text aims 
to introduce the resonances of these terms by interpreting them through 
comment on a number of selected quotations. Although the current approach 
does not aim to be comprehensive in gathering all significance of the 
concepts, it may still provide a basis for future research on the essence of 
Sidney's ideas. By pursuing this line of inquiry, I aim to create a better 
understanding of Sidney's appreciation of virtue and its significance for the 
question of the institutional shape of politics envisaged by Sidney. The 
discussion of the key concepts, particularly of Sidney's concern for virtue, 
wi l l suggest that the above named concepts serve as fundamental principles of 
government, whose maintenance is more substantial to Sidney than the 
existence of a particular form of government. On the basis of this chapter's 
exploration, I shall develop the thesis that it was not the decision on particular 
constitutional arrangements that mattered most to Sidney, but the existence of 
a political reality that allows those who are endowed with virtues to excel for 
the sake of being an example as well as the guide to those who are governed. 
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Thus, the purpose of political power is envisaged in consideration of the moral 
development of the governed. 
II.2 Sidney's argument 
This principal theme of the Discourses is embedded, as stated above, in the 
attacks on Filmer. At this point it is worth emphasising that I treat Filmer's 
Patriarcha as catalyst for Sidney's production of the Discourses in the 
distinctive intellectual climate of the late seventeenth century (see Chapter I). 
Particularly since Blair Worden's recent discovery of the Court Maxims, there 
is no doubt that Sidney's political thought had developed much before the 
writing of the Discourses, hence, that his thought developed independently 
from the polemical intention that is the starting point of the Discourses. Yet, 
imprinting its shape on Sidney's Discourses, Patriarcha had an undeniable 
influence on the form of the Discourses, and therefore also on the way in 
which Sidney's key concepts are presented to the reader. 
The key concepts have a twofold function in being firstly deployed as a 
weapon to contend with Filmer and secondly in communicating the backbone 
of Sidney's thought. The concept of virtue, for example, is directly held 
against Filmer when he characterises the nations that Filmer refers to for the 
sake of giving evidence of his political theory. Sidney states, "Assyrians and 
other Eastern nations [...] were never remarkable but for pride, lewdness, 
treachery, cruelty, cowardice, madness, and hatred to all that is good". 
Contrasting Filmer's examples, Sidney presents his own, in this particular 
case, the Greeks and Romans, who, in contrast to other statements of Filmer, 
he characterises as excelling in "wisdom, valour and all the virtues that 
deserve imitation." 1 7 2 This statement, too, provides clarification: first of the 
way in which Patriarcha directly influenced Sidney, e.g. in the choice of 
172 Discourses \\.\, 134. 
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commenting on particular historical examples, and secondly in the way on 
which Sidney intertwines the presentation of his own political concepts with 
his attacks on Filmer. 
To characterise the role of Patriarcha on a more general level, it may be 
said that the work dictates the frame of the Discourses for two reasons: it 
challenges Sidney to a point by point answer and attempts to discredit several 
thinkers whose thought seems convincing to Sidney. Secondly, it stimulates 
Sidney to refer to and to reassert discredited authors very directly. Hence, 
Ancient Greek, Ciceronian and Tacitean ideas are supported and enhanced. 
Through dealing with Bellarmine's and Suarez's account of the state of 
nature, Sidney is stimulated to discuss natural law ideas on the foundation of 
society. These ideas gain significance and are further developed in 
consideration of Grotius', and Coke's justification of rebellion. 1 7 3 In his rather 
extensive explicit usage of Filmer's sources, Sidney differs from Locke and 
Tyrrell, who attack Filmer, but do not place great emphasis on justifying 
openly the ideas of Filmer's adversaries from earlier times. While Locke 
hardly provides any reference to his sources, Tyrrell is more accurate in their 
regard. Still, Sidney is ahead of them. 1 7 4 
Sidney's answer to Filmer starts with the reassertion of natural law theory. 
In the second chapter, Sidney concentrates on an extensive re-establishment of 
the value of republican forms of government, particularly through underlining 
the superior value of republican states over absolutist states.175 It remains to 
ask in this respect, whether Sidney is speaking for republics or simply for non-
absolutist forms of government. The answer to this question wil l be 
approached by means of discussing Sidney's key concepts below. 
Regardless to the extent to which Sidney favours republicanism as such, 
1 7 3 Cf. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, J677-1683, 209. 
1 7 4 This characteristic of Sidney's Discourses allows the reader to get introduced to the time's 
sources of political thought. It is a further point that gives the Discourses a certain value as 
a source for research on the intellectual climate of the time. 
1 7 5 Scott, "England's Troubles: Exhuming the Popish Plot," 213. 
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one unique point about his political thought can already be stated. Sidney is 
distinguished from such contemporaries as Hobbes in suggesting that political 
order has deeper moral implications than just creating a co-operative 
advantage over a state of nature situation. 
From chapter I I ; 30 - I I I ; 14, Sidney brings arguments against absolutism. 
These chapters promote virtue as a counter-principle to inheritance or 
arbitrary distribution of political responsibility. In this respect, the polemical 
intention of the work is very clear, as well as Patriarchal function of serving 
as a catalyst that stimulates Sidney to voice his political ideas. 
Sidney concludes this account of politics with references to the "ancient 
constitutionalist history of the Anglo Saxons", which he presents as a counter 
example to Filmer's and to contemporary justifications of personal rule. This 
approach finally leads to a plea for rebellion in conjunction with a claims for 
the "[absolute] sovereignty of parliaments."176 
II.3 Original Principles 
Beyond this general structure of the discourses, Sidney's political concepts 
determine the structure of his political thought. Sidney himself claimed during 
his trial that the manuscript seized was concerned with "general principles" 
which were written "long since". Blair Worden claimed, "those statements 
were not true, but that there was truth in them." Truth was in them because 
Sidney's political ideas reflected in the Discourses had developed over a long 
* 177 
period of time. But truth was in these statements as well, because the 
Discourses allow the identification of "general principles". Through my own 
research I have come to the conclusion that Sidney's political thought rests on 
the foundation of the concepts of virtue, liberty, and justice which form the 
1 7 6 Ibid., 214. 
1 7 7 Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 14. 
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ground of Sidney's attacks on Filmer and the centre of his thought. While 
virtue is the centre peace of these three concepts, particularly in consideration 
of the purpose of the state, liberty is considered a general principle that 
emphasises the principle of choice in regard of a form of government and the 
protection of the person against arbitrary measures of the government. Justice 
in its ideal form is above human capability, but always a governing principle; 
the state came into existence for its sake. It is linked to the purpose of the state 
in at least two ways, firstly justice protects the citizen from injury, and 
secondly the state's aim is, according to Sidney, to encourage man to virtue, 
which consists in just actions. 
For Sidney, the concept of virtue is grounded on a metaphysical premise 
that combines goodness in the Christian sense with the Classical Greek ideal 
of excellence as the highest aim of man's moral development. Platonic 
influences and, above all, political Aristotelianism stand in the background of 
Sidney's idea of human nature and shape his understanding of virtue. I f we 
inquire into the particularities of Sidney's political thought and ask what sort 
of political ideas he is promoting, we arrive at the following principal 
statements: 
Firstly, Sidney speaks for maintaining an order that guarantees the 
flourishing of virtue, liberty and justice. 1 7 8 Maintaining these concepts as the 
foundation of all political reality has greater value than any form of 
government may have in itself. 
Secondly, Sidney has a normative teleological idea of human nature that is 
to be considered in his account of virtue. As a result, the state ought to have a 
civilising effect on human conduct rather than just regulating human activity. 
The end of the state is the sound moral development of its citizens. It may be 
achieved through institutional mechanisms and the right sort of people in 
power - those who are virtuous. 
1 7 8 1 shall give various references for this thesis in the respective chapters dealing with these 
terms. 
88 
Thirdly, a just state is, owing to the latter point, more than just an order that 
prevents mutual injury and secures property. Rather it provides an 
environment that is conducive to man's striving for virtue. This gains 
significance, for example, in Sidney's account of law. In his account, law is 
more than a regulative mechanism deployed to avoid disaster. It functions as a 
means of education for both citizens and magistrates. While it regulates the 
affairs of citizens, it also encourages the development and maintenance of 
virtue among both citizens and magistrates. In this sense, it has the purpose of 
encouraging just and good behaviour. It ought to prevent magistrates from 
falling into corruption so that they can fulf i l the end for which they are 
instituted. 
Fourthly, virtue is the governing principle regarding the distribution of 
power. The concept of virtue is the foundation of Sidney's understanding of 
just hierarchy within a state. 
With a broadened perspective, the above points agree with Sidney's 
metaphysical premises, in which they are embedded. As we know from 
Sidney's friend Jean Baptiste Lantin, Sidney considered theology the highest 
form of knowledge. He stated, "political science, or the study of the world of 
men [...] is second only to Theology or the study of God". 1 7 9 It follows that the 
fundamental concepts are more than just the constitutive foundation for a 
worldly political order. They are the basis for a political thought which is, 
despite all contemporary fashions, anything but completely secularised. 
In the aforementioned points, we may detect a close proximity to Ancient 
Greek ideals of political life. While the teleological idea of human nature is 
closest to Aristotelian thought, the metaphysical background may be disclosed 
as a Christian version of Platonism which is equally discernible in other 
aspects of Sidney's political thought. The extent of this proximity wil l be 
explored in Chapter I I I , "The intellectual foundation". At this point, I limit 
1 7 9 Sidney's conversation with Jean Baptiste Lantin, quoted after Scott, Algernon Sidney and 
the English Republic, 1623-1677, 4. 
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myself to unravelling the meaning of the three key concepts of virtue, liberty 
and justice through an exploration of the text itself. 
II.3.1 Virtue 
The concept of virtue can be scrutinised from various angles, since Sidney 
speaks about virtue in a holistic sense. Several implications of the term are not 
obvious at first glance. To throw light on the meaning of the term, I shall place 
particular emphasis on the role virtue plays as the end of human nature, which 
is crucial for Sidney's political thought as a whole: the virtue of the citizen, 
virtues relationship to society and Sidney's political virtue are in the centre of 
attention. Covering these perspectives on the idea of virtue, I hope to do 
justice to the holistic idea of the term, as it has been transmitted from classical 
antiquity to the early modern period, which differs from our modern 
understanding. 
In this approach I am not trying to marginalise the emphasis which has 
hitherto been placed on such other key concepts of republicanism as the 
participatory ideal of citizenship, the principles of mixed constitution,180 
liberty, 1 8 1 as well as the Machiavellian concept of virtue. 1 8 2 I rather make a 
first step towards building on and complementing these ideas through a study 
of the classical, primarily Greek impact in the case of Sidney. But first, there 
is something to be said about virtue as it appears in the Discourses. 
Cf. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition. 
1 Cf. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism. 
2 In Sidney's time, this idea is most explicit in Harrington's political thought. Cf. Fukuda, 
Sovereignty and the Sword: Harrington, Hobbes, and Mixed Government in the English 
Civil Wars, Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, James Harrington and J. G. A. 
Pocock, The Commonwealth of Oceana and a System of Politics, Cambridge Texts in the 
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Sidney holds a normative concept of human nature, though he does not 
disregard empirical observations on man found in society. This shapes 
Sidney's idea of human nature uniquely and indicates his bridging position 
between medieval and humanist accounts of virtue and the early modern 
emphasis on empirically derived knowledge. Through this fusion of two 
different approaches to the acquisition of knowledge, he differs from his 
contemporary Thomas Hobbes, who aimed to leave ancient knowledge 
behind, to build a new science of politics based on reason and observation, as 
already mentioned in the chapter on Sidney's context. On the other hand, 
Sidney's thought is also to be distinguished from humanist idealism about 
human nature, in accepting and explaining the dichotomy between human 
destructive behaviour and the ideal of goodness or virtue. He accepts that 
moral failures are a particularity of human life, rather than being tempted to 
succumb to an over-idealistic adoration of classical ideas. 
From the other anti-Filmerian authors, Tyrrell and Locke, Sidney differs in 
respect of his frequent direct and indirect references to his idea of human 
nature. Comparing Patriaracha non monaracha and Two treatises on 
government to a reading of the Discourses, the reader is left with the 
impression that Sidney has a much greater interest in communicating a certain 
idea of human nature than the other authors. This emphasis on human nature, 
and particularly on its weaknesses, is directly linked to Sidney's concern 
about the right distribution of political power. He is convinced that knowledge 
of human nature is a pre-condition for taking on political responsibility. 
Firstly, because the purpose of the magistrate's office lies in providing 
guidance for the people's moral development, and secondly, because 
History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Worden, 
"English Republicanism." 
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"[t]hey who know the frailty of human nature, will always distrust their 
own; and desiring only what they ought, wi l l be glad to be restrain'd from 
that which they ought not to do." 1 8 3 
As discussed in the biographical chapter, Sidney knew only too well from own 
experience how difficult it may be, i f one has high moral ideals, to live up to 
them. Hence, he might well have spoken from his own experience when 
stating, "there is a vast distance between what men ought to be, and what they 
184 
are." The desire to overcome this gulf between ideal and reality was the aim 
of both Algernon Sidney's personal life and of his writings. Similarly, this aim 
is considered in relation to his own person as well as in relation to his country. 
To establish the value of virtue, as well as to present it as a natural aim of 
man, Sidney deploys the same state of nature ideas that he and his 
contemporaries use to prove society's foundation on the social contract. 
Unlike Rousseau, Sidney does not suppose that man would in mere wilderness 
become "what he ought to be", and thus develop his moral potential 
independently. Rather, he considers education the premise for a sound 
development of human moral potential. 
Like virtue, education is understood in a more holistic sense than common 
usage suggests. Sidney ascribes an educational function to "well govern'd 
states [in which] men from the tenderest years are brought up in a belief, that 
nothing [...] deserves to be sought after, but [...] virtuous actions".185 He 
ascribes an educational function to all influences within a state that have an 
impact on the moral growth of a human being. Laws, behaviour of fellow 
citizens, and particularly magistrates in public offices play an important role, 
who, "by precept and example [...ought to] educate the youth in a love of 
virtue and truth". 1 8 6 
183 Discourses 111.36, 523. 
m Discourses lli.l, 325. 
185 Discourses 11.25, 253. 
186 Discourses, III. 19,432. 
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This awareness of the effects of a civil environment on moral growth is one 
means of explaining a key feature of Sidney's ideas on the institutional shape 
of politics. It explains that Sidney's anxiousness about the quality of a 
political system derives from his awareness for the effects on morality that an 
i l l constituted system may have. As a result of these deliberations, Sidney's 
approach requires the measurement of the value of a political system against 
the effects it has on the moral development of a nation. This result-oriented 
focus frees Sidney from the tendency to any kind of constitutional dogmatism. 
Sidney, like other contemporaries - most prominently, Thomas Hobbes -
outlines the value of a state and particularly man's dependence on it through 
imagining that its absence would result in a "fierce barbarity of a loose 
multitude, [as it is] bound by no law, and regulated by no discipline". Such a 
condition of life is, according to Sidney, "wholly repugnant to" the way in 
which man ought to live. "Whilst every man fears his neighbour, and has no 
other defence than his own strength, he must live in [...] perpetual anxiety".1 8 7 
Here, the description of an extra-social condition serves as illustration of 
unimproved human nature. It reveals that man is driven by "affections, 
passions and vices,"1 8 8 and bound to lead a life in "bestial barbarity" unless 
improved by "art and discipline".1 8 9 These juxtaposed forms of life reveal that 
Sidney's account of human nature is Manichean. On the one hand, he 
considers human nature as being prone to barbarity, on the other hand, he 
throws in that 'art and discipline' are the means that ought to change the 
situation. These means, however, are, as we shall see later, considered to 
human invention. Hence, like the potential for corruption, Sidney also sees the 
potential to innovation and creating regulating mechanisms as grounded in 
human nature. 
Through this dramatic description, the necessity of having a state that 
regulates human life is emphasised, particularly as some passages of the text 
187 Discourses, II. 1, 83. 
188 Discourses 11.1,83. 
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indicate that Sidney considers, like Hobbes, a perpetual state of war as the 
alternative to civil life. Yet the decisive difference from this contemporary 
political author is that the right form of the political system matters to Sidney 
more than the mere existence of a state as a means of war avoidance. This line 
of thought is already evident i f we consider the presentation of Sidney's 
examples for illustrating a life that lacks virtue. 
Sidney presents two different forms of life characterised by the lack of 
virtue. They share the characteristic of a life governed by passions rather than 
reason. As everyone, even "the best men can never wholly divest themselves 
of passions and affections",1 9 0 these forms of life exemplify what may happen 
to all human beings, even within a well governed state. 
The first example and the prototype is the "natural man"; he stands for life 
characterised by a low moral standard and illustrates man's moral 
incompleteness; as "man by sin is fallen from the law of his creation", Sidney 
considers him "in a perpetual enmity against God, without any possibility of 
being reconciled to him, unless by the destruction of the old man". With this 
last point, he reveals much about his idea of human nature as this very 
destruction of the old man is at the heart of Sidney's political thought. This 
idea implies that man is in a constant struggle to move towards the initial 
state, "to degenerating or renewing him through the spirit of grace."191 
This statement provides, in reference to Adam's original sin, a theological 
explanation for man's danger of falling back to a state of brutishness. It also 
reveals that Sidney's concept of virtue is not just part of a secular political 
theory, but the key to an understanding of human nature that is grounded in 
religious premises. We may conclude from this statement that goodness is not 
just a quality in relation to a certain social environment and its moral 
standards, but a quality that cannot be separated from Christian morality 
conveyed through Scripture. This is particularly clear through the textual 
189 Discourses III.7, 357. 
190 Discourses 111.24, 461. 
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context of the above quotation as it occurs in conjunction with reference to 
such biblical quotations as "Out of the heart proceed evil thought, murders, 
adulteries, fornications".192 Here the text presents the religious implication of 
Sidney's emphasis on the need to strive for virtue. This provides a first 
explanation for the significance of this key concept. 
The second example of man characterised by a lack of virtue is 
observations on natural tribes. Like other contemporaries, Sidney sometimes 
refers to, for example, native Africans and Americans to illustrate his 
arguments with an impression of basic and pre-civilised forms of life. Their 
brutishness reveals to Sidney what human nature is, i f not "improved by art 
and discipline".1 9 3 In line with contemporary assumptions, he considers those 
tribal political structures as basic and autocratically organised. He assumes 
that "Asiaticks and Africans" pursue a life of a low moral standard. In the 
light of Sidney's ideas, they appear as being most opposed to the ideal of the 
virtuous man. Their lack of virtue goes together with them "being careless of 
their liberty, or unable to govern themselves". This latter trait allows Sidney to 
look at their lack of virtue in conjunction with an irresponsible handling of 
liberty. In this respect, he is explicitly referring to Aristotle, by stating that 
they 
"were by Aristotle and other wise men called slaves by nature, and 
lookes upon us little different as beasts. /This [...] has its root in common 
sense [and ] reason."194 
1 Discourses II.8, 123. 
2 Cf. Matthew 15:19. 
3 Discourses III.7, 357. 
4 Discourses 1.2, 9. In the seventeenth-century-context, not many people had contact with 
slavery and savages, there were various examples for the use of the term slave to illustrate 
lack of virtue. Writings in literature, philosophy and Political theory content various 
examples. Due to this context, an adoption of the Aristotelian conception was at hand. 
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The most striking phrase here is: "being careless of their liberty". It highlights 
both Sidney's aim to discredit all social and political structures built on a high 
limitation of liberty and his emphasis on individual human autonomy. Here, it 
becomes particularly clear that the Discourses 'concern' not only the issue of 
political 'government', but also the issue of self-government, which is the 
ability to be responsible in liberty instead of careless as the slavish man is 
bound to be, which we shall explore in Chapter II.3.2. 
Through the drastic examples of life untouched by civil society, the 
Discourses contrast Sidney's ideal of man as he "ought to be" 1 9 5. Although 
this contrast underlines the normative character of Sidney's idea of human 
nature, the Discourses also display Sidney's experience of the imperfection of 
human nature, most explicitly in such claims as that perfection is in God 
only. 1 9 6 However, even i f perfection seems unattainable, Sidney is not at all 
convinced that this characteristic of the human condition would free man from 
a constant obligation to strive for virtue as the above statements on the natural 
man have already allowed suggested. Rather he sees it as the reason for man's 
dependence on the state as a means that encourages moral growth. 
Regarding the relationship between the state and virtue, education plays a 
pre-eminent role. The state itself is seen as a means of education; it fulfils a 
civilising function. Sidney makes clear that by means of educational 
arrangements "virtue itself becomes popular." With this statement, he 
introduces the reader to his idea of judging a political system against its ability 
to provide an environment in which virtue can flourish. He calls such a state 
197 * 
"well-governed". While Sidney's examples for such states, e.g. Sparta and 
Rome, are republics and may suggest that Sidney only approves of republican 
governments, the emphasis on the importance of a virtue-fostering 
environment suggests that Sidney's primary concern is not the form of 
government, but the state's ability to foster virtue. In conjunction with the 
195 Discourses III. 1, 325. 
196 Discourses 111.24, 463. 
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above statements, Sidney defines virtue only vaguely as "such qualities as are 
beneficial to the publick". 1 9 8 
This rather vague definition permits accommodation of the notions of virtue 
that appear to be important through a reading of other passages of the 
Discourses. The educational function of the state as well as the weight that 
Sidney places on this function is most explicit when he states, "but a state 
cannot subsist, which compensating evil actions with good, gives impunity to 
the most dangerous crimes".1 9 9 In this account, he shows that concern for the 
educational side of politics is not only a precondition for the development of 
virtue, but even a necessity for the survival of a state. Hence, a decreasing 
concern for the common good goes along with dissolution of the state. The 
quoted passage is particularly concerned with services rendered to the state, 
that justify relief from punishment. With this topic, Sidney expresses that the 
educational and regulating function of the state has significance for the 
behaviour of political leaders. 
Being a work on government, the Discourses reveal further insights into 
Sidney's concept of virtue in sections that are concerned with political 
leadership. Sidney identifies the origin of political office in the "consent of 
men", who set up magistrates that they "may be well with themselves and 
their posterity". This, according to Sidney, is accomplished by advancing 
those above their equals, "who have valour, integrity, wisdom and skill" and 
are "most fit to [advance] the common good. 2 0 0 Unlike the above introduced 
concept of the slave by nature, the magistrate is expected to excel in self-
government.201 Only self-government allows him not to follow passions that 
lead to corruption and enables him to "seek the good of the people" which 
197 Discourses 11.25, 253. 
1 9 8 Ibid. 
199 Discourses 11.18, 178. 
2 0 0 Discourses 1.16,49. 
2 0 1 Cf. Discourses 111.21, 442. 
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chiefly consists "justice and virtue, [which] he endeavours to plant and 
202 * • 
propagate". Asking in what way virtue is promoted by the magistrate, the 
issue of education gains significance. Sidney considers 
"it a great part of his duty, by precept and example, to educate the youth 
in a love of virtue and truth [...] before they attain the age which is exposed 
to the most violent temptations".203 
To illustrate his understanding of well-developed virtue among magistrates, 
Sidney refers to historical examples. One of them is Alexander of Macedon. 
Referring to him on the one hand illustrates man's ability to attain a high level 
of virtue when Sidney says, "[h]e seems to have been endow'd with all the 
virtues that nature improved by discipline did ever attain". On the other hand, 
Sidney also deploys the example of Alexander to emphasise the instability of 
human nature, which prevents man from achieving virtue as a stable quality, 
when he says "but even that virtue was overthrown by the successes that 
accompanied it [...] so that it may be truly said, he died a coward".2 0 4 
The case of Alexander allows Sidney to prove how easily and in what 
manner such an eminent virtue may be lost. A result of virtue is success; yet 
success may also give way to corruption. In this case, the advancement of 
corruption becomes apparent when Alexander "burnt the most magnificent 
palace of the world, [...] ki l l 'd the best and bravest of his friends, [when] his 
valour [...] perished[,...and...] he became lewd, proud, cruel and superstitious". 
As the source of this corruption, Sidney identifies - most likely while 
imagining the English situation, which is sarcastically described in the Court 
Maxims - the influence of such morally inferior persons as "a drunken whore 
[... and] eunuchs and rascals".205 This example shows to what extent Sidney 
202 Discourses III. 19, 432. 
203 Discourses III. 19, 432. 
204 Discourses 11.11, 139. 
205 Discourses 11.11, 139. 
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ascribes the possibility of maintaining virtue through context. This is not only 
true in the case of governors or magistrates, but also in the case of the people 
or the citizen. 
As we have seen in the example of Alexander the Great, Sidney is aware 
that virtue may always vanish and does so particularly among people who 
hold political offices. Similar to the conviction that citizens have to be 
educated to be virtuous by the state, magistrates and governors have to be 
prevented from losing virtue through the state. The means for that is law; he 
considers it "a help to those who are wise and good, by directing them what 
they are to do, more certainly than any one man's judgement can do". 2 0 6 This 
role of law shall be encountered in further detail in Chapter II.2.3. 
The ability to govern makes some men eminent within a people. 
Accordingly Sidney states, 
"valour, integrity, wisdom, industry, experience and skill are required for 
the management of those military and civil affairs that necessarily fall 
under the case of the chief magistrates. He or they therefore may reasonably 
be advanced above their equals, who are most fit to perform the duties 
belonging to their stations" 
Among those factors that Sidney names as a source of the development of 
virtue, warfare has significance too. There is no doubt that, among others, this 
notion of virtue in particular owes a lot to the Machiavellian influence. Yet 
this influence wil l not be treated separately since the focus wil l later be on the 
ancient Greek influences on Sidney. At this point, it is merely worth 
emphasising that a number of Machiavellian ideas occur in combination with 
Aristotelian ideas in Sidney's as well as in other seventeenth-century writings 
2 0 6 Discourses III. 13, 390. 
207 Discourses 1.16,49. 
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on politics. At this point, we shall concentrate on the relation between virtue 
and warfare that Sidney's text reveals. 
Referring to the English past, this aspect of Sidney's thought comes into 
sight through his particular interest in ancient or Saxon nobility and the 
relationship between virtue, responsibility and war. It appears that the Saxon 
nobleman is considered an example of eminent political virtue. While Chapter 
1.1. introduced the biographical context that seems to have shaped Sidney's 
interest in this aspect of English history, the following account looks at 
Sidney's account of ancient nobility in the Discourses. 
Sidney is convinced that the ancient English nobility - which he considers 
true nobility owing to their virtue 2 0 8 - proved their ability to take on 
responsibility through brave actions in war. They were, in Sidney's account, 
examples for their inferiors and were followed voluntarily. Through military 
virtue, they excelled them and were admired for it and ennobled.209 As already 
mentioned in the biographical introduction, Sidney was well aware of such 
examples of true nobility among his ancestors from the Percy, the Neville and 
the Dudley families. This family background emphasised the idea of a 
virtuous nobility. In Sidney's approach to political philosophy, the emphasis 
on a nobility based on virtue introduces the idea of a political hierarchy based 
on virtue. It is opposed to a hierarchy based on the inherited right of kingship 
and the respective king's inclinations to advance or degrade individuals who 
are to his service. In consideration of the situation of his times, he calls them 
"court creature[s]" , who attained their title through payment or dubious 
favour rather than through his own or his ancestors merit. 2 1 1 These people 
were, in Sidney's account, far from being virtuous and even farther from 
proving their ability on the battlefield. 2 1 2 
i m Discourses 111.28, 486. 
209 Discourses 111.28, 484. 
210 Discourses 111.28, 489. 
2 , 1 Discourses 111.28, 483,489-90. 
2 1 2 Discourses 111.37, 526. 
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II.3.2 Liberty 
Liberty inspires "solid virtue, and produced [...] stability, good order and 
strength".213 Considering the meaning of term liberty, at least the two 
connotations may be distinguished, as has most prominently been done by 
Isaia Berlin, into negative and positive liberty. The former "is simply the area 
within which a man can act unobstructed by others",214 or to put in the terms 
of Sidney's contemporary Thomas Hobbes, "By L I B E R T Y , is understood [...] 
the absence of externall Impediments."215 Negative liberty, on the other hand, 
concerns the source of power. 2 1 6 Quentin Skinner has developed a broader 
approach to the understanding of liberty and reveals the connotations of the 
term for Sidney's time by comparing the ideas of liberty of those authors he 
considers neo-roman.217 This text wil l not expand on this aspect of Sidney's 
intellectual context, but turn to the text itself. 
Liberty is the key term in Sidney's political thought according to 
218 
eighteenth-century reception. Accordingly, the concept of liberty had the 
greatest share in distorting the image of Sidney, as it was primarily interpreted 
in conjunction with the justification of rebellion. Yet, in the Discourses, it 
presents itself as manifold in its connotations as the concept of virtue. As in 
the last chapter, the aim wi l l be to approach the connotations of the concept by 
focussing on its presentation in the Discourses with regard to other key 
concepts. 
2 1 3 Discourses 11.18, 177. 
2 1 4 Isaia Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in A Companion to Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 393. 
2 1 5 Thomas Hobbes and Richard Tuck, Leviathan, Rev. student ed., Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Political Thought (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
XIV.91. 
2 1 5 Cf. Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," 396. 
2 1 7 Cf. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism. 
2 1 8 Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America, 223. 
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The starting point for a discussion of the idea of liberty is the initial liberty of 
man. This denotes the aspect of liberty that Sidney considers - like many 
contemporaries, particularly his fellow anti-Filmer authors - as the liberty of a 
pre-social state.219 A premise of Sidney's political thought is that all men are 
through their creation endowed with a God-given initial liberty. As he 
considers it an absolute negative liberty, 2 2 0 it might seem useless owing to 
non-existent limits of individual liberty. Yet Sidney counters this objection as 
he considers the human need to form and live in societies as natural as this 
initial liberty. In his argument, this liberty has its value as it leaves free choice 
to the people to enter society and to decide, "how far it is good [for them] to 
recede from [their] natural liberty". 2 2 1 These ideas stand in the background of 
Sidney's political thought. 
Beside the idea of negative liberty, these fundamental thoughts on the basis 
of state and society also comprehend the idea of positive liberty, meaning the 
freedom to perform certain actions - which is apparent in Sidney's emphasis 
on choice. Although the latter principle has greater significance in the 
Dicsourses, Sidney became renowned for negative liberty during the century 
following his death. English parliamentarians, Whig politicians, political 
writers or American spokesmen for freedom and independence developed an 
affection for the passages of the Discourses which encourage rebellion and 
disobedience to absolutist government. Quoting from Sidney was particularly 
attractive in conjunction with glorifying Sidney as a martyr of freedom. He 
was considered a historical example to be followed. 
The Discourses, particularly the third and last chapter, justify these 
interpretations as it provides evidence for an inclination to stir up 
2 1 9 Although Paulette Carrive claimed that the Discourses do not contain the hypothesis of a 
state of nature, the section on pre social life discussed earlier, suggests that Sidney must 
have considered such a hypothesis. Carrive, La Pensee politique a" Algernon Sidney, 1622-
1683: La Querelle De L 'absolutisme, 101. 
2 2 0 Cf. Discourses 1.10,30. 
221 Discourses 1.10, 30. 
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revolution. Yet this is only one part of the story. In consideration of the 
whole book, and especially i f we focus on the fundamental concepts of 
Sidney's political thought, we have to acknowledge that the concept of 
positive liberty prevails. Sidney states " I f men are naturally free, such as have 
wisdom and understanding will always frame good governments".223 Those 
who come together to frame a government are free, even after submitting 
themselves under the government, as the source of political power still rests 
entirely in them as a nation. The above-mentioned thoughts on the foundation 
of society are a repeated theme throughout the Discourses which forms the 
basis for a lot of other ideas. This is particularly clear when Sidney states, "it 
is the fundamental right of every nation to be governed laws, in such manner, 
and by such persons as they think most conducing to their own good". 2 2 4 
The struggle with Filmer's Patriarcha caused Sidney to define his 
understanding of liberty. Firmer's condemnation of liberty stimulated Sidney 
to respond with his own account. Against Filmer's equation of liberty with 
anarchy, Sidney holds, 
"that the liberty asserted is not a licentiousness of doing what is pleasing 
to everyone against the command of God; but an exemption form all human 
laws, to which they [the people] have not given their assent."225 
Here we find further emphasis for the idea that liberty is a fundamental 
concept for a state. Even i f liberty is diminished through the people's 
subjection under its laws, the people is always seen as the originator of the 
state. As such, it may always revive the initial liberty as a reaction to the 
government's deviation from the laws, that have their origin in the people.226 
2 2 2 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 260-1. 
223 Discourses 1.10, 31. 
224 Discourses 111.36, 524. 
225 Discourses 1.2, 9. 
2 2 6 Discourses 11.20, 191-2. 
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Sidney emphasises the general value of liberty though the idea that "men are 
according to the laws of nature and God all free" 2 2 7 and illustrates that with 
examples from Scripture, history and philosophy. As the source of a 
fundamental concept, initial liberty stands in the background of Sidney's 
reasoning on the state and citizens. 
I f we aim to understand the liberty of a citizen, we may contrast it with 
Sidney's understanding of a slave as someone 
"who serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who 
serves the worst; and he does serve him i f he must obey his commands, and 
depends upon his w i l l . " 2 2 8 
Sidney emphasises that the decisive question for determining liberty does not 
concern the convenience of circumstances, but the potentiality of subjection 
under someone's wi l l . The free citizen is the person who is his own master. As 
the origin of a state is considered to be the result of the free wil l of a 
multitude, all consequential impediments on individual negative liberty are 
seen as a result of initial free decision making rather than an infringement of 
individual freedom. Here, the principal idea is that heads of families initially 
"resign[ed] so much of their rights as seems convenient into the publick stock, 
to which everyone becomes subject."229 This understanding of the foundation 
of society results in the maintenance of the principle of liberty. The idea of the 
slave plays a role, as Sidney's approach does prevent anyone from giving up 
his liberty completely; all liberty that is not held individually is held 
commonly and therefore not given up. As a result, the individual citizen is far 
from being in anything like the situation of a slave. 
The free citizen, in contrast to the slave, takes on responsibility in the sense 
of self government and self-direction. Here, we find the emphasis on positive 
227 Discourses 1.9, 30. 
228 Discourses 111.21,441. 
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liberty, which seems so remote from our time's common usage of the term. 
Obviously, this aspect of Sidney's concept of liberty shows proximity to the 
idea of autarchy to a greater extent than the modern term liberty would 
suggest. 
Liberty of society is to be understood as equivalent to the liberty of the 
citizen (we could compare the individual to the state as microcosm; the state, 
as the macrocosm of political life mirrors the principles that govern the life of 
the citizen). Also a whole people, or a nation, is only free i f it exercises self 
government. This type of freedom has a twofold implication. It concerns, on 
the one hand, the relation to other states - sovereignty - and on the other hand, 
the relation between people and government. The former aspect is in the 
foreground of Sidney's appreciation for military virtue and freedom; it is the 
source as well as the result of it. The latter has significance in, firstly, Sidney's 
references to the foundation of the state, and secondly, magistrates' concern 
for the common good, and finally in Sidney's justification of rebellion as a 
means to correct a corrupted government and to preserve the people's 
liberty. 2 3 0 
This aspect also ties in with the idea of the sovereignty of the people as 
opposed to interest of state, which in its Dutch counterpart has been labelled 
'True Liberty'. 2 3 1 Sidney admires cities and states that have for the sake of 
preserving their liberty "render[ed] their people valiant, obedient to their 
commanders, lovers of their country, and always ready to fight for i t " . 2 3 2 He 
appreciates fostering a spirit in society that stimulates people to care for the 
preservation of their state. For him, this is the essence of liberty. In this 
understanding, military virtue is key as a means to preserve the liberty of a 
229 Discourses II.5, 96. 
230 Discourses 111.36, 519. 
2 3 1 For an exploration of the idea of princely interest in France and the Dutch version of 
republicanism as well as in its English form, cf. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English 
Republic, 1623-1677, 207-21. 
232 Discourses 11.22, 203. 
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state. Admiring other nations that excelled in both maintaining their virtue and 
fighting for their liberty, Sidney often uses examples such as the Germans, the 
Spartans and the Athenians, e.g. in their fights against the Persians, who, "as 
long as they had any strength, virtue or courage amongst them, were esteemed 
free nations, because they abhorred such a subjection [as was common among 
233 
Arabic peoples]." 
With this characterisation, Sidney not only underlines the idea of freedom 
from the influence of another power, but also freedom in the sense of being 
fully in charge of one's own affairs. "Subjection common among Arabic 
peoples" refers to the enslaved state of the subjects of a country ruled by an 
absolutist prince. In such a country the people would not have a say in the way 
that their government was regulated. In contrast, a free nation is "governed by 
the laws of their own making: Potentiora erant legum quam hominum 
imperia.234 In this account, the people is seen as the originator of the laws. 
This statement suggests that Sidney finds subjection to law appropriate, 
provided these laws are grounded in the liberty of the people, who through 
their representatives, for example in parliament, have a share in the 
government. 
While these sentences represent Sidney's Classical Republican ideals, the 
following one tells about Sidney's idea on political leadership, by asserting: 
"Even their princes had the authority or credit of persuading, rather than the 
power of commanding."235 Here, the link between virtue and authority is at 
stake. Sidney expects that a free people would choose to obey the most worthy 
person, rather than having the need to be bound to obey the commands of a 
magistrate. This quotation allows the inference that the virtuous leader, 
magistrate, or prince is obeyed, on the one hand, because he has proved his 
ability to provide for the external liberty of a people, e.g. by being a successful 
2 3 3 "The rule of laws was more powerful than that of men." Livy, History of Rome, bk. 2, ch. 
1.1.5, 17. 
107 
commander in warfare, and on the other hand, because he best preserves 
internal liberty since he refrains from oppressing his subjects or regulating 
politics contrary to the common good. The underlying principle for the 
relationship between ruler and subject is trust on the part of the governed and 
political ability as well as a concern for the common good on the part of the 
magistrate insofar as he refrains from infringing the liberty of a people 
through arbitrary rule. 
The above example of the ideal situation of a people in terms of their 
liberty and their prince providing for it may be contrasted to the, in Sidney's 
perspective, all too common situation in which magistrates and particularly 
kings are not providing for the liberty of a people; neither internally, nor 
externally. Sidney suggests that obedience to government loses its binding 
character as 
"The only ends for which governments are constituted, and obedience 
render'd to them, are the obtaining of justice and protection; and they who 
cannot provide for both, give the people a right of taking such ways as best 
please themselves, in order to their own safety." 
In this statement, Sidney elaborates further on the idea of positive liberty. The 
focus lies again on a people's right to be in charge of their own affairs. Yet, in 
this situation, Sidney refers to a case in which magistrates fail in having the 
virtues required for their responsibility and thereby endanger the autarchy of 
their state and the liberty of their people. The consequence, in Sidney's 
account, is the right to rebellion, which in itself is an example of a people 
reclaiming their initial liberty. In the Discourses, this stands for "the people's 
right to order their own political affairs through their representatives.237 
236 Discourses 111.33, 512. 
2 3 7 Scott 1991,205. 
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As we can see, Sidney's idea of sovereignty is dichotomous: on the one 
hand it implies the right to rebellion, on the other hand, it seems to require 
subordination under the respective political representatives. Two points 
implicit in this observation have particular value. Firstly, Sidney looks at the 
people as a unity, as one political body; secondly, the liberty connected to 
sovereignty is obviously not in any random person's hand. The last point links 
the idea of popular sovereignty back to the idea of virtue. It is again the person 
capable of a certain task, who should be trusted to fulf i l it. 
Sidney takes the people's ability to decide over the political constitution as 
very important, and even favoured the changes to the political system implicit 
in this idea as an important feature of a political system. Jonathan Scott 
considered this "politics of change" as "the most theoretically interesting 
aspect of the DicsoursesP* He subtracts from Sidney's thought the idea: 
"only states that embrace change can grow and respond as times change;"239 
The source for change is the liberty of the people. 
The consideration of liberty so far may seem to suggest that the concept of 
liberty is merely the right to rebel. Yet the seventeenth-century context 
suggests that liberty concerns to a great extent the preservation of the person 
and property of the subjects. The preservation of the person also plays a role 
in Sidney's account of the genesis of society. His account of the social 
contract comprehends that the restraint from initial liberty is general; the 
people do refrain from their liberty on the premise that everyone does, for the 
sake of protecting the person.2 4 0 The issue of property is of smaller 
significance to Sidney than it is to his fellow anti-Filmer authors. In one of the 
few sections that concern this point, he refers to Hobbes's account of the 
"bellum omnes contra omnes, wherein no man can promise to himself any 
other wife children or goods, than he can procure by his own sword." 2 4 1 In this 
2 3 8 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 206. 
2 3 9 Ibid. 
240 Discourses 11.20, 191-2. 
241 Discourses III. 19, 432. 
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very common way of seventeenth-century reasoning on the purpose of the 
state, Sidney does not pay particular attention to the issue of property. This 
examplifies his general attitude with regard to this topic, that is of so much 
more importance to his fellow anti-Filmer authors Tyrrell and Locke. 
II.3.3 Justice 
Like liberty, the concept of justice as an original principal can be developed 
out of Sidney's understanding of a state of nature. But it is also an underlying 
principle in the general discussions of politics. Here, justice occurs as a term 
that has, like virtue, a more holistic meaning than current usage would 
indicate. Justice has a relation to good order and goodness. As a consequence, 
Sidney also considers God as the source of justice. This understanding of 
justice is most explicit in the fist section of the second chapter of the 
Discourses. With all its references to Plato, political order and a number of 
theological statements, this section of the Discourses leaves no doubt that 
Sidney's use of the word justice or good order means more than twenty-first-
century usage suggests. We shall encounter the different aspects of Sidney's 
understanding of justice through an exploration of, firstly, the foundation of 
justice: natural law; secondly, justice and society; thirdly, justice and political 
responsibility, and finally, justice and political order. 
Sidney presents his discussion of natural law through the already 
encountered state of nature that allows everyone to enjoy a God-given right to 
unlimited liberty. Prior to the foundation of society "everyone has a right to 
everything", leading to an unlimited but worthless freedom as the "liberty of 
one is thwarted by that of another".242 The result is controversies "and the 
fierce barbarity of a loose multitude". 2 4 3 Hence, the initial state of natural law 
is bound to be a lawless chaos owing to the lack of co-operation. Yet, whilst 
2 4 2 Discourses 1.10, 30. 
2 4 3 Discourses II. 1, 82. 
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Sidney considers this the consequence of a natural right to unlimited liberty, 
he considers also that man is distinguished through reason, which stimulates 
him to establish civil society. "[M]an is hereunto led by reason which is his 
nature. Everyone sees they cannot well live asunder, nor many together, 
without some rule to which all must submit."2 4 4 With this quotation we get an 
insight into Sidney's understanding of the development from a situation 
purely governed by natural law, to the establishment of positive law. Yet this 
development is only complete i f the mutual submission to an established 
political order is guaranteed. Being aware of this problem, Sidney states that 
men "join together to establish such laws and rules as they oblige themselves 
to observe".245 He expresses his awareness of the problem of allegiance, 
without which no state can ever subsist. But what we can see in this statement 
as well is Sidney's concern for a particular political order. Favouring the 
principle of consent, he expects that the free choice regarding the form of 
Government may only lead to the establishment of just governments, as those 
who have "wisdom and understanding wil l always frame good 
governments".246 As encountered in Sidney's biography, he himself had his 
own experiences with the issue of allegiance. As stated in some of his letters, 
he was willing to subdue himself to Charles I I , even to serve under him. Yet, 
as the letters also state, he considered the king established by parliament, 
whose members he apparently considers as that part of the government that 
has 'wisdom and understanding'. 
A good government is a just government since justice, according to Sidney, 
is the end of all governments.247 The way Sidney uses the term justice differs 
from our time's understanding. It considers good as well as bad actions and 
has its essence in the principle of giving everyone his due. The underlying 
idea for this approach is a particular concept of equality. While men are equal 
244 Discourses 11.20, 192. 
245 Discourses II.5, 98. 
246 Discourses I, 10, 30-1. 
247 Discourses 1.1,6. 
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prior to society as they all enjoy the natural right of exercising unlimited 
liberty, men within the state are equal before the law. In Sidney's approach 
this means that the individual's actions are considered not only for 
punishment, but also for reward. 2 4 8 Hence justice is seen as a principle 
considering the actions of people, either to punish and degrade or to reward 
and exalt individuals. This idea differs from our time's understanding of 
equality as this idea is not at all expecting that each individual would receive 
an equal treatment or share in things, political power, but an appropriate one. 
This hints already at the social implications that this principle of justice is 
bound to have in conjunction with Sidney's emphasis on virtue. Having 
referred to Cicero's statement that governments were instituted to obtain 
justice, Sidney says "That this work could be performed only by such as 
excelled in virtue." 2 4 9 With this statement it becomes clear that Sidney's 
understanding of equality does not at all prevent hierarchy within the state. 
The pre-eminent position of the concept of virtue is underlined and, through 
the above quotation, we may also see the importance of an understanding of 
virtue as justice. 
This connection reveals that the virtuous person is the person who performs 
just actions and is - ideally - able to judge about right and wrong. Above that, 
he even has a right to gain greater public responsibilities within society. We 
can see in this statement that Sidney puts all his trust into the person who is 
chosen to be judge. "Virtuous" means in this case a just person who watches 
over the well-being of fellow citizens. This approach relies on the one hand on 
the classical Greek tradition of the idea of justice and virtue, - or arete - to be 
translated as excellence. On the other hand, it is a very pragmatic way of 
discriminating against the English situation, which Sidney attacks for 
allocating political, and legal offices for money, or by favour on the basis of 
inheritance and nepotism as well as a preference for flattering courtiers rather 
248 Discourses 11.18, 178. 
249 Discourses 1.1, 6. 
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than ability and merit. 
This aspect of Sidney's thought shows that Sidney, despite all his support 
for legal arrangements guiding the actions of magistrates and governors, does 
not see the key to justice in these arrangements themselves. It is rather the 
value they may have, to prevent abuse of power, and to select the most able 
people for offices of government. Owing to the contemporary situation, 
Sidney places greater emphasis on the necessity of discharging these people, 
than on mechanisms to find and select them. Here lies one of the key problems 
with his political thought: Sidney tells his readership how important it is to 
have a magistrate who is virtuous and watches over right and wrong in 
consideration of a sound moral development of man, but he gives only limited 
guidance for finding persons ready to become magistrates. 
A crucial issue for any discussion on natural right to unlimited liberty and 
the state is the question of obligation. While the state of nature lacks security 
of law - natural law is seen as the governing principle, but is of no use owing 
to the lack of enforcement - a properly established state requires security of 
law, thus the awareness for the binding force of the law and the 
acknowledgement of the political order. The concept of liberty and submission 
to the state pose a challenge to any political theory. Particularly in Sidney's 
case, this seems a difficult matter owing to his frequent statements that the 
initial liberty remains in the people. Sidney tries to face this challenge through 
explaining the binding force of law and obligation to the state within the 
framework of the contract. 
The contract consists of public resignation of liberty for the sake of setting 
up government.251 Out of free wi l l a multitude enters into a contract which 
constitutes the founding moment of a civil society.252 Considering Sidney's 
usage of the words 'multitude', 'society' and 'people', it seems that Sidney 
regards individuals in the state of nature as the holders of a right to liberty. 
2 5 0 Discourses 111.37. 524-7. 
251 Discourses 11133, 5U. 
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Being not organised in any form makes them a multitude. After the contract 
the situation changes in so far as the power and liberty seem to rest in society 
as a unit. The individual resigns his freedom voluntarily as "no one [...] is 
obliged to enter into society", to enjoy its benefits. "But i f he enter in society, 
he is obliged by the laws of i t . " 2 5 3 In this situation individuals wil l only play a 
role as a force within a common decision-making process. The extent to which 
this is possible depends on the rules, thus the constitution of the respective 
society.254 The constitution is the result of a common - not an individual -
decision making-process, which is evident in such statements as "[a] people 
[...] sets up kings, dictators, consuls, praetors or emperors, [...] that it may be 
well with themselves and their posterity."255 Sidney underlines that this 
subjection of the individual under the rules of a community - the people - has 
256 
a foundation in religion and law of nature. He states: 
"Tis not only from religion, but from the law of nature, that we learn the 
necessity of standing to the agreements we make; and he who departs from 
257 
the principle written in the heart of men pactis standum seems to 
degenerate into a beast."258 
This, and similar statements are the key to Sidney's way of tackling the 
issue of allegiance. He is well aware that a state cannot subsist, unless its laws 
have binding force and the individual submits to its order. Yet Sidney also 
252 Discourses II.5, 105. 
253 Discourses 11.5, 104. 
2 5 4 In the course of framing a society, "we ourselves are judges how far 'tis good for us to 
recede from our natural liberty". Discourses 1.10, 31. 
255 Discourses 1.16, 49. 
2 5 6 Both are always considered in accordance by all three considered anti-absolutist authors. 
Frequent proofs and statements of the agreement of both can be considered a weapon 
against Filmer's usage of Scripture. Cf. Chapter I. 
2 5 7 One must stand by its agreements. 
258 Discourses III. 19,431. 
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knew that a state may deviate from his definition of its original ends, which 
are to procure the common good, obtain justice 2 5 9 and to guide man in his 
striving for a God-pleasing goodness.260 The awareness for this danger and the 
consequent need for correction pose a challenge for the problem of allegiance. 
Sidney tries to solve this problem through two approaches. Firstly, through 
distinguishing - following the issues discussed above - between society and 
individual. Secondly, through pointing at the linguistic particularities of the 
word allegiance. Focussing on the individual, Sidney declares contracts 
binding and submission under the law. Focussing on the individual, Sidney 
does not question the principle pactis standum. The individual is bound to 
allegiance, which "signifies no more (as the words, ad legem declare) than 
such an obedience as the law requires."261 Conversely, the whole people is 
above the law. Sidney considers it the sovereign power when he says, "the law 
can require nothing from the whole people, who are masters of i t " . 2 6 2 Owing 
to this context, we have to interpret that a people as whole may strip off the 
restraints of a government that does not fulf i l its purpose, while the individual 
is still bound to stick to contracts, e.g. an oath of allegiance, or submission 
under the law. Thus the individual's natural right to unrestrained liberty is 
conferred on the sovereignty of the whole people or nation. As a result, Sidney 
sees all governments merely as the means of nations, to execute power, not as 
263 
the originator of sovereignty itself. 
This understanding binds governments and individuals equally to 
subordinate themselves under the rules of the constitution and the laws. Thus 
the government cannot request any action from an individual that is contrary 
Discourses 1.1, 6. 
0 Discourses II. 1, 83. 
1 Discourses 111.36, 521. 
2 Discourses III.36, 521. 
3 Cf. Sidney suggests this understanding of people's sovereignty through pointing out that 
"the natural liberty of nations is discovered in the several limitations put upon the 
sovereign power. {Discourses 111.31, 505). 
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to law, nor has the government the freedom to act outside the rules prescribed 
by the law. I f it does, the individual citizen is not bound to follow. With 
linguistic scrutiny, Sidney states, "private men who swear obedience ad 
legem, swear no obedience extra or contra legem".264 It follows that private 
men are, according to Sidney, bound to obligation as long as a government 
acts within the limits of the constitution and the laws. A government acting 
outside the realm determined by law endangers the allegiance of the nation. 
IL4 Sidney's Common-Wealth 
Sidney, unlike other political authors, was a doer not a sayer. Not only 
intellectual fancies, but also practical experience found their way into his 
writings. In 1649 Sidney, together with Milton, Neville and Nedham, was 
justifying the establishment of an English Republic. During the Protectorate, 
Sidney, Harrington, Neville and Nedham formed a republican opposition, and 
in 1659 they contributed to a brief revival of the republic. Jonathan Scott has 
pointed out that these experiences are the precise political context for the 
265 ,».i 
emergence of Republican ideas in the seventeenth century. The Discourses 
were written much later than the period of the commonwealth and the 
protectorate. 
These experiences were important for the development of Sidney's political 
ideas, yet they were not the context in which the Dicscourses were written. 
Their significance stems from the fact that they were the real world experience 
of Sidney, as a political author, which told him that his ideas on a just society 
and on good government might be put into political reality. In this chapter I 
consider the ideas of the Discourses that give an insight into the institutional 
shape favoured by Sidney. Thus I shall explore the consequences for a 
264 Discourses 111.36, 521. 
2 6 5 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 14. 
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political structure that follow from the key concepts of virtue, liberty and 
justice. 
II.4.1 Political architecture 
"[T]he various talents that men posess, may by good discipline be 
rendered useful to the whole, as the meanest piece of wood or stone being 
placed by a wise architect, conduces to the beauty of the most glorious 
building. But every man bearing in his own breast affections, passions and 
vices that are repugnant to this end, and no man owing any submission to 
his neighbour; none wil l subject the correction or restriction of themselves 
to another, unless he also submit to the same rule. They are rough pieces of 
timer or stone, which 'tis is necessary to cleave, saw, or cut: This is the 
work of a skillful builder, and he only is capable of erecting a great fabrick, 
who is so: Magistrates are political architects; and they only can perform 
the work incumbent on them, who excel in political virtues."2 6 6 
This passage tells a lot about Sidney's understanding of politics. It is worth 
devoting some attention to its interpretation, with particular regard to Sidney's 
usage of metaphor. In the history of political thought the development of 
metaphors has always been a successful means of rhetoric. Plato and Aristotle 
often illustrated their ideas through reference to the activities to different 
crafts, e.g. to the shoemaker; Cicero, for example, in De inventione, compares 
his writing with the work of an artist; while Machiavelli illustrates his ideas on 
fortune in reference to the Goddess Fortuna. As one of the most learned 
Englishmen in this subject during his time, 2 6 7 Sidney was well aware of this 
tradition and took advantage of it. 
2 6 6 Sidney, Discourses II. 1, 83. 
2 6 7 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 9. 
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As we see above, Sidney considers politics a constructive science; not 
only because people initially decide to frame a particular constitution to their 
own convenience, but also because politicians are metaphorically referred to 
as architects269 who erect a "glorious building" or as "skilful" builders. 
Citizens are allocated their places and they are shaped to contribute to its 
beauty. They are shaped, which can only mean - i f we remember the passages 
on virtue - that they are stimulated to a sound moral development. Let us try 
to understand Sidney's suggestion of speaking about the state metaphorically. 
Chapter I L L of the Discourses stimulates to interpret Sidney's political 
philosophy by referring to it as a political building. Chapter I I . 1, which I 
consider a condensed account of Sidney's political ideas, serves as the 
principal reference for the following statements. I extend the metaphor of the 
political building in the hope that it may clarify some fundamental idea of 
Sidney's theory. 
To erect the "glorious building" of the state, several requirements have to 
be fulfilled: First of all, it must be built on a strong foundation. The basic 
components of this foundation can be identified as the key concepts of virtue, 
liberty and justice. They fulf i l several functions. Firstly, virtue has to be 
fostered and sustained in the magistrate as well as in the citizen. Secondly, the 
key concepts determine the structure of the state itself. The constitution is 
built on them. It exists to maintain the initial liberty of the people, to allow the 
exercise of justice and to ensure that virtue acts as the guiding principle of 
human action. Thirdly, virtue is the only principle that Sidney acknowledges 
for a justification of hierarchy, which may only develop in liberty and exist for 
the sake of justice. Finally, virtue determines the stability of the state both 
internally as well as externally, so that it maintains justice. The state gains 
internal stability through the maintenance of virtue and justice, and external 
stability as virtuous citizens are inclined to resist foreign invasion and to fight 
2 6 8 Cf. also: Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 226. 
2 6 9 Cf. also Discourses 111.24,460. 
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for their liberty. A l l these principles have to be realised within the 
constitution. It ensures that the elements of a state are put together in the right 
manner. Secondly, the details of the plan find their equivalent in laws which 
regulate the building process and the placing of building materials. Thirdly the 
citizens, who stand for the building material, need to be shaped as much as 
'timber and stone' need to be 'cleaved sawed and cut'. They are put at the 
right places within the state and contribute to the beauty of the building. 
Ideally they are involved in the political decision-making process, but may 
ful f i l a number of functions, e.g. defence, to stabilise the political building or 
their respective professions to care for substitution. Just as the building 
material is formed, Sidney's metaphor suggests that laws form man's 
behaviour for the sake of both the common well-being and individual 
achievement of a good life. Outside the state such well-being is jeopardised by 
violence, lack of self-government - responsible usage of liberty - which hardly 
develops without the right education. Fourthly the magistrates as 'skilful 
builders' watch over education and the good organisation within the state. 
They have the greatest share in co-ordinating the successful building process. 
Those among them who have the greatest skills - which is political virtue -
even survey the building process. Governors find their equivalent in wise 
architects. Under their eyes, the right plan, the laws and the constitution 
together mould every man's nature towards completion. As a result, the 'right 
order' emerges, which is the 'glorious building' of a state that provides 
justice, cares for the well-being of its citizens, secures their liberty, and 
through their contribution is able to resist all internal and external dangers. 
Sidney's idea of stability, like all his concepts, appears value-laden. He 
expresses this conviction by saying "stability is then only worthy of praise, 
when it is in that which is good." 2 7 1 Virtue clearly is considered good, and 
2 7 0 Cf. Chapter II.2.1, "Virtue". 
271 Discourses TIM, 136. 
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ought to provide stability to human nature, as Sidney's account of virtue 
shows. However, human nature is actually not capable of stability, for its 
weakness makes it prone to regression to a vicious state. The requirement 
for stability can only be fulfilled i f political order is based on reason and 
virtue 2 7 3 since the requirement to act virtuously and reasonably can give 
stability to human conduct in general.274 As human reason is always prone to 
be subdued by passion, Sidney considers the law as artificial reason that 
provides guidance. Consequently, the principles of justice and virtue take up a 
decisive function as a foundation of the political building, which finds its form 
in the constitution. While Sidney considers tyranny rooted in corruption, 
275 
"mixed or popular governments are only in a possibility of falling into it. 
The constitution has the task of preventing this decay. Here we can discover 
Sidney's preference for popular or mixed government. The metaphor of the 
political building hints at this preference, as it is not seen as a structure that is 
pressed on the people, but it stands for a building process that involves the 
citizen. 
For Sidney, the end of governments is always the common good, regardless 
of whether one speaks about monarchy, aristocracy or democracy. He derives 
this thesis from his premise that the origin of all governments lies in the 
interest of the people who once set it up in "consideration of their own good" 
and transferred their original power to a few to execute it according to the 
laws. As the "good of the publick" 2 7 6 is always in the centre of attention, the 
form of government is of less importance. The only problem may arise from 
interpreting what this good is. 
Despite the requirement that the constitution ought to be based on the 
principles of virtue and justice and as it should maintain liberty, Sidney's 
2 7 2 Cf. Chapter H.I.I. 
2 7 3 Discourses 11.11, 136. 
2 7 4 Discourses 11.11, 137. 
275 Discourses 11.19, 189. 
2 7 6 Discourses II.5, 99. 
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theory is open towards several forms of government. In respect of a particular 
institutional structure he is rather vague.277 
"A wise architect may shew his skill, and deserve commendation for 
building a poor house of vile materials, when he can procure no better, but 
he no way ought to hinder others from erecting more glorious fabricks i f 
they are furnished with means required. Besides, such is the imperfection of 
all human constitutions, that they are subject to perpetual fluctuation, which 
never permits them to continue long in the same condition". 
Things have to be adopted to times and circumstances. "Simple perfection" is 
only found in God, "relative perfection [...] in the things he created: He saw 
they were good, which can signify no more than that they were good in their 
kind, and suited to the end for which he designed them." The first reason 
for this lies in Sidney's conviction that a constitution has to be judged on the 
question of whether it is "well or i l l proportioned"; not only does the form 
matter, but also the question of whether the form matches the needs of the 
people living under it and whether the form is well suited for its end, which is 
to foster the virtue and well being of the people. Here the Aristotelian notion 
of excellence {arete) stands in the background, which has a close link to the 
question of the right proportion of things. Secondly, Sidney's vagueness has a 
theological implication, expressed in the statement: "Tis hard to imagine, that 
God who hath left all things to our choice, that are not evil in themselves", 
should have prescribed a particular form of Government (as Filmer 
With this vagueness, his system mirrors the "constitutional anti-formalism" that Scott 
ascribed to the interregnum, the time of Sidney's vita activa. Jonathan Scott, England's 
Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 158. 
Discourses 111.24,460. 
Discourses III.24,463. 
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believes). Contesting Filmer, who claims that monarchy is ordained by 
God, Sidney claims that man is endowed with reason and born free, so that he 
himself can decide what form of government is suitable for him. For Sidney, 
this means that man definitively has choice in terms of the form of 
government he want to submit himself to. For Sidney, it is a matter of reason 
to decide for one of those forms of government that support the moral 
development of the people. 
Certainly, Sidney's recourse to religion supports his understanding that the 
choice of government is the result of mutual agreement. He presents the 
freedom of forming governments as a religiously sanctioned right of man. 
Here, the sovereignty of the people who come together to speak with one 
281 
voice, constitutes the basis for creating the legal reality of a constitution. 
Built on the free wi l l of the people to form society for their own good, Sidney 
stresses the basis of liberty which is prior to this formation of social order and 
which remains the basis as it can always be reclaimed i f the social order fulfils 
its purpose. 
According to Sidney, law has its origin in "God's general ordinance, that 
there should be laws; and the particular ordinances of all societies that appoint 
such as seem best to them." 2 8 2 Hence, the source of law is religion as well as 
the sovereignty of the people. Due to its educational function, law is the 
decisive means of the state. It develops and sustains virtue, and plays a key 
part in Sidney's political architecture, particularly as a means of directing 
those who hold political responsibility. Accordingly, Sidney states, "[m]en are 
so subject to vices and passions, that they stand in need of some restraint in 
every condition; but most especially when they are in power." But it is not 
280 Discourses 1.6, 23. 
2 8 1 With this aspect of his thought he perhaps anticipates Rousseau's theory of the social 
contract. 
282 Discourses 11.24, 219. 
2 8 3 Discourses III. 13, 390. 
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only with regard to its educational function that the law has paramount 
importance, but also with regard to the superiority it has over individuals and 
institutions of the state. Law serves as a regulatory mechanism that ensures 
justice and virtue for a number of reasons: Law does not decay as human 
virtue does;284 neither is it subject to passions or emotions that could vitiate its 
function, 2 8 5 nor is it subject to external influences as it is good, deaf and 
inflexible. 2 8 6 Above that, laws aim at the public good without distinction of 
persons287 and therefore sustain equality. Hence, Sidney considers law the best 
guide for the actions of political officers. 
However, looking at the source of law, which is human reason, Sidney sees 
also its possible flaws. As men are never perfect, neither can the law ever 
be. 2 8 8 Consequently, Sidney sees the need for a force which can correct the 
law, which he accords to the parliament.289 For the parliament represents the 
wi l l of the people and ought to act in accordance with the common good, and 
thus wil l frame the law in such a way that it can be improved constantly and 
procures the development of virtue. 
The right plan, the laws and the constitution, mould every man's nature 
towards completion, while the constitution determines the whole structure. 
Owing to the "frailty of human nature", deviations from good and virtuous 
behaviour can occur, but are lessened since "the law [...] denounces severe 
penalties for crimes". The law is moulding man for the sake of the glory of the 
political building, since law "is indeed merciful both to the i l l men, who are 
by that means deterred from committing [crimes]; and to the good, who 
otherwise would be destroyed."290 This feature of law contributes to the good 
Discourses 111.40, 544. 
Discourses III. 15, 400. 
Discourses III. 15, 401. 
Discourses 11.18, 179. 
Discourses 111.22, 451; III. 24,46. 
Discourses III.22, 452. 
Discourses 111.40, 544. 
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development of man. It reflects the Aristotelian idea that acts are called "just 
that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the 
political society". "[T]he rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily 
conceived one less well. This form of justice, then, is called complete virtue", 
provided , of course, the law is rightly framed. 2 9 1 
But even laws cannot provide a perfect frame for political order and so he 
states, referring to Aristotle, "No laws made by man can be perfect" and 
concludes, "there must be in every nation a power for correcting such defects 
as in time may arise to be discovered".292 The role of "altering, mitigating, 
explaining or correcting the laws" 2 9 3 he ascribes to parliament, which he 
regards as the community of those citizens chosen to represent the state 
because of their paramount virtue. Here the right order comes into play with 
the people being involved in government. 
'Laws' and 'good discipline' are the means Sidney has in mind for the 
formation of man's character - symbolically named as 'rough pieces of wood 
and stone' - in order to enable the achievement of virtuous life. With this 
metaphor, Sidney emphasises the idea of human nature and its relationship to 
virtue, which we have encountered in Chapter II.2.1. 'Rough pieces of timber 
and stone' stand for man as he could be found outside society. The metaphor 
refers to unguided human nature. As worthless as rough timber and stone are, 
they may be valuable i f treated in the right manner. As much as the skilful 
builder shapes these pieces in the course of a building process, men are shaped 
through the state and magistrates in their development. It is interesting that 
Sidney says about 'timber and stone' that they may be rendered useful to the 
whole. Also men, in his account, are meant to be stimulated to be useful to the 
whole, when they are living in a state, and according to their ability, have a 
share in running it. 
291 ENV, 1129b. 
292 Discourses 111.22,456. 
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Due to affections and passions that every man 'bears in his breast', such 
educational means as the role of magistrates, education and above all laws are 
necessary to mould man in a manner that he is stimulated to fulf i l his potential 
and to contribute to the well-being of society out of insight rather than 
arbitrary rule. From his own experience, Sidney had learned hard it is to cope 
with one's own passions.294 The right guidance is important in order to 
understand that an awareness for the community of citizens results in the 
beauty of the most "glorious building", in which each part has a purpose. The 
magistrates have the task of assisting with this guidance so that the individual 
citizen may act in consideration of his own as well as the community's 
interest. 
Even i f magistrates play an eminent role in Sidney's political thought, they 
are still considered to be as much part of the metaphorical building process as 
the citizens. The constitution and the laws, which I consider the building plan 
and the details in my extension of Sidney's metaphor, bind the magistrates as 
they do other citizens. However since magistrates are more aware of the 
beauty a 'glorious building' might have in the end, Sidney seems to expect 
that they do not need to be 'cleaved sawed or cut' but wil l act out of this 
insight and a knowledge of the higher ends of society, for which they have 
initially been instituted. Sidney makes this very clear when he states that a 
magistrate needs the knowledge of God as it is his task to lead man back to the 
good from which he is fallen. 2 9 5 The knowledge of God is important, as 
Sidney considers it the "root of all justice and goodness".296 
As we see from these ideas, Sidney's decision to compare the state to a 
beautiful and most glorious building might be related to the religious 
2 9 3 Ibid. 
2 9 4 For his own passionate character see Chapter 1.1, as well as Houston, Algernon Sidney and 
the Republican Heritage in England and America, 132. 
295 Discourses 11.1, 82 
296 Discourses 11.1,83. 
125 
implications politics always have for Sidney. With the most "glorious 
building", it seems, men are in form of the state, creating something like a 
temple, that exists for the honour of God. The magistrates' responsibility lies 
in assuring that this higher end of politics governs all political action. These 
metaphysical implications of the tasks of the magistrate are poignantly 
expressed in the first section of chapter two. Sidney speaks about the "skilful 
builders" in a more general way, while constantly underlining virtue as the 
necessary premise of their actions. 
In reference to Livy, Sidney states, "the virtuous were willing to be 
restrained by law." 2 9 7 Magistrates, accordingly, are expected to appreciate the 
guidance they experience through the law, rather than feeling it as a restraint. 
This reference to Livy is of course not the only example taken from the 
Roman emphasis on the importance of virtue as a principle of political 
leadership. With Tacitus, Sidney shares an admiration for the principles of the 
Germans, in particular their principles of political leadership. Sidney 
paraphrases, 
"[t]heir princes according to their merit had the credit of persuading, not 
the power of commanding; and the question was not what part of the 
government their kings would allow to the nobility and people, but what 
they would give to their kings". 2 9 8 
Here it becomes apparent that Sidney's ideal is political leadership purely 
founded on merit. Hence, the job of the "magistrate" or "architect" is clearly 
seen as an honour rather than a privilege. This becomes significant also in the 
following quotation: 
Discourses 11.20, 193. 
Discourses 11.30, 291. Germania Chapter 11. 
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"Honours and riches are justly heaped upon the heads of those who 
rightly perform their duty, because the difficulty as well as the excellency 
of the work is great. It requires courage, experience, industry, fidelity, and 
wisdom. The good shepherd, says our Saviour, lays down his life for his 
sheep".299 
Here we also find one of the infrequent specific statements on virtue. Sidney 
points out that he sees courage, experience, industry, fidelity, and wisdom as 
the virtues a magistrate ought to have. With his reference to the shepherd, 
Sidney stresses that he finds it important for a politician to be so much guided 
by the well being of his people that he would give his life for it. As we see in 
Sidney's own situation, he was not only talking about this high maxim for 
politician's behaviour, but was also acting in accordance with it. 
II.4.2 The political building: Resulting order 
"Order doth principally consist in appointing to everyone his right place, 
office, or work". 3 0 0 The material must be placed rightly to form the political 
building well. Similar in a society there must be an appropriate social or 
political structure. While general principles that would count as part of the 
constitution are decisive for its state, 'skilful builders' also contribute to it. 
The former wil l be the main concern of this section while the latter wil l be the 
subject of a later chapter. 
The principles upon which the social order is based are virtue, justice and 
liberty. The structure of the social order turns out to be a justified hierarchical 
order. The principle of liberty seems, at first glance, to contradict hierarchy, 
yet Sidney's concept of liberty is its decisive source. Derived from nature and 
the relation between men, liberty appears as a basis for the necessity of 
299 Discourses 11.24, 224. 
300 Discourses 11.11, 135. 
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consensual government, but not as an adequate reason for the justification of 
an egalitarian political system. Sidney reveals the premises for the social 
structure by referring to the hypothetical genesis of society. Being born in 
"natural equality", men decide to resign their liberty into a "common stock 
[to...] form societies for their own good."3 0 1 Thereby they are "advancing one 
above another" which can only be done in consideration of the "opinion of a 
man's virtue and ability." Naturally, consensual government wil l be 
hierarchically based on virtue, since reason leads to the conclusion "Virtue 
only can give a just and natural preference."302 The initial liberty gives way to 
a hierarchy of ability as Sidney expresses in the following section: 
"As reason is our nature, that can never be natural to us that is not 
rational. Reason gives paria paribus,[equal things to equals] equal power to 
those who have equal abilities and merit: It allots to everyone the part he is 
most fit to perform; and this fitness must be equally lasting with the law 
that allots i t . " 3 0 3 
As is apparent in this statement, apart from virtue Sidney is also concerned 
about the right balance within a constitution. Right balance has a relationship 
to his understanding of justice, which, in his account, is a concept that asks for 
the appropriate measure rather than for the equal measure of things. 
This idea of justice is the foundation of Sidney's ideas on the institutional 
shape of politics. It allows Sidney to refrain from commending a particular 
constitution, i.e. democracy, as the most just form of government, since he 
expects that constitutions are always the result of circumstances. These 
develop and change in consideration of the good of the people, which is 
guaranteed i f the 'original principles' of virtue liberty and justice are 
maintained. On the basis of this understanding of justice, Sidney's system 
301 Discourses 1.12,35-6. 
3 0 2 Discourses 11.1,81. 
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allows us to infer a certain constitutional flexibility. This is also reflected in 
Sidney's discussion of principles transmitted from the past. Time and 
changing circumstances can demand constitutional change. Hence the 
institutional shape of politics may give way to the needs for which the actual 
government has to cater. 
I f constitutional changes are demanded for whatever reason, the age of the 
once established constitutional principles ought not to be the compass for 
political decision-making, but the maintenance of the original principles of 
government. Considering the impact of time on the value of a political 
arrangement, Sidney states in relation to his principle of justice, 
"time can make nothing lawful or just, that is not so of itself [...] that 
which a people does rightly establish for their own good, is of as much 
force as continuance can ever give to i t " 3 0 4 
Hence, however long a political arrangement exists, its value can not be 
derived from age, but from an inquiry into the question whether the original 
principle of justice is being maintained. This has implications for the question 
of whether Sidney was speaking in favour of Ancient Constitutionalism - John 
Pocock has brought this point into the discussion.305 Answering this question, 
we may say that Sidney was not questioning the value of the old English 
constitution, yet he was not justifying it per se, but in consideration of his 
original principles. As much as for other institutional shapes of politics, we 
may derive the conclusion that his concepts are more important than one 
particular order. The maintenance of virtue, liberty and justice overrules age: 
"that which a people does rightly establish for their own good, is of as 
much force the first day, as continuance can ever give to it: and therefore in 
303 Discourses II.4, 94. 
304 Discourses 111.28, 479. 
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matters of the greatest importance, wise and good men do not so much 
inquire what has been, as what is good and ought to be." 3 0 6 
Pocock, "England's Cato: The Virtues and Fortunes of Algernon Sidney." 
Discourses 111.28, 479. 
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I l l The Classical Inheritance 
I I I . l Introduction 
Consideration of Greek authors is imperative since they form the 
background that allows understanding of Sidney's emphasis on virtue and on 
human nature. Sidney himself states that he places great value on Plato and 
Aristotle owing to their understanding of the "secrets of human nature". 
Beyond that, Sidney expresses his trust in these authorities by pointing out 
that they know "more rightly [than Filmer] of the interests of mankind [...and] 
have comprehended in their writings the wisdom of the Grecians, [as well as] 
all they had learnt from the Phoenicians, Egyptians and Hebrews".307 It seems 
that Sidney considers the writings of the Greeks an invaluable source. Even i f 
there is no doubt that other political writings also left their trace on Sidney's 
political writings, the Greeks, so it seems, are considered a source of ancient 
knowledge of mankind that has a fundamental value for all questions posed to 
humanity. They appear as principal sources of knowledge. The above 
quotation suggests that their influence was of such value as to be significant in 
any inquiry into the nature of Sidney's reasoning on man and politics. As in 
the statement above, Sidney does not consider Plato and Aristotle as 
proponents of two different schools, but rather as the proponents of the same 
type of philosophy. Jonathan Scott emphasised this observation by asking, "Is 
Sidney a Platonis or Aristotelain? He is both." 3 0 8 This requires their being 
considered together. In my account, however, I shall place greater emphasis 
on the Aristotelian influence as it has so far received less attention. 
Despite these points in favour of an exploration of the classical Greek 
influence, it has to be borne in mind that it was by no means the only 
307 Discourses 11.1,78. 
3 0 8 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 352. 
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influence with significance for Sidney's political thought. According to 
Jonathan Scott, it was Filmer's polemic against Ciceronian and Tacitean 
Republicanism309, Bellarmine's and Suarez' natural law theory, and Grotius' 
and Coke's justification of rebellion, that challenged Sidney's opposition, and 
stimulated him to refer to and to re-establish these authors310. While these 
authors, as already mentioned in Chapter I , found their way into the 
Discourses through its opposition to Patriarcha, such other authors as Plato, 
Aristotle, Livius, Machiavelli, Lipsius and Grotius also found their way into 
the Discourses because they already had fundamental value for Sidney's 
political thought before Sidney started composing an attack on Filmer. 
However the issue here is not to recall Sidney's intellectual development.311 
In consideration of the concept of virtue and Sidney's idea of human nature, 
Machiavelli plays an important role. This is because his political thought, like 
that of most humanists, was to a certain extent indebted to Aristotelian as well 
to Ciceronian ideas. Machiavelli's political ideas in the Discorsi had an 
impact on Sidney that is sometimes intertwined with Aristotelian concepts. 
The notion of virtue and political stability as well as warfare is particularly 
shaped by Machiavellian Republicanism. As Richard Tuck has pointed out, 
Machiavelli derived from Cicero "that the survival and advancement of one's 
republic had to take precedence over all things, and that the conventional 
3 0 9 Worden stated the term Republicanism used to be term of abuse and was not used by 
themselves. Worden, "English Republicanism," 443. 
3 1 0 Cf. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 209. 
3 1 1 On Sidney's intellectual development, cf. above all, Scott, Algernon Sidney and the 
English Republic, 1623-1677, 13-42. 
3 1 2 For further reference on the Machiallian notion of virtue in Early Modern republicanism, 
cf. Niccolo Machiavelli, Discorsi Di Niccolo Machiauelli... Sopra La Prima Deca Di Tito 
Liuio (Firenze: 1531), Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. Bernard Crick, Pelican 
Classics ; Ac 14 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970).;Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, 
and Maurizio Viroli, eds., Machiavelli and Republicanism, Ideas in Context (Cambridge 
[England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition.) 
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313 virtues might not in fact always be adequately instrumental to that end." For 
the present thesis it is important to note that Sidney appreciated Machiavellian 
ideas, but still maintained a more traditional attitude on virtue than 
Machiavelli's emphasis on survival would have allowed. This more traditional 
view has its source in Aristotelian concepts that Sidney on the one hand 
acquired through his own reading of Aristotle, and on the other hand through 
reading such other authors influenced by Aristotle as for example Cicero. 
There is no doubt that some of the notions of Sidney's concepts, particularly 
of virtue, also have resonances of other authors. Hence, for example 
Machiavelli's influence in some of Sidney's concepts may be equally as 
discernible as the Aristotelian influence. However, while the process through 
which these implicit concepts found their way into Sidney's thought wi l l 
remain a matter of contention, the present thesis just aims to show where we 
can find theses ideas to understand firstly, what the Aristotelian aspect of 
Sidney's thought really is, and secondly, what an exploration of Aristotle can 
add to an appreciation of Sidney's ideas on virtue and their relation to the 
other concepts of liberty and justice. 
I shall introduce explicit as well as implicit concepts into the classical 
concepts of thought in Sidney. Through Sidney's example we may learn what 
importance Greek antiquity still had in providing authoritative sources for 
political argumentation in the seventeenth century. This is surprising i f we 
consider the Early Modern discontent with the Scholastic tradition of 
discussing authoritative sources that was later to be overcome by the 
emergence of empiricism and the striving for intellectual innovation. Sidney's 
language and thought seem untouched by the early modern attempts to leave 
the intellectual past behind for the sake of recent innovation. This is evident as 
Sidney refers to Classical Greek and Roman ideas, for example of Cicero, 
Livy and Tacitus, alongside such modern ideas as the neo-stoicism of Justus 
Lipsius or the natural law thinking of Hugo Grotius. Also Machiavellian 
3 1 3 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-165J, 20. 
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republican thought always lurks somewhere between the arguments. The 
reader of the Discourses is always tempted to focus on the classical republican 
aspects of Sidney's thought. This is particularly so as a result of the 
Machiavellian influence in conjunction with references to the republican 
character of some periods in Hebrew, Spartan, Roman and Venetian history. 
Yet Jonathan Scott has stated "classical republicanism is [...] neither a 
sufficient nor a very precise category for describing Sidney's thought as a 
whole." 3 1 4 Hence, i f we want to come to grips with Sidney's thought as a 
whole, we need to pursue other lines of inquiry as well. I hope that my 
approach to reveal the important aspects of the Greek tradition may bring us 
closer to an appreciation of Sidney's thought as a whole: It should help us to 
understand to what extent the ancient Greek ideas, particularly on virtue and 
justice, had an impact on Sidney, and perhaps also on his interpretation of 
more recent political texts. This may then help us to understand why classical 
republicanism is not sufficient as a category for understanding Sidney. 
There are several reasons for treating the Classical Greek influence on 
Sidney as important. Beyond the fact that it has hitherto received only scant 
attention, it may be said that the subject of Classical Greek influences on 
republicans is not well established as a research topic. Most of the recent 
publications on English republicanism display a greater inclination to 
scrutinising the Roman past than the Greek origins of political concepts. There 
may be reasons to believe that the Roman influence was more important as 
well as more immediate than the Greek influence. The Roman Republic has of 
course often been used as a model, particularly in the case of Harrington. 
Without doubt Machiavelli, and through him, Polybius and Livy were decisive 
sources for Harrington. Concerning Sidney, the influence of these authors 
cannot be denied. Yet there is evidence that the Greek authors' influence was 
substantial. Particularly as there is hardly any reason to doubt that Sidney read 
3 1 4 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 15. 
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these authors themselves rather than it being through his reading of Roman 
authors. 
I f we consider Sidney's time, there are differing statements on the 
importance of Greek authors. There is contention about the influence of 
Aristotle in regard to political philosophy. With Plato, the focus of attention 
has been on the Oxford and Cambridge Platonists. They are an example of the 
flourishing development Platonic philosophy had in the seventeenth century. 
A further example is the interest of protestants in Plato. It resulted in attempts 
to blend theological answers to the troubles of their time with Platonic 
philosophy.315 This background sets the context for Sidney's Platonist 
thinking. 
In the case of Sidney, Jonathan Scott has pointed out a few facts that 
underline Plato's significance for Sidney's political thought. First of all, he 
characterised Sidney's thought as 
"a combination of extreme relativism, and scepticism, about the variety 
and mutability of particularly worldly things, with an emphasis on a small 
core of immutable moral values standing outside this changeability, 
represented by the law of nature, discernible in reason, and anchored finally 
in the only perfect and unchanging being: God." 3 1 6 
I should like to suggest that we may consider Sidney's emphasis on the 
unchangeable key concepts of virtue, justice and liberty as being influenced 
by these ideas as well. Secondly Jonathan Scott also revealed a close 
T I T 
connection between the Sidney family, neo-stoicism and Platonsim. 
Thirdly, Grotius - who Sidney referenced, particularly in his account of 
natural law and rebellion- accepted that good laws can never be entirely 
3 1 5 Schobinger and Ueberweg, Die Philosophie Des 17. Jahrhunderts, Bd. 3. England, 213. 
3 1 6 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 17. 
3 1 7 Ibid., 18. 
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stable, but have to vary according to time, people and circumstances. 
Through this flexibility, which has already been mentioned, e.g. in the account 
of Sidney's constitutional thought, a gap opens between positive law and the 
law of nature, or between human law and universal standards of justice. This 
aspect of justice also has, according to Jonathan Scott, Platonic sources.319 
Fourthly, Sidney, like Mil ton , 3 2 0 Nedham and Stubbe, was aware of how 
difficult it was for some people to handle liberty. On their account, "those 
incapable of liberty, that is of ruling themselves, would have to be ruled by 
those capable of i t . " 3 2 1 We have already encountered this aspect of Sidney's 
thought in his key concepts and their relationship to the citizen. There are 
further points that substantiate Sidney's particular interest in Plato, and we 
shall encounter a few more in the course of this chapter. So far it should be 
sufficient to get an impression of the various ways in which Sidney was 
influenced by this philosopher. Let us then move on to the relationship 
between Plato's pupil Aristotle and Sidney. 
Turning to Aristotle, we can draw the conclusion that his importance for the 
intellectual landscape of Sir Philip Sidney has been clearly demonstrated,322 
3 1 8 Ibid., 19. 
3 1 9 Ibid. 
3 2 0 There are a number of similarities between Sidney's and Milton's thought that have 
hitherto not been explored properly. In particular the mutual usage of Aristotelian ideas is 
a topic that deserves attention in future projects. For Milton's republicanism, see above all: 
Martin Dzelzainis, "Milton's Classical Republicanism," in Milton and Republicanism, ed. 
David Armitage, Quentin Skinner, and Armand Himy (Cambridge: CUP, 1995). 
3 2 1 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 21. 
3 2 2 Cf. Worden, The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney's Arcadia and Elizabethan Politics, 301. 
Peltonen shows that Aristotle had a strong influence on humanist thought, that he was in 
fact rediscovered (p. 25). His exploration of several Renaissance writings illuminates 
Aristotle's presence in these time's writings. Peltonen's book reveals this for example by 
means of Thomas Rogers, who deals with Aristotle's concept of virtue (p. 34), or Foord, 
who claimed, referring to Aristotle, the King was elected among the magistrates (p. 45); 
Peltonen, Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570-
1640. Schmitt stresses the particular interest in the Aristotelian tradition in the last quarter 
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while the literature about Algernon Sidney's time offers differing 
statements.323 Contributions to Republicanism state that Aristotle was an 
important source at least for some of the writings of this time and particularly 
for Sidney's fellow republicans, Mi l ton 3 2 4 and Harrington.3 2 5 Nevertheless, 
Blair Worden's statement that Aristotle was the "fountainhead of the classical 
political inheritance" is by no means characteristic for this field of research. 
But I shall argue that it is well suited to the case of Algernon Sidney.327 
Research on seventeenth-century political thought has placed relatively little 
stress upon the importance of Aristotle. The intellectual roots of this period's 
thinkers are seen in later philosophers such as the Roman historian Tacitus, 
the Florentine political writer Machiavelli, the Renaissance philosopher 
of the sixteenth century; Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 
26. 
In 1983 Charles B. Schmitt stated that Aristotelianism in sixteenth - and seventeenth -
century England has not been a subject of serious scholarly interest despite a definable 
revival of Aristotle in the work of such writes as Digby, Case, Hooker, Laud and Harvey 
Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England. Schmitt considers it 
necessary to pursue further research on this topic. The greatest problem related to this field 
of research is, that it is hard to isolate the influence of Aristotle's thought (Worden, 
"Republicanism and the Restoration, 1660-1683," 52.). 
Dzelzainis 1995 in: David Armitage, Armand Himy, and Quentin Skinner, eds., Milton 
and Republicanism, Ideas in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 16, 
23. 
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition, 480, Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 
147. 
Worden, "English Republicanism," 445. 
It seems as if Sidney can be considered as an example of the several Aristotelian 
movements called "humanist Aristotelianism." According to Schmitt, it is adequate to 
speak about "Aristotelianisms" rather than Aristotelianism due to vast variety of theories 
which stand in the influence of Aristotle's philosophy. (Schmitt, John Case and 
Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, 23.). Sidney's theory can be seen as one example 
among these theories. 
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Montaigne, or the legal theorist Grotius. This focus is justified through 
references to the general characteristics of attempts in this period to overcome 
scholastic traditions and to create new conceptions. The new humanism of 
Lipsius is only one example of this tendency.329 The total rejection of 
scholastic and humanist thought in Hobbes is another example, and stands for 
the rejection of Aristotelian theory in particular. However, Aristotle seems 
to have a pertinent influence on other thinkers and it is worth highlighting the 
fact that his continuing influence might well have been underestimated, 
particularly i f implicit Aristotelian concepts are taken into account. This seems 
to be significantly so in the case of Algernon Sidney. Even i f the 
aforementioned philosophers also had a strong influence on him, frequent 
references to Aristotle in his own work confirm the impression that the Greek 
331 
thinker still maintained a substantial influence on Sidney. 
Historical reasons help to understand why Aristotle was so attractive to 
Sidney. The Philosopher's analysis of the principle of monarchy could 
become a ground from which the English monarchy could be indicted for its 
332 
maintenance of a lack of common interest between king and people. In 
Aristotle's Politics Sidney found what was to his mind a convincing theory of 
the original principle of government: the theory of Kingship based on virtue. 
Cf. Peter Burke, "Tacitism, Scepticism, and Reason of State," in The Cambridge History of 
Political Thought, 1450-1700, ed. J H Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 484-93. In addition, Richard Tuck, "Grotius and Seldon," in The Cambridge 
History of Political Thought, ed. J H Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 518-19. 
9 Cf. Gerhard Oestreich, Geist Und Gestalt Des Fruhmodernen Staates. Ausgewahlte 
Aufsdtze (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1969).. Other examples of the rejection of 
Aristotle's philosophy are to be found in the new approaches to sciences in the works of 
such figures as Boyle or Bacon. (Compare also Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in 
Renaissance England., "Introduction".) 
0 Leviathan IV, ch. 46. 
1 Cf. Nelson, The Discourses of Algernon Sidney, 65-6. 
2 Worden, "English Republicanism," 448. 
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Like many contemporaries, Sidney was convinced of the prerogative of law 
over kingly rule. The theory of just kingship (which was to Sidney implied in 
this conviction), was at the time not only substantiated by referring to the 
ancient constitution, but had already a history since it was a common-place 
among the supporters of this theory - especially lawyers - to refer to Aristotle 
in the sixteenth century.333 Hence, Aristotle's writings were, at least in this 
context, still considered a relevant source. 
But apart from this historical background, it is above all the textual 
evidence that convinces the reader of the Discourses that Aristotle was an 
important source. The polemics against Filmer suggests that Sidney reassessed 
Aristotle. Filmer's selective and distorting references to Aristotle drew Sidney 
into a justifiable critique. 3 3 4 Filmer's attempts to discredit pagan authors such 
as Aristotle can be considered a stimulation for Sidney to reinstate the Greek 
philosopher. Regardless of whether Sidney reassessed Greek philosophy in 
reaction to Filmer, he undeniably had vast knowledge of it. Having inherited a 
passion for study from his father, the Earl of Leicester,335 it would have been 
surprising i f they did not draw him towards thorough reinterpretation of the 
T n zr 
Nicomachean Ethics and Politics in the context of his time. Consequently 
there is no reason to doubt the credibility of Sidney's own statement that he 
337 
had "read [Aristotle's] books of government with some attention." The 
great number of references to Aristotle in the Discourses confirms this. The 
fact that Sidney did not enjoy a kind of formal higher education allows us to 
3 3 3 Christopher W Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society since 1450 (London: 
Hambledon, 1998), 202-4. 
3 3 4 Cf. Discourses 111.22,449; 452; 111.23, 452. 
3 3 5 Carswell, The Porcupine: The Life of Algernon Sidney, 15. 
3 3 6 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, trans. W. D. Ross, World's Classics; 546 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1954), Aristotle, The Politics, and the Constitution of 
Athens, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. Jonathan Barnes, Rev. student ed., Cambridge Texts in 
the History of Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Cited as 
Poltitics and EN (Ethica Nicomachica). 
337 Discourses III.23,452. 
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conclude that he may have escaped the contemporary academic requirement to 
work with or against the scholastics' reading of Aristotle: as a consequence 
Aristotle's direct influence on Sidney may have been much deeper than with 
many of his learned contemporaries, e.g. Hobbes, whose Leviathan contains 
numerous polemical sections against Aristotle. 
The Discourses' direct references to Aristotle can be considered conscious 
concepts of Aristotelian thought included in Sidney's text. They have already 
received attention, most notably by Scott Nelson. 3 3 8 1 take it as important to go 
beyond the exploration of conscious Aristotelian concepts, in Sidney's 
thought to appreciate this particular background - ancient Greek learning-
fully. Even i f it "is difficult to assess precisely the role of [Aristotle's political 
thought] because it is so vast and all pervasive",339 the case of Sidney allows a 
different perspective on this problem. Owing to direct reference, Sidney points 
the reader to conscious Aristotelian concepts in his thought. The above listed 
evidence for the importance of an Aristotelian impact on Sidney suggests that 
we can only approach a ful l appreciation of Sidney's political thought i f we 
consider implicit as well as conscious concepts. This approach leads to an 
appreciation of the most decisive foundations on which Sidney modelled his 
own political ideas. Textual comparison wil l assist in approaching an 
understanding of conscious as well as implicit Aristotelian concepts in 
Discourses. 
Cf. Nelson, The Discourses of Algernon Sidney, 62-76.This is the only work that devotes 
an own chapter on relation between the Discourses and the Greeks. 
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition, 67. 
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III.2 Original Principles 
Owing to the great emphasis Sidney places on virtue, Sidney's argument 
hints that there is a case to be made for an impact of Ancient Greek and 
particularly Aristotelian virtue ethics, which provides the key to an 
understanding of Sidney's thought. While the concept of liberty has greater 
significance in Roman and Renaissance Republicanism, Greek philosophy still 
covered several aspects of the concept of liberty we find in Sidney. The 
concepts of virtue and justice, on the other hand, have a pre-eminent position 
in Plato's and Aristotle's writings. 
The significance of virtue in Sidney's political thought is closely bound up 
with his general ideas about ethics and politics, which appear as one branch of 
thought in Sidney, similar to the early modern reception of ancient 
philosophy, and Aristotle in particular. As much as the Nicomachean Ethics 
appears to the reader as the basis for the Politics, the late medieval and early 
modern reader studied both books together. In particular the translation of 
Aristotle into Ciceronian language suggests that it reinforced the tendency to 
discuss the moral questions, such as the significance of virtues in conjunction 
with politics. As both works were considered a unit, they were published 
together.340 
III.2.1 Virtue 
It is difficult to give an exact definition of arete, the Greek term for virtue. 
The reason for this difficulty lies in the variety of meanings this term has 
already in the Greek language. Being derived from the word agatos - which 
can be translated as good - virtue might just be translated as goodness or the 
best. It refers to the best state of something. Hence, saying about someone that 
3 4 0 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651, 12-20. 
141 
he is virtuous could simply mean that someone is a good person. 
Looking at this rather general meaning of the initial Greek concept of virtue 
may help us to understand, why Sidney only sporadically names specific 
qualities as virtues. This meaning - which seems rather vague to anyone who 
is used to specific definitions - also draws our attention to the extent to which 
a consideration of the context may bring us closer to the term's meaning than 
a search for exact definitions. In Plato's as well as Aristotle's philosophy we 
find both the usage of arete to denote nothing but good, or useful, as well as 
the meaning of arete as goodness in consideration of the well being of man, or 
moral goodness. The latter concept, of course, is what is of greater interest to a 
discussion of Sidney's political thought. 
"[T]here are three kinds [...] of moral states to be avoided- vice, 
incontinence, brutishness. The contraries [... ]are[...] virtue [and] 
continence; to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose superhuman 
virtue[...]. Therefore [...] i f men become gods by excess of virtue, of this 
kind must obviously be the state opposed to the brutish state: far as a brute 
has no vice or virtue, so neither has a god; his state is higher than virtue and 
that of a brute is a different kind of state from vice." 
One of the main issues linking Sidney to Plato's and Aristotle's political 
philosophy is a form of teleological anthropology. A l l three writers 
presuppose that human development has its own inherent target. Human life is 
3 4 1 In my discussion of the Greek terms I have relied on: Rudiger Bubner, Drei Studien zur 
Politischen Philosophie, Schriften der Philosophisch-Historischen Klasse der 
Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften; Bd. 11 (Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag C. 
Winter, 1999), Rudiger Bubner, Welche Rationalitat bekommt der Gesellschaft?: Vier 
Kapitel aus dem Naturrecht, 1. Aufl. ed., Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft; 1258 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996), Joachim Ritter et al., Historisches Worterbuch der 
Philosophie, vollig neubearbeitete Ausgabe des Worterbuchs der philosophischen Begriffe 
von Rudolf Eisler. ed. (Basel: Schwabe, 1971). 
142 
seen as a development which ought to strive towards moral cultivation. As we 
have seen in Chapter I I in Sidney's thought we find a number of points that 
agree with the above statement: Firstly, Sidney takes up the idea that human 
life and moral development occur between the state of brutishness, 
characterised by a total lack of any virtue, and a state of divine perfection, 
unachievable for man, for which he still ought to strive. Secondly, man is seen 
as a rational creature,343 able to follow the voice of reason and thus he has at 
least the capacity of achieving virtue, a capacity that he should aim to use. 
Thirdly, Sidney shares the teleological anthropology which presupposes 
that there is a difference between man as he can be observed in everyday life 
and man as he ought to be. Sidney underlines this thought in a platonic 
manner, when he states, 
"The misery of man proceeds from his being separated from God 
[...and...] his restitution therefore to felicity and integrity [...] can only be 
brought about by his reunion to the good from which he is fallen." 3 4 4 
Although this quotation may look as i f it is simply an expression of the 
Christian (and especially protestant) notion of man's fall and his duty to strive 
to return to his prelapsian state, Sidney makes clear that he has Plato in mind. 
He states in the next sentence, "Plato looks upon this as the only worthy object 
of man's desire".345 
Assuming man develops towards a goal - telos - Sidney shares with Plato 
and Aristotle the idea that man develops towards the completion of his nature 
throughout his life. In Plato, we find the idea that there is a hierarchy of 
pleasures which a person can experience. The highest position has the exercise 
of reason, which is the acquiring of knowledge. Compared to the pleasures 
3 4 2 Aristotle, £W VII, 1145a 
3 4 3 Cf. e.g. Discourses 11.20, 192. 
344 Discourses II. 1, 83. 
345 Discourses Ibid. 
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man might get from other activities, such as eating or the enjoyment of carnal 
pleasures, the acquisition of knowledge is a higher form of being. Therefore, 
the devotion to an acquisition of knowledge and the exercise of reason is, for 
Plato, a virtue worthy to be achieved. The Tyrant, according to Plato, is far 
from this activity, hence also far from true virtue. 3 4 6 For Sidney, this 
comparative aspect of reasoning about virtue of the mind must have been an 
appealing development in Plato's philosophy. In his thoughts on Filmer's idea 
of Kingship, Sidney for example states, '"Tis strange that he who frequently 
cites Aristotle and Plato, should unluckily acknowledge such only to be kings 
as thy call tyrants, and deny the name of king to those, who in their opinion 
are the only kings." 3 4 7 
Finally, all thinkers distinguish a divine and a brutish state from the states 
achievable by man. The brutish state is below human life. Yet it is also the 
state which - according to Sidney's interpretation of Plato and Aristotle - is 
equivalent with tyranny. Referring to the Greek authors, he states that living 
under tyranny, or in what they call barbarum regna, is worse than being 
"subject to the lust of a beast".348 Being unachievable, the divine state is above 
all human virtue. While Aristotle in the Ethics or Politics does not devote 
much attention to divine being, Sidney gives a hint of his own interpretation 
for this state. Like Milton, he refers to the fall as the explanation of man's 
imperfection, but always looks at it in conjunction with references to Plato's 
ideas. 
"man, [.. .] when separated from law and justice is the worst of all 
[animals]; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped 
at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which 
he may use for the worst ends."349 
Politeia 584 d-590a. 
Discourses 11.30, 287. 
Discourses 11.30, 288. 
Politics I, 1253a 
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"The fierce barbarity of a loose multitude, bound by no law, and 
regulated, is wholly repugnant to [the way in which man ought to live...]. 
Whilst every man fears his neighbour, and has no other defence than his 
own strength, he must live in [...] perpetual anxiety".3 5 0 
Although similar statements occur in a number of seventh-century writings, 
it is worth inquiring what this section may tell us about the Greek thinking 
that, in Sidney's case, may be considered a background from which his 
thought is more easily understood. I am not at all suggesting that Sidney is 
exclusively referring to the Greeks in this passage. But there is enough reason 
to believe that the Greek philosophers are the most decisive influence in the 
above quotation. This is particularly so in that Sidney embedded this 
discussion into references to Plato and Aristotle. 
Having Aristotle's famous statement in mind, that man is a political animal, 
the above quotation of Aristotle seems surprising as it rather looks like an 
anticipation of a Hobbesian state of nature as described in Leviathan.351 Yet 
the context in which Sidney's statement appears suggests that Sidney aims to 
emphasise the difference between man guided through the civilising effect of 
the state and man as he degenerates into a beast-like creature, i f this effect is 
lacking. The proximity to Hobbes in this anticipation of a state of nature 
brings to mind a decisive difference between Sidney and Aristotle on the one 
side and Hobbes on the other. While Hobbes refers to a state of nature 
scenario to emphasise the importance of having political order at all, Sidney 
uses it, and here he is in line with Aristotle, to emphasise the need for a 
particular political order that allows man to practice, and we may infer, 
develop his talents. Thus the decisive difference from Hobbes is the purpose 
of civil society that is opposed to the state of war. While Hobbes is simply 
interested in disaster avoidance, Sidney and Aristotle have a teleological 
3 5 0 Discourses, 11.1,83 
3 5 1 Hobbes and Tuck, Leviathan, XIII. 
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conception of human nature that requires them to consider the state as a means 
to the end of human development. 
Sidney makes clear that it is the "good discipline" that renders the 
"individual useful to the whole", 3 5 2 and allows him to achieve "happiness, and 
that sedate temper of mind" which is required for a righteous life. The former 
point, in particular, being "useful to the whole", is in line with the Aristotelian 
idea that man ought to live in the community of the state to which he 
contributes through bringing in his talents.353 
This feature of Aristotle's thought requires us to recall some of his 
statements on human nature and the state. As early as in the first book of the 
Politics it becomes clear that the political state is a creation of man. From this, 
Aristotle derives the statement that man is a political animal. Yet he also 
makes clear that "man is more a political animal than bees or any other 
gregarious animals."354 Thus he clarifies that it is not particularly human to be 
a political animal, but to be "more a political animal". Hence man has a higher 
quality of the political. Among the various answers spread out though the 
Ethics and Politics the reference to morality - the sense of good and evil -
prevails.3 5 5 The ideas behind this are extensively dealt with in the Ethics, but 
the point of greatest interest here is the thesis that morality is concerned with 
the good life within the community, which equals the fulfilment of human 
nature. This is only possible within the state, first, because it is the highest 
form of community as it encompasses all others, and secondly, because it 
enables the cultivation of the political - the sense of community - of man. In 
this sense the state is prior to human nature. The quotation at the beginning of 
the chapter precisely illustrates this thesis. By giving a short hypothetical 
statement, Aristotle outlines how unimaginable man's separation from the 
state is as a result of his thesis that the development of the particularly human 
352 Discourses II. 1, 83. 
3 5 3 DisoursesWA, 83. 
354 Politics 1253a. 
355 Politics 1253a. 
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political quality depends on the state and cannot develop outside the state. 
The same hypothetical move recurs in Sidney's Discourses for a similar 
purpose. Describing an extra-social condition that is determined by 
"affections, passions and vices,"3 5 6 Sidney highlights how man is bound to 
lead life in a "bestial barbarity" unless "art and discipline" improve i t . 3 5 7 But 
in Sidney's cultural context this statement gains another dimension. Due to 
Hobbes' well-known Leviathan, Sidney's statement appears much closer to 
the hypothetical state of nature theorem. Thus its rhetorical effect must be 
considered as a decisive one. The thesis of man's inability to live apart from 
the regulative mechanisms of the state thereby gains a strong emphasis. 
Opposed to the idea of the natural man is the idea of the good or virtuous man. 
He stands for the aim of the moral development of man. "An excess of virtue" 
"1 C O 
was superhuman, as Aristotle stated. By definition, man cannot achieve it. 
In the same way, Sidney states that a man of absolute virtue wil l never be 
found since "perfection is in God only". 
Following a rational principle implies acting in deliberate and goal-
orientated ways. Yet the premise for acting in this manner is education, which 
plays a principal role in the thought of the Greek philosophers as well as in 
Sidney's thought: "Neither by nature nor contrary to nature do the virtues 
arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made 
perfect by habit." 3 6 0 
Sidney, like Aristotle, made it clear that man is not born virtuous, but, 
rather, that he is born to become virtuous during life. The fact that we are not 
born virtuous gives us the initial liberty to behave in a vicious, unjust, and 
harmful manner towards our neighbours. Sidney's "natural man" acts upon 
this capability, as do Aristotle's humans governed by passion. Aristotle 
356 Discourses \\.\, 83. 
357 Discourses III.7, 357. 
3 5 8 Cf. above quotation and ENXJ-S. 
3 5 9 Discourses II. 1. 
360 EN 11, 1103a. 
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describes the "evil and unnatural condition" found in the nature of slaves,361 in 
barbarous nations, and in "mad men or children". Referring to children, 
Aristotle's statement has the connotation that such life conditions can only 
properly mark the starting point for development, but can never be a natural 
final state that would be the fulfilment of human nature. This natural 
fulfilment, however, can only be achieved by virtue of the innate human 
principle of reason that tends to human fulfilment. 
The aim implied is goodness; the way to achieve it and the result of having 
achieved it is to act in a way that is "wise, just and good". 3 6 3 Thus Sidney, 
after Plato and Aristotle, associates rationality with virtue. These statements 
concerning reason pinpoint the idea of virtue as it occurs in both thinkers' 
writings. Unlike Sidney, Aristotle gives a rather detailed account of his 
understanding of virtue by saying, "some of the virtues are intellectual and 
others are moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom 
being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral." 3 6 4 It goes without saying 
that perfect virtue encompasses both aspects of virtue in Sidney's as well as in 
Aristotle's text. Yet Sidney also expresses in accordance with Aristotelian 
principles a hierarchy among the conceptions of a virtuous life. Taking the 
excellence of intellectual virtues for granted, he makes it clear that life in 
society aims towards the attainment of a "sedate temper of mind" 3 6 5 which can 
be seen as a contemplative state resembling the Aristotelian "theoretical life", 
366 
which Aristotle finally values higher than all other forms of life. For Sidney 
this is the state which leaves behind the 'corrupted nature' of the natural man 
361 Politics 1.5, 1254b. 
3 6 2 Politics VII, 1323a. 
363 Discourses 1.20, 74. These are the characteristics for the good magistrate. They can be 
taken as representative for Sidney's idea of the virtuous man since he requires the greatest 
virtue in magistrates. 
364 EN I, 1103a. 
365 Discourses 11.1,83. 
3 6 6 £Ani41b3. 
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and appears as the highest achievable state. 
Looking for particular examples of a virtuous life, Sidney also names Plato 
and Socrates as "wise men following the light of nature". In this reference to 
the private life, he emphasises that abating "the lusts and passions that arise in 
the hearts of men [... raises] our hearts to the love of those treasures that perish 
not." 3 6 7 Here we find an admiration for the vita contemplativa which, thanks 
to the reference to Plato, allows the conclusion that Sidney deliberately 
follows this Ancient Greek concept. Unlike in Aristotle's philosophy, this 
highest form of being has distinct religious implications. The "sedate temper 
of mind" 3 6 8 is seen as a form of theoretical life striving to attain the nature of 
the spiritual man which is aimed to be renewed "through the spirit of 
grace".369 Hence a religious idea appears here in conjunction with the 
emphasis on the vita contemplativa. Sidney is not alone with this Platonic 
approach. John Milton also took the constant striving of man to regain the 
paradise lost as a moral challenge.370 A closer look at the ideas behind this 
aspect reveals the Platonic interpretation of Sidney's metaphysical and 
religious ideas, as the 'spiritual man' appears as a form of being that aims to 
•\-t i 
regain a former state. The state of contemplation, as interpreted, remains the 
highest form of being in Sidney's thought and the creation of opportunities for 
achieving it one of the principal roles that Sidney ascribes to the state. 
I f we consider Greek influences on the political dimensions of Sidney's 
idea of virtue, we are turned to Aristotle. A key idea in Sidney is that men are 
equal in nature, yet he still allows a hierarchy on the basis of political virtue, 
when he states, "equality continues t i l l virtue makes the distinction" 3 7 2. This 
367 Discourses 1.19, 67. 
368 Discourses 11.1,83. 
369 Discourses II.8, 23. 
3 7 0 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683, 218-9. 
3 7 1 Cf. in particular: Ibid., 214-20. 
3 7 2 Discourses 111.23, 453. 
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understanding of hierarchy, borrowed from the Ancient Greek world, is 
simply defined through the ability of political capacity in relation to the ends 
of society. As they are, according to Sidney, "defence, and the obtaining of 
justice", the persons excelling the rest of the people, are required to have 
"a mind, unbiased by passion, full of goodness and wisdom, firm against 
all the temptations to i l l , that may arise from desire of fear; tending to all 
manner of good, through a perfect knowledge and affection to it; and this to 
such a degree, that he or they have more of these virtues or excellencies 
than all the rest of the society, tho computed together".373 
The idea of military virtue has its main source in Roman Republican and 
Machiavellain thought. Sidney, being strongly influenced by Machiavelli's 
Discourses on Livy, found warfare crucial for the achievement of virtue. This 
idea was appealing to him for a number of reasons. Firstly, Sidney considered 
the old English aristocracy, to which he himself belonged, as a group of 
families who had initially obtained their social standing through the proof of 
military virtue in warfare, and thereby also through the proof that they were 
willing to subordinate their own good to the well-being of the whole nation. 
Secondly, Sidney considered the activity of warfare as a balancing force 
against the corrupting force a civil life has on the character. The 
inconveniences of a life of warfare, as Sidney believed, would maintain the 
individuals' appreciation for fundamental values rather than for decadent 
amenities. Thirdly, as stated in the biographical chapter, Colonel Sidney 
himself had experienced war during the Irish Revolt as well as during the civil 
war. While he seems to have experienced the difficulties of maintaining virtue 
during the Irish Revolt, he had also proven through his military success during 
the civil war that military virtue was not simply an abstract concept, but could 
3 7 3 Discourses 111.23, 453. 
3 7 4 Discourses 1.5, p. 18. 
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be translated into personal experience. In this light of such information about 
Sidney's life, it seems as i f his speaking for the value of military virtue meant, 
for Sidney, to express appreciation for his own experience and life. 
III.2.2 Liberty 
In Greek antiquity freedom or liberty did not exist as a distinct idea, yet a 
great deal of Sidney's understanding of it can be explained within the context 
of ancient Greek thinking. In the discussion of natural liberty, Sidney attacks 
Filmer. He rectifies the authorities who are misinterpreted by Filmer and 
names Plato, Arsitotle, Plutarch, Thudydides, Xenophon, Polybius in one 
breath as proponents of the "natural freedom of mankind" 3 7 4. Even i f we do 
not find liberty as a commonly used term in Greek philosophy, we do find the 
idea of self government. It finds its Greek equivalent in autarkia - which 
stands for an independence from external means and self sufficiency. In the 
Discourses, the aspect of popular sovereignty comprehends autarkia as well 
as the idea of military strength as a means to prevent foreign invasion. It may 
be said that the valour of armed citizens exists for the sake of maintaining 
independence from foreign nations. 
Another aspect of liberty we have encountered in the Discourses is the idea 
of self government. This idea has some similarities to the Greek idea of 
proheiresis. This term stands for the freedom and ability to decide. 
Proheiresis is the precondition for independent decision making. Thus Sidney 
picks up Aristotle's theory of the natural slave, but adjusts it for his own 
purposes. Sometimes it helps to understand Sidney's concept of liberty by 
looking at sections concerned with its absence: 
"Asiaticks and Africans, for being careless of their liberty, or unable to 
govern themselves were by Aristotle and other wise men called slaves by 
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nature, and lookes upon us little different as beasts. /This [...] has its root in 
375 
common sense [and ] reason." 
The phase most striking here is: "being careless of their liberty". It highlights 
both Sidney's aim to discredit all social and political structures built on a high 
limitation of liberty and his emphasis on individual human autonomy. The 
Discourses "concern" not only the issue of political "government", but also 
the issue of self-government, which is the ability to be responsible about 
liberty instead of careless as the slavish man is bound to be. As for the precise 
anthropological status of 'Asiaticks and Africans' to Sidney, it is fair to say 
that their state was not a primary concern to Sidney's anthropological theory, 
This is so even i f Sidney's utilisation of Aristotle in their regard is very 
significant to us today as an illustration of an early modern attitude to the 
'New World's' inhabitants. In highlighting self-government, Sidney echoes 
the Aristotelian principle of - proheiresis - a principle concerned with 
deliberate action and decision-making. The deliberation in the act of 
deciding appears as a moment in which the agent takes his freedom seriously 
by using his reason in order to act virtuously and in a manner appropriate to 
the temporary circumstances. As it is a deliberate act it looks like a principle 
which we relocate in Sidney's plea for the responsible handling of liberty. 
This similarity is clearer i f the situation of the slave is considered. The 
slave lacks precisely the ability of deliberate action and becomes therefore 
slave of his passions. The same is so with the natural man. Both examples of 
moral inferiority are characterised by their inability or lack of wi l l to make the 
most out of the freedom with which they are born. Aristotle's famous theory 
of the master and the slave gives a further example for these characteristics of 
375 Discourses 1.2, 9. In the seventeenth-century context, not many people had contact with 
slavery and savages, there were various examples for the use of the term slave to illustrate 
lack of virtue. Writings in literature, philosophy and Political theory content various 
examples. Due to this context, an adoption of the Aristotelian conception was at hand. 
3 7 6 £W 1113a. 
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human states, which is, in various forms, gratefully adopted in Sidney's 
theory. Being incapable of self-determination, the slave can only lead an 
adequate life i f he follows the voice of his master to compensate for his 
inability to follow the voice of his own reason. Sidney refers to the relation 
between master and slave as partially similar to the relation between King and 
subject, thus underlining the necessity that reason governs all and that the 
ruler himself behave with virtue. In several passages378 he discredits absolutist 
and arbitrary rule as slavish behaviour, so he shows that the tyrant is himself a 
"slave". Thus we already find in Sidney's Aristotelian anthropology 
intimations of his political theory. As the idea of the natural man already tells 
us of the limitations of government, the ideas of the virtuous man himself tells 
of the virtues required for just rule. 
III.2.3 Justice 
We can suppose, from Jonathan Scott's findings about Sidney's education, 
that our author was introduced to the Greek idea of dikaiosyne (derived from 
deik, which means something like state, manner, adequate, as well as right 
legal issue), a term, originally used for a Goddess, which became in Greek 
political philosophy the term for a divine universal norm. In the Republic, a 
text Sidney was particularly familiar with, Plato defines justice in the second 
book and classifies it as one of the four cardinal virtues. The religious 
implication still plays a role, yet the emphasis is on the ethical and legal 
implications of the term. While the three other virtues are allocated to the 
different classes within the state, or the different parts of the soul, Plato 
defines justice as superior, being the foundation of all other virtues. He states 
in Book IV that justice was everyone doing his due, or suum cuique 
tribuere, to allocate to each his own, as the idea is more famously known. 
377 Politics 1155b. 
3 7 8 Discourses 11.24. 
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Hence, he relates the idea of justice to the order of the state, which recurs in 
the Discourses as the idea of the good order. 
Aristotle, whose philosophy is seen by Sidney as closely related, inherited 
the idea from his master and devotes Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics to 
the discussion of justice. Naming justice as completed virtue or arete teleia, 
he follows Plato. Yet, unlike Plato, Aristotle sees justice as an idea covering 
all other virtues in regard of interpersonal relationships. He considers justice 
as one virtue among others and ascribes to it primarily juridical connotations. 
He looks at it in greater detail by dividing justice into corrective and 
distributive justice, a division we encounter in Sidney's political writings. 
While the former involves arithmetically equal distribution, the latter requires 
proportional distribution, that is to say giving everyone his due. It is justice 
in relation to the law and customs of the polis. This principle recurs in 
Sidney's idea of social structure. The idea of corrective justice governs 
Sidney's thoughts regarding equality before good and in the founding of 
political order. However, for the political philosophy of the ancients as well as 
for Sidney the idea of distributive justice is more important. The idea of 
justice as virtue is in the foreground. 
A further aspect of justice that links Sidney with the Ancient World is 
Natural Law. It comes into the discussion of justice in conjunction with the 
idea of teleology. This basic idea, which is related to the Classical Greek 
anthropology, is the principle behind Sidney's ideas as well. Although later 
influences such as Thomism and English early modern natural law theory 
played a part in shaping Sidney's ideas of natural law, the impact of the 
Ancient Greek ideas is still significant particularly because we have sufficient 
evidence that Sidney familiarised himself through reading the originals. In 
regard of the power of laws, Sidney follows Aristotle rather than Plato when 
he gives preference to the rule of laws rather than to the rule of an individual. 
3 7 9 Republic, IV, 433a. 
380 "jjjgf j j j e p r 0 p e r e n d of justice is to give to everyone his due;" Discourses 11.1,82. 
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In Book I I I of the Politics, Aristotle expresses his preference for the rule of 
law. 3 8 1 
II.3 The Polis and its influence 
III.3.1 Political architecture 
"[T]he various talents that men posess, may by good discipline be 
rendered useful to the whole, as the meanest piece of wood or stone being 
placed by a wise architect, conduces to the beauty of the most glorious 
building. But every man bearing in his own breast affections, passions and 
vices that are repugnant to this end, and no man owing any submission to 
his neighbour; none wil l subject the correction or restriction of themselves 
to another, unless he also submit to the same rule. They are rough pieces of 
timer or stone, which 'tis is necessary to cleave, saw, or cut: This is the 
work of a skillful builder, and he only is capable of erecting a great fabrick, 
who is so: Magistrates are political architects; and they only can perform 
T O T 
the work incumbent on them, who excel in political virtues." 
Sidney's political architecture, which we have already encountered in Chapter 
I I , leads us directly to the platonic influence. Chapter I L L of the Discourses 
tells us a lot about Sidney's understanding of politics as well as about the 
extent to which Sidney relies on Plato and Aristotle. The image Sidney creates 
by means of the above text reminds of Aristotle's idea that the state is to be 
considered a unity built out of manifold individual parts. 
1 Politics, III, 13, 1284 a 3-17. 
2 Sidney, Discourses II. 1, 83. 
3 Cf. Politics III. 1252a-1254b, 1276a- 1277a. 
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"The state comes into existence for the bare needs of life, and continues in 
existence for the sake of the good l i f e . " 3 8 4 
"The first step [towards] society is for many to join in one body, that 
everyone may be protected by the united force of all; and the various talents 
that men posess, may by good discipline be rendered useful to the whole, as 
the meanest piece of wood or stone being placed by a wise architect, conduces 
to the beauty of the most glorious building." 3 8 5 
The two statements above have one decisive similarity: it is the idea that, 
though the state begins in the establishment of protective order, this only 
marks one step in the process but does not stand for the ful l purpose of 
government. Such a purpose is to enable that good and virtuous life which is 
only possible - to use Sidney's words -in the "glorious political building" of a 
just state. In reference to the Ancient Greeks, Sidney states that governments 
are instituted as the result of people seeking "their own good". And he 
continues by paraphrasing a topos of Platonic philosophy, 
"for the wil l is ever drawn by some real good, or the appearance of it. 
This is that which man seeks by all the regular or irregular motions of his 
mind. Reason and passion, virtue and passion do herein concur, though they 
differ vastly in the objects, in which each of them thinks this good to 
consist."386 
The real good that men desire in their decision to set up a government is the 
aim of setting up a good government. The question whether a government is 
good or not is fundamental for Sidney's political thought in general. From all 
that we have discussed about Sidney in Chapter I I , it seems that he subscribes 
3 8 4 Aristotle, Politics. 
3 8 5 Sidney, Discourses II. 1, 83. 
386 Discourses 1.16,49. 
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to the Greek idea of a good government. Within this philosophical framework, 
a government is considered good, i f it allows the good life - eudamonia - and 
allots to everyone his right office and work. 
Seeing politics as a constructive science, as the above quotation suggests, 
which we have already looked at in Chapter II.4, is reminiscent of Plato's 
Politia. And it is not only the above quotation, but the whole section I I . 1 of 
the Discourses, which introduces the reader of the Discourses to the extent to 
which Sidney has imbibed platonic ideas. Key issues here are the nature and 
the purpose of political order, and the importance of virtue and justice as 
guiding principles. Apart from the relation between the constitution and the 
T 0 * 7 
good life, we have seen that Sidney places importance on stability. This 
aspect brings in an issue of neo-stoicism. The notion of virtue and constancy 
is particularly shaped by Lipsius de Constantia. Lipsius aimed to establish 
constancy as the "crown of the virtues". 3 8 8 Neo-Stoicism has in Sidney's 
theory a complementary function to the Aristotelian conception of virtue. 3 8 9 
Sidney also employs Aristotle as a source for asserting the natural liberty of 
man, 3 9 0 which implies that a people can choose their own government. Here, 
of course, his contractualism and the related idea of liberty become even more 
evident.391 The dependence of the actual form of the constitution on the wi l l of 
the nation is once again highlighted.3 9 2 
At this point, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics proves once again very 
revealing. Aristotle states about human nature: 
Cf. DiscoursesII.il, 137. 
Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651, 52. 
Cf. Justus Lipsius, De Constantia, trans. Florian Neumann (Mainz: Dietrichsche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1998).. Cf. e.g. 1.6, 40-42. 
Discourses 1.5, 18. 
Discourses II.5. 
Discourses II.6. 
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"There are three things which make men good and excellent; these are 
nature, habit and reason. In the first place, everyone must be born a man 
and not some other animal; so, too, he must have a certain character of both 
body and soul. But some qualities there is no use in having at birth, for they 
are altered by habit, and there are some gifts which by nature are made to 
be turned by habit to good or bad." 
More clearly than Sidney, Aristotle names the means that mould imperfect 
human nature to good and virtuous creatures: these are nature, habit, and 
reason. While the particularly human character of body and soul is due to 
nature, habit turns the natural gifts to good or bad. Reason, finally, is of 
paramount importance since it mainly comes into play as the source of self-
discipline,3 9 3 which frees the person's cultivation of virtue from continued 
dependence upon external education and laws. As we saw earlier, in Sidney's 
account of political virtue he considers self discipline as one of the key 
features of a magistrate. For Sidney, as for Aristotle, law represents reason 
and has a prerogative over reason due to its greater stability. As such it fosters 
the good life, by stimulating and sustaining good habits. By placing emphasis 
on the role of law both authors intend to leave the citizen more willing and, at 
the same time, more able to live virtuously through their own self-discipline. 
The well-being that is achieved by a perpetual process within the Aristotelian 
polis had been adapted into Sidney's idea of a God-pleasing virtuous life and 
is hence reflected in his political theory. 
For Aristotle, as well as for Sidney, man seems to be born in a kind of 
natural state. Yet in childhood habits develop which affect our ability to 
become virtuous as adults. The idea of the natural man as well as the reference 
to barbarous people show that the man who has not developed practical 
wisdom to rule himself may just naturally follow the untamed passions. 
Concerning the development of man and the relation to passion, Aristotle, for 
m Politics VII.13, 1332a-b. 
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example, is very explicit right at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Even well brought up young men should not bother to attend his lectures until 
their natural passions are controlled by practical wisdom and make them 
receptive enough for the theoretical side of ethical instruction.3 9 4 
Looking at Sidney's own personality, one may wonder to what extent he 
was in fact capable of governing himself appropriately, as he was well known 
for his hot temper. It would not be surprising i f this personal weakness made 
him particularly attentive to this issue of human development. Sidney's own 
experience of human moral weakness (see Chapter 1.1) made him believe that 
law was necessary to work against the frailty of man's character. The way he 
implements this idea in his theory reminds us of Aristotle again, who 
emphasises the educational function of law. He states it is "the intention of 
every legislator [...] to make their citizens good by habituation"395. In addition, 
he clarifies this idea by such statements as that the good man would be 
encouraged to act virtuously, "while a bad man, whose desire is for pleasure, 
is corrected by pain like a beast of burden."3 9 6 The aim of Sidney, like 
Aristotle, is to construct a theory conducive to the development of virtue in a 
political situation where people act virtuously in free wi l l rather than as a 
reaction to the fear of punishment.397 As Aristotle states, the truly virtuous 
man acts intentionally well because of his good nature, since goodness is not 
only an activity but primarily a state which is the cause of good activity. Since 
it is the innate idea of the state to "care for virtue", a state that cares only for 
the lawful behaviour of its citizens but not for the origin of this behaviour "is 
394 EN 1095a2. 
395 EN III, 1103b. 
396 ENX, 1179b-1180a. 
3 9 7 This concept of law and punishment goes together with the conviction that the individual is 
totally responsible for his actions. It goes together with Houston's statement that Sidney's 
conception of freedom was much more individualistic than that of Locke. Referring to 
Discourses 111.40, he claims that the natural freedom makes man very responsible for his 
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nothing but an alliance". 
It has been argued that liberty and virtue are constitutive for Algernon 
Sidney's political thought. The notion of virtue and constancy is particularly 
shaped by Lipsius de Constantia. Lipsius aimed to establish constancy as the 
"crown of the virtues".3 9 9 Neo-Stoicism has in Sidney's theory a 
complementary function to the Greek conception of virtue. 4 0 0 
"[T]he proper act of justice is to give to everyone his due; to man what 
belongs to man, and to God that which is God's. [...] [It is] impossible for 
any man to perform the part of a good magistrate, unless he have the 
knowledge of God; or to bring a people to justice, unless he baring them to 
the knowledge of God., who is the root of all justice and goodness. I f Plato 
therefore deserve credit, he only can duly perform the part of a good 
magistrate, whose moral virtues are ripened and heightened by a 
superinduction of divine knowledge."401 
Through this quotation, we gain insight into Sidney's attempt to blend his 
Platonism with his Christian principles. It becomes clear that the role of the 
magistrate is the highest and most responsible office Sidney presents, not only 
because the magistrate's knowledge of the principles of justice is outstanding, 
but also because he fulfils a quasi religious function. 
The ideal image of the magistrate, which is presented above, resembles 
Plato's philosopher king. His position is superior to all other classes within 
own actions (Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and 
America., 113). 
3 9 8 Accusing Sidney of proclaiming the need of virtue without providing a method of 
cultivating it, Houston describes Sidney's theory as intellectually unsatisfying (Ibid., 177). 
In the light of an Aristotelian interpretation this accusation has to be rejected, as the 
method of cultivating virtue is ascribed to the influence of law on human character. 
3 9 9 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651, 52. 
4 0 0 Lipsius, De Constantia, 1.6,40-2. 
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society because he has the task of overseeing the citizens' activities and 
allotting to everyone the task that is most suitable to his nature. This is what 
Sidney means by the statement, "that the various talents that men possess, 
may by good discipline rendered useful to the whole." 4 0 2 As we can deduce 
from these statements, Sidney fully subscribes to the Platonic approach of 
seeing the concept of justice realised in every detail of state and society. 
I f we recall Sidney's statement about the "beauty of the glorious building", 
we can understand that just as the "skilful builder" has to have an awareness 
for the final beauty of a building, so the magistrate - being the builder's 
equivalent - has to have an awareness of the ideal of justice. It is his task, in 
his political function, to be guided in all his activities by the knowledge of the 
ideal of justice, so that he may always find the right means to decide in 
particular situations. This knowledge, according to Plato, is the knowledge 
necessary for leading a fulfilled life. Justice is being achieved for the sake of 
happiness.403 
III.3.2 The good polis and Sidney 
Referring to Aristotle, Sidney states, 
"No law made by man can be perfect, and there must be in every nation a 
power of correcting such defects as in time may arise or be discovered. [...] 
And i f Aristotle deserve credit, the power of altering, mitigating explaining 
or correcting the laws of England, is only in the Parliament, because none 
but the Parliament can make them." 4 0 4 
Despite this stress on freedom of choice, Sidney's political conception has a 
401 Discourses 11.1,32-3. 
4 0 2 Dicsourses 11.1,83. 
4 0 3 Cf. Respublica. I, 344a, 347e. 
4 0 4 Discourses 111.22,451. 
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normative tone as he derives the necessity of a virtue-based system from the 
combination of liberty, equality and justice. From this compound it follows 
that liberty must be used responsibly. Clarifying this, Sidney sees that freedom 
of choice ought to result in virtue-orientated constitutional principles,405 as 
expressed in the following: "rational creatures would [not] advance one or a 
few of their equals above themselves, unless in consideration of their own 
good." 4 0 6 
However much this normative moment seems to predict the shape of the 
constitution, the theory still has a great flexibility concerning its concrete 
institutional structure. Sidney states, "political science [is most] variable 
according to accidents and circumstances."407 The key for this flexibility lies 
in the Aristotelian principle of virtue, or excellence. This idea implies that the 
virtue of every thing is its best state. For example, as a knife exists for the 
sake of cutting well, its best state is to do so. This teleological conception 
results in the following: since the state exists for the sake of the good and 
virtuous life, the state that fosters a good and virtuous life perfectly, is a good 
state. Owing to the various possible forms of both human character and 
changing circumstances that influence it, the actual best structure of a state is 
bound to depend on the principle of virtue, but be flexible in its actual 
institutional shape. Despite the requirement for general flexibility, Sidney 
does, nevertheless, express his preference for one form of government. For 
him, the form of government allowing the required flexibility is that of the 
mixed constitution 4 0 8 In this respect, his preference for Aristotelian political 
thought becomes evident once again. But here he is not unusual in the context 
of early modern constitutional thought. Fortescue had previously described the 
4 0 5 It is the idea of positive or classical liberty which comes into sight. Its nature is revealingly 
analysed in Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism. Even though Roman and Machiavellian 
origins are decisive, Arsitotelian origins also have a share in this concept.. 
4 0 6 Discourses 1.6, 21. 
407 Discourses 11.8, 121. 
*°* Cf. Discourses 1.10,31. 
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English constitution as mixed government. During England's troubles in the 
seventeenth century, Neville and Harrington, for example, followed this 
tradition. That Sidney is indebted to Aristotle for his preference of the mixed 
constitution is unquestionable and has often been discussed in writings on his 
thought. 
Looking at the relation between constitution and law, a similar situation 
occurs. It is true that there is a tendency in seventeenth-century constitutional 
thought to believe that a right constitution has to be based on the rule of law. 
This is not only a republican idea, but also a general thesis discernible in the 
thought of lawyers, that was already established in the 16 th century.410 It is 
Fortescue again who laid the foundation for this stream of thought and thereby 
stimulated a tendency to take up Aristotelian principles. Although magistrates 
have to "excell in all manner of virtue", deviations from this code can never 
be totally excluded.411 This is due to the instability of human nature.412 
Therefore the law plays a role as a remedy to minimise the unavoidable 
deviations and to sustain the virtue of the magistrate. Consequently the law is 
set above magistrates, even above kings. Here the Aristotelian idea appears 
that the good citizen has both to rule and to obey. This subjection to the law 
4 0 9 Worden, "Republicanism and the Restoration, 1660-1683," 56. 
4 1 0 Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society since 1450, 202-09. 
4 , 1 According to Houston, the fear of passion and arbitrary rule initiated Sidney's "Legalism" 
(Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America, 156-7. 
Due to the importance law has as a source of virtue in his Sidney's conception, it seems 
not totally adequate speak about legalism. Carrive, for example, draws the consequence 
that Sidney's thought lacks a theory to obligation (Carrive, La Pensee Politique D' 
Algernon Sidney, 1622-1683: La Querelle De L'absolutisme. which is wrong. Owing to 
Sidney's statements on rebellion it may seem as if Sidney does overlook the necessity of 
obligation. Yet, a closer look at the Discourses reveals, that the whole people is not 
obliged to continue obedience in a corrupted state, but that individuals are generally 
bound. Pacta servanda sunt!). This is of course exaggerated but illustrates that the rule of 
law is not stressed in a way that legalism would appear as a emphasised foundation of the 
theory. 
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holds even for those who hold tenure obligatorily, and their virtue is judged on 
their ability to do so will ingly. 4 1 3 
With Tacitus, Sidney shares an admiration for the Germans. While 
idealising their virtue may be considered one side of his admiration, the other 
side might be Sidney's understanding of the Germans as the ancestors of the 
Saxons and their nobility, whom he might have considered the root of his own 
family line. 4 1 4 Both have an appreciation for the importance virtue plays in the 
life of the Germans, and particularly as a principle of rulership. In Germania 
Tacitus hails values that are as much of Greek origin as the values that are all-
pervasive in Sidney's key concepts. Like Sidney, Tacitus had experienced 
political reality as a politician and not only as an observer. Both lived in a 
time that they perceived as corrupt and in which they frequently encountered 
the want of virtue in politicians as well as in citizens. The idealised Germans 
and particularly the Ancient Greeks served as an ideal against which to 
measure their own time. In the case of Sidney, the ancient Greek ideas of 
Aristotle provide the background for his assessment of his own time and the 
premises for the conclusions he drew for political reality. Accordingly he 
states: 
2 Discourses III. 
3 Politics 1277b. Following this interpretation, an apparent problem of coherency in 
Sidney's thought can be solved. Due to the lack of a - for instance Harringtonian - theory 
of education to virtue, he blames Sidney for presenting an incomplete theory of virtue 
(Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America, 177.). 
The above Aristotelian interpretation solves the problem in so far as a different concept of 
virtue lays the foundation. The decisive point in this respect is that the theory encompasses 
both: the classical concept of civic and the Aristotelian of moral virtue. 
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"virtue alone [.. .] ought to give pre-eminence. And as Aristotle, 
following the wise men of those times, shews us how far reason, improved 
by meditation, can advance in the knowledge and love of that which is truly 
good". 4 1 5 
As counter example to Filmer's thesis, Sidney advances in reference to 
Arisotle the idea that virtue is to be maintained for the sake of the "happiness 
for which governments are instituted".4 1 6 To sum up, the appreciation that 
Sidney shares with Tacitus amounts in his political system to the plea for a 
form of government that furthers the good life of the citizen in a broader sense 
than just protection and security; his approach clearly goes beyond an 
appreciation for military virtue. As a result, the telos of Sidney's ideal 
government is the good life of the citizens. 
4 1 4 Cf. Discourses III. 28, 490. 
415 Discourses 11.11, 134. 
4 1 6 Discourses 11.11, 133 
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IV Conclusion 
Among the responses to Filmer's absolutism, only Locke's Second Treatise 
on Government has attracted attention as an independent political theory. In 
the present thesis, this work has only played a minor role in the consideration 
of the context. Locke's Two Treatises serve in this respect simply as a contrast 
to Sidney's ideas so that we may see the unique character of the political ideas 
of the Discourses. Despite similarities between the starting point of the 
political thought of Sidney, James Tyrrell and John Locke, the unique 
character of Sidney's political thought has found little attention to date. 
Considering similarities in the anti-Filmerian writings, there are topics that 
suggest on first sight that Sidney's arguments are in line with Locke and 
Tyrrell. For example, like his fellow anti-Filmerians, Sidney uses the concept 
of the contract as one of the battlegrounds on which he challenges absolutism. 
Like Tyrrell and Locke, Sidney contests Filmer's argument for the original 
right of kingly sovereignty with the concept of initial liberty as an "original 
principle" of government. Likewise, he derives from this concept of liberty 
both the social contract and the necessity of establishing political order. These 
points are all imprinted on the nature of the Discourses through the discussed 
shape of Filmer's Patriarcha. Regardless of how important these points are to 
understand the context in which the Discourses developed, they do not lead to 
the core of Sidney's political thought. Rather one starting point of all three 
authors leads to the core of Sidney's political thought. This starting point is 
the mutual endeavour to reveal the original principles of government. In 
Sidney's case, these principles have been identified as the intellectual 
concepts of virtue, liberty, and justice as they form the foundation of Sidney's 
political thought. In the course of the discussion of these concepts, virtue 
ethics appeared as a governing principle in Sidney's thought that sets him 
apart from his contemporaries. 
The discussion of virtue as the key principle showed that Sidney builds his 
ideas around a normative idea of human nature. Differentiating between man 
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as he ought to be - virtuous man - and man as he is found in society, Sidney 
ascribes to the state a civilising function that ought to enable man to move 
from an unimproved natural state to a state of virtue. This idea of human 
nature marks his main difference from his contemporaries as it has 
implications for Sidney's ideas of political order. 
Considering the institutional shape Sidney is favouring, the key to 
understanding his uniqueness lies in the answer to the question of what in 
particular determined the value of a political order. This aspect gained 
significance in the discussion of the social contract. While Locke and also 
Hobbes - who may stand as an example for other contemporaries - see the 
primary tasks in developing political order as such, Sidney is concerned about 
the establishment of a particular political order that fits his values. 
To Sidney, it is not just the form that matters, but the question whether 
form and substance are in accordance. While Locke is anxious, and Hobbes 
even more so, that political order is established at all, Sidney's key question is 
whether a political order maintains liberty, provides justice and, above all, has 
a civilising effect on the citizens' moral development towards virtue. 
On the basis of the discussion of the above matters, it has been shown that 
there is a fair case to be made for the Greek influences on the developments of 
Sidney's concepts. Apart from the biographical reasons for Sidney's 
inclination towards the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, textual 
evidence confirmed that, in particular, Sidney's concept of virtue, his concept 
of justice and the metaphysical premises for his idea of human nature owe a 
great deal to the Greeks. This influence revealed itself as an intellectual 
context that allows an interpretation of the fundamental principles of Sidney's 
political thought. 
Regarding the relation between Ancient Greek moral and political thought 
and other influences on Sidney's political ideas, it may be said that it is 
important to pay particular attention to the Greek ideas as they allow us to see 
Sidney's political thought in a more holistic context. Instead of seeing the 
impact of various currents of thought on different aspects of Sidney's theory, a 
consideration of the Greek ideas allows us to understand the interaction a of 
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number of opposing ideas, such as the contract and virtue ethics, or the 
modern idea of liberty and the educating function of the state. 
This method of looking at implicit concepts of Aristotelian philosophy in 
Sidney's thought has proved a satisfactory one. Revealing the Aristotelian 
influence on Sidney has added to the variety of influences that are discernible 
in him by showing the links between Aristotle's and Sidney's thought. 
Although this approach has been limited to exploring the ideas of Aristotle in 
particular and to a limited extent those of Plato, it may still be taken up for 
exploring in greater detail some of the additional influences, which have 
hitherto similarly been noted, but so far have not undergone scholarly 
scrutiny. 
Although the limitation of the present study to the significance of ancient 
Greek concepts in the Discourse may not provide a definite answer to the 
question of what sort of republican Sidney really was, the research presented 
so far allows one at least to conclude that Sidney's fundamental principles 
suggest that he was favouring an order that allowed the virtuous to advance in 
the political hierarchy. The research on the nature of Sidney's concept of 
virtue and the intertwined concepts revealed what the further implications are 
of Sidney's account of virtue. We know that an idealised virtuous nobility is 
the group Sidney wants to see in power as long as it fulfils the purpose of 
running the state for the sake of the sound development of the people. Even i f 
those virtuous people were not to be selected from one particular group of 
society, his aristocratic idealism at least suggests that he considered men of 
Algernon Percy's standing and character, or himself, as some of the rare 
examples of those virtuous noblemen who would be prepared to burden their 
shoulders with the responsibility of political office that requires the people to 
be stimulated to live a life that does not neglect the endeavour to fulf i l their 
moral capacity. 
While it has already been revealed by Blair Worden that Sidney looked to 
politics "to raise men above beasts and to secure the victory of reason and 
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understanding over passion and w i l l " , 4 1 7 the present thesis enhances our 
understanding of the foundations of Sidney's thought through substantiating 
the above claim. The question of why Sidney was pleading for a political 
order in which "liberty is the path that leads men through virtue to wisdom" 4 1 8 
has been answered in consideration of the impact of Aristotelian concepts 
from the Nicomachen Ethics and Politics. The statement that Aristotle was the 
"fountainhead of the classical political inheritance,"419 had already indicated 
that an inquiry into the significance of Aristotelian ideas for republicanism is 
worthwhile. Jonathan Scott, for example, has emphasised that Sidney "took 
his basic political categories" from Aristotle, 4 2 0 but his argument does not 
place significant weight on exploring the relation between Aristotle's and 
Sidney's text. Conversely this thesis has explored the relationship between 
Sidney and Aristotle to lay open the reasons for, firstly, the lack of 
constitutional dogmatism which characterises Sidney's thought and allows 
him to be considered as an author whose political theory stretches beyond 
republicanism. Secondly, the present approach provides an explanation for the 
emphasis Sidney places on the moral purpose of the state through taking into 
account the teleological anthropology in the respect in which it is derived 
from implicit Aristotelian concepts present in Sidney's thought. 
4 1 7 Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon Sidney," 22. 
4 , 8 Ibid., 25. 
4 1 9 Worden, "English Republicanism," 445. 
4 2 0 Scott, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 29. 
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